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The Internet continues to grow in importance for service deliveries for businesses, gov-
ernment, and private entities (i.e. via social networks). Governments and businesses of all
sizes have reported that internet connectivity is crucial in their day-to-day operation. They
have also reported that they have been affected in some way by cyber attacks. Security
measures and policies are developed to counter known threats and risks. However there
may be unintended weaknesses in a security measure, or new previously unknown types
of attacks to which a security measure is vulnerable, or new Internet services and Internet
protocols for which security implications are not yet fully understood. A set of security
measures may hence be insufficient to provide a reliable assurance against attacks.
This highlights the importance of systems that can detect network intrusions, which is
the first step to respond to security incidents. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a
runtime security mechanism to detect malicious attempts at a system or a network. Much
research efforts are needed to devise effective and robust IDS. Current IDSes either lack
accuracy, reliability or speed such that attacks are mainly detected by a person rather than
by automated systems. As a consequence, attacks may remain undetected for a long time
or may be detected after damage has already been done. One hypothesis in this thesis is
that the problem with IDS is in part due to a lack of better understanding of relationships
between normal and attack behaviours. A second hypothesis in this thesis is that many
current approaches to IDS are highly specialized and may hence not be sufficiently robust
to changes in protocols, network services, and attack patterns. A third hypothesis in this
thesis is that some current approaches to IDS are not sufficiently scalable to allow real-
time or just-in-time detection of attacks.
This thesis proposes and investigates a neural network ensemble approach to IDS that
consists of a High Resolution Self-Organising Map (HRSOM) and a classifier such as
MLP or Fully Recursive Neural Network (FRPN). To our knowledge, this is the first
HRSOM and FRPN applications for IDS. The HRSOM is used for the projection of data
such that relationships between attack and normal patterns can be identified via visual
inspection. It will be found that the mappings of an HRSOM show the rationale of com-
mon IDS strategies and highlight feature spaces where a high degree of confusions occur.
The HRSOM thus identifies situations where failure to detect attack samples or failure to
correctly classify samples are more likely. The thesis also devises an alternative method
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to obtaining HRSOMs by using a Trilinear interpolation method. The scaling method is
shown to improve the mapping quality. The projections of the HRSOM are also used to
assist the classifier in the ensemble. It is found that it is best to use trained HRSOMs
rather than scaled HRSOMs.
The methods are evaluated on multiple IDS benchmark data sets. It will be shown
that HRSOMs provide a much more detailed insight into the relationships of data and
data clusters than traditional SOMs, and that the mappings of HRSOMs are better at
supporting the classifier in modeling the data and in generalizing to new samples. The
thesis will also find that FRPNs produce better results than traditional approaches based
on MLP. The proposed method is shown to be both robust and scalable while at the same
time providing an explanation facility via the mappings of the HRSOM. It is demonstrated
that the proposed approach can serve as a general framework to IDS.
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Thesis contribution
1. This is the first application of an NN ensemble method involving very recently de-
veloped High Resolution Self-Organising Map (HRSOM) [1] and Fully Recursive
Perceptron Network (FRPN) [2] to IDS.
2. HRSOM capabilities are investigated in this thesis. We examined its capability
as a visualisation and clustering tool. The thesis demonstrates that the HRSOM
is effective in visualising intricate, previously unknown details about network log
data. The HRSOM is also shown to improve over its lower resolution counterparts
on multiple metrics and across different large datasets.
3. A visualisation component to IDS has been proposed in previous works [3, 4, 5,
6, 7]. However, it is often proposed as another layer of interpretation from the de-
tection system outputs. The HRSOM component for IDS proposed in this thesis
alleviates the need to implement another middle layer. The visualisation of new un-
known sample is instantly visible on the mapping space. System administrators can
feasibly use HRSOM directly as a dashboard as well as pre-processor for detection.
4. Further understanding in the domain is obtained through HRSOM visualisation.
There are two main intuitions in IDS: (1) attacks can be detected using previously
found attack patterns [8] and (2) deviation from normal behaviour may indicate
an attack attempt [9]. The HRSOM provides visualisation on how these intuitions
are realised on benchmark data. Normal patterns in IDS tend to create large well-
formed clusters, which confirm the intuition about how normal patterns would be
uniform. However, given a large enough mapping space, the normal patterns are
often found to be organized in multiple clusters or sub-clusters rather than in a
single large cluster. Attack behaviour is thought to deviate from the normal one
such that it would have been mapped separately from the normal samples. Similar
attack types are also thought to be similar and mapped together. The HRSOM
mapping not only shows how these intuitions about the attack samples materialise
but also provides insights on how attack and normal cases relate, and where samples
classifications are more likely to be confused. The gaps between normal clusters
indicate potentially vulnerable attack pathways as in some cases attack patterns are
mapped in these gaps.
5. A tool to describe an identified detection resolves the black-box problem in NN
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approaches to IDS. Insurance and regulation are necessary in cyber security as an
external deterrence. The ability to explain the implemented security mechanism
is crucial to lower premiums and as a proof compliance. IDS have a traceable
requirement on its detection results which can be difficult to achieve when using
NN black-box approaches. The HRSOM mapping shows where a sample is mapped
in context to other cases to further explain an NN result.
6. The proposed HRSOM encourages better generalisation by identifying areas of
high confusion. Approaches to IDS have a generalization requirement such that
they can detect attack samples not previously found in the training phase of a model.
This thesis uses the mappings of a HRSOM to augment samples before training a
classifier. This allows a classifier to focus the learning effort on cases where the
error rate would otherwise be high. The HRSOM is thus used as a pre-processor
in a neural network ensemble. It is shown that the approach matches and exceeds
the performance of Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) in accuracy while being
much simpler in architecture.
7. The approach described in this thesis has been empirically shown to be a general
framework for the development of IDS. It performed well against three large IDS
benchmark datasets ( KDD99 dataset, CTU-13 dataset, and UNSW-NB15 dataset)
as well as on a dataset from a related domain (viz. Microsofts malware recognition
dataset). No other method has yet been demonstrated to consistently perform at
state-of-the-art level on such a broad spectrum of IDS benchmark problems.
8. The proposed ensemble system is entirely data driven and is shown to have excel-
lent generalization capabilities that extend to previously unknown attack samples.
9. A computational efficient alternative to achieving HRSOM is proposed in this
thesis. The method is analysed and is found useful for improving the visualization
capability of a HRSOM.
10. For the first time a FRPN is deployed as a classifier in IDS. It is shown that
FRPNs produce better results than MLPs while being much simpler in structure
and requiring much less network parameters than an MLP counterpart. The FRPN
is thus found to be a computationally efficient alternative to MLPs (that are often
considered for IDSs) and to be a robust method that performed well on a spectrum
of IDS benchmark problems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Neural networks have shown to work very well in a wide range of learning problems,
example range from hand writing recognition [22], financial forecasting [23], and even
cancer diagnosis [24]. It has been shown to generalise across different learning problems
is a sought out trait in cyber security. This thesis considers the learning problems asso-
ciated with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), and how a Kohonen’s Self-Organising
Map (SOM) can improve the understanding of the problem domain, and, subsequently,
improve the detection rate.
Cyber security continues to be a topic of much concern both in research and practice
owing to reports of large data breaches in big corporate entities, for example, Yahoo!, De-
loitte, Sony, SWIFT banking network, Anthem Health Insurance and Target. Yahoo! is an
information technology based company that provides internet search services, email ser-
vices and a content publishing platform. It was purchased in 2017 by Verizon for US$350
million, a significant decrease from the original offer, due to two massive breaches prior
to settlement [25]. On two separate occasions intruders had successfully obtained sensi-
tive user information illegitimately from the information systems of the company. Yahoo!
reported in July 2016 a massive breach that occurred two years prior and which had ex-
posed over 500 million user account information including passwords [26]. A separate
data breach was reported later that same year, which had occurred in 2013 [27].
Deloitte, one of the largest accounting firms, reported to have discovered a cyber attack
in early 2017 [28, 29, 30]. Deloitte admitted to not fully know the extent of the breach
but its staff and clients sensitive information were accessed, including those pertaining to
the U.S. Government [28]. The intruder was believed to have access to its systems since
October or November 2016 [28, 29, 30].
Sony Corporation and its subsidiaries had suffered several public security breaches over
the years, such as Sony Play Station Network (PSN) in 2011 [31] and again in 2014 [32]
as well as Sony Pictures and Entertainment in the same year [33]. The PSN 2011 attack
was caused by an external intrusion that resulted in extended period of outage and 77
million user accounts disclosure [31]. The PSN 2014 attack also caused service outage
1
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and affected its competitor, Microsoft’s XBox Live [32]. The intrusion to Sony Pictures
and Entertainment in 2014 caused disclosing a number of sensitive internal emails [33].
These breaches had been estimated to cost over US$100 million per incident [34, 35].
In some instances, security breaches continued to be occurring despite a prior dis-
covery. For example, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunica-
tion (SWIFT) banking network suffered a security breach in 2015 and 2016 respectively
caused by the same attacker as the 2014 Sony Pictures and Entertainment incident [36, 37,
38]. The attack was reported from the Central Bank of Bangladesh with US$81 million
stolen. A dozen other banks revealed to have been affected by the same attacker [39].
The health care industry has been experiencing security intrusion as well. For example,
a medical insurance company Anthem Inc. experienced a security breach in 2015. The
reported intrusion exposed approximately 800 million customer records, which contained
personal identifiable information [40, 41]. The company paid US$115 million to settle
the lawsuit following the breach [42].
The Target Corporation, a U.S. based retail company, suffered a security breach costing
US$148 million [43]. Approximately 40 million payment cards and 70 million customer
personal information records were disclosed [44, 45]. Target was found to have ignored
early signs of the intrusion [46, 47, 48]. The particular alert trace was not followed up
immediately because the intrusion detection system flagged a high volume of potential
alerts on any given day [46, 47, 48].
These security breach events are a few of the many more examples where security
goals were breached resulting in the disclosure of data to an unauthorised party [49].
Security goals are defined as preserving the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
the information assets and resources [50, 51], whereas a security policy is a document
that defines clearly and concisely the mechanisms to achieve the security goals, such as
the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) security policy model [52]. An access control policy is one
of the measures included in the BLP. It defines which actor can access what asset and
how. There are many other security policies that target software development [52, 53],
standards for cryptography devices [54, 55], and the system as a whole [56, 57, 58, 59]. If
an unauthorised party attempts and becomes successful in violating a security policy then
an intrusion has occurred. The set of all security mechanisms that are required to enforce
a security policy is called Trusted Computing Base (TCB) [60].
The growing rate of connectivity, reduced communication latency, and increasing net-
work speeds of systems through the internet increase attack vectors and the ease of at-
tacks [61, 62]. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport in the United
Kingdom found that almost all businesses they surveyed in 2018 are reliant on online ser-
vices, in which 43% of them experienced a cyber security breach or attack in 2018 [63].
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner commented on the Verizon Data
Breach Investigation, reported in 2018 that breaches do not only affect the information
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sector but also the health care, the financial, and the public sectors [49, 64].
It is likely that the frequency and severity of security breaches continue an upward trend
in the coming years based on a report by the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) which
observed an approximate 40% increase in security breaches annually since 2015 [65, 66].
Such observation provides a motivation for the development of stronger security methods
and more accurate and responsive early warning systems. The TCB needs to consist of
security measures where they can be most effective. This can require a break with the
traditional view of keeping the TCB as small and as simple as possible [60].
Apart from the ever increasing number of cyber attacks, there are increasing sophistica-
tion in the methods deployed in the attack. A highly motivated adversary with sufficient
resources could find ways to circumvent security mechanisms. There are many attack
strategies infiltrating an information system. For example, previously a favourite method
of direct attack is through brute-force password cracking techniques [67, 68, 69, 70]. This
prise on the unsuspected users, who, used simple and easy to guess passwords to their user
accounts. One way of minimizing the effect of such attacks is to enforce strong password
mechanism, in which an acceptable password must be longer than, say, 10 characters,
must include non alpha-numeric characters, and must not use any word which resembles
one of the words which can be found in a dictionary [70]. This together with a maximum
number of unsuccessful attempts, before the login session is being locked out, and the
enforcement of regular password changes, appear to have minimized the risk of direct
brute-force attacks. However, a more recent attack to achieve similar effect is “phish-
ing”, in which an unsuspected user is convinced to provide details of its user account, and
password, through the mechanism of unsolicited emails, including, a link to an external
website, and request the user to click on it for authentication or assent purposes [71, 72,
73, 74]. Alternatively, a bogus website, that is very similar to the user’s frequently visited
websites, can be used to obtain the user login details. From such “phishing” mechanisms,
an external attacker may gain access to the user account, and may be able to use this
information to further penetrate into the targeted information system. Such infiltration
could lie low for months, and slowly attack and transmit sensitive information to external
personnel.
Such change of attack strategies is typical of cyber attackers. This increasing sophis-
tication in attack strategies causes renewing challenges in knowing how to analyze the
incoming and outgoing information intercepted at various levels, in the communication
switches in the information systems. The most important switch in an information system
is the border router, in which all incoming and outgoing traffic must go through. Inter-
nally within a border router, there are many switches, e.g., zone switches, if the internal
system is divided into zones, floor switches, and access switches. Therefore, the inter-
nal switches within a border router can be modelled as a graph, in which there are links
(connections) and nodes (switches). Representing the information systems into graphs
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or other notations may provide visualisation to better understand how security violation
occurs and what damage could be done [75, 76, 77, 78].
This kind of modelling effort tend to be manually generated by human experts, although
automatic methods had been proposed to ease the process [79, 80, 81, 82]. Model-driven
security in this context would be most useful at the design phase, especially to identify
which security mechanism should be put in place. However, it is very difficult to antic-
ipate every possible security weaknesses. Moreover, the information in the nodes, and
the link connections could change with respect to time. Therefore, a full fledged analytic
model of security would be one which consists of spatial-temporal graph models, possibly
of the entire internet, as the attack could come from almost anywhere in the world. Such
complex models would be impossible to analyze, or study.
In this thesis, we are interested in the intrusion detection problem, i.e., is it possible
to detect intrusion to the information system under study, from the information which
arrived from various nodes in the internet.
1.1 Motivation
The majority of security breaches is from outside perpetrators, which made around 20-
40% of the reported incidents [49, 63, 64]. Other major causes are human errors or by
inside actors [49, 63, 64]. A 2018 survey in the UK found that businesses that allow staff
to use personal devices at work are more likely to be affected by security breaches or
attacks [63]. However, the number of cases involving internal actors have not changed in
the past two years as reported in [49].
Interestingly, the causes of security incidents have not changed significantly over recent
years. Denial of Service (DoS) still appears as the most common type of attack as of
2018 [49]. Privilege abuse, such as user-to-root patterns, according to the same report,
is one of the most common attack vectors. These types of attack were reported to have
occurred as far back as 1999 [11].
These breaches are not necessarily caused by the lack of interest or lack of investment
in cyber security. All businesses understood the importance of cyber security when sur-
veyed in 2018 [63]. The average investment in cyber security by firms in the last financial
year of the survey was £3,580 [63]. The enterprise “Target” was found to be compliant
to the Payment Card Industry (PCI) standard and to have deployed an IDS. Despite being
compliant to industry standards they became the subject of a serious security breach inci-
dent [48]. The pace of technological progress makes it difficult to keep up with security
measures. Increasingly sophisticated attacks are emerging due to strong financial moti-
vations. Another problem for intrusion detection systems is that human interaction with
networked systems can introduce anomalies that appear as false positives [83, 84, 85, 86].
A system that flags too many false positives makes it harder for an operator to identify the
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true positives as was the case with “Target” [46].
Detecting an intrusion is a first step in recognizing, responding and recovering from
security attacks. However, currently available Intrusion Detection System (IDS) imple-
mentations are not sufficiently effective. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media,
and Sport in the United Kingdom reported 57% of the most disruptive breaches in 2017
were identified by human individuals rather than by automated software [63]. Verizon
reported that the time from intrusion to being compromised was measured in minutes and
yet discovering them often takes months [49].
Understanding attack patterns and how these relate to normal behaviour may be the
key to devise better detection approaches. The general assumption that attack and normal
behaviours are very different may not be valid as evident by the high false alarm rate
reported [87, 88, 89, 48]. A main motivation of this thesis is to understand where intrusion
can easily be misidentified and to improve on their detection.
1.2 Research Problem
Seminal work by D. E. Denning proposed a general purpose framework for real-time sys-
tem security called Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) [9]. The work is motivated
by discoveries of abnormal user behaviours in log files. The framework is a rule-based
system determined from user behaviour statistical models. A profile of normal user be-
haviours is established. The profile is updated for observed activities and checked against
the statistical model for possible deviant behaviours. If an abnormal behaviour is detected,
a flagging of an anomaly record is triggered. This anomaly-based IDS is an evolution from
the misused-based IDS, where system activities are monitored and log then an intrusion
is detected by matching a log entry to a list of possible attack patterns [8].
Anderson discussed the limitations with current implementations of IDS [84, 90]. Fun-
damentally, the limitation of IDS comes from the fact that there are security failures that
cause errors and security failures that do not. Given the right processing of the available
data, security failure that causes an error can be detected. However, some security fail-
ures may not cause errors, e.g., confidentiality failure caused by shoulder-surfing a [84].
Noise, such as bad packets generated from software bugs, corrupt DNS (domain name
server) data, and local packets, can raise the false-alarm rate which can severely limit the
effectiveness of IDS [84]. The number of real attacks and the number of false-alarms
are often disproportionate. Number of real attacks is often so far below the number of
false-alarms that real attacks are easily missed or ignored [84, 87, 88, 89]. In dealing
with evolving adversaries misuse-based IDS may miss new emerging threats or attack
vectors [84]. On the other hand, anomaly-based IDS may generate more false positives
aAn adversary looking over a victim’s shoulder to obtain password, personal identification number, and
other confidential data
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as atypical behaviour may not be indicative of maliciousness [9].
IDS problem can be considered as a learning problem, where it has to model the net-
work environment based on historical data to classify normal and attack patterns. Note
this network model is different from the spatial graph model mentioned earlier. The model
generated from a learning algorithm is more akin to the statistical model described in [9].
There are a few unique learning approaches to IDS. A general assumption underlying
these approaches is that attack patterns occur rarely. Common benchmark problems and
benchmark datasets hence tend to skew towards normal samples. The generalisation ac-
curacy demand on IDS application is high as new never-seen-before attack patterns can
occur in a live system. There are behaviours which are easily confused, such as infrequent
behaviour from legitimate users or stealth attack patterns to avoid detection.
Therefore, the research problems for this thesis investigated are the following:
• R1: Gain deeper insights into the domain knowledge of IDS especially where con-
fusions are likely to occur.
• R2: Investigate in a robust data driven IDS that generalises well.
• R3: Develop a general IDS framework that works on multiple environments.
1.3 Approach Overview
Visualisation has been proposed for obtaining a better understanding of secure sys-
tems [75, 76, 77, 78]. These methods define use-state-diagrams (called influence
diagram) to help identify vulnerabilities in a TCB. A problem with these state diagrams
is that at design time it can be difficult to anticipate exceptions from user interactions.
Users may deviate from the prescribed system because it is necessary to their work [86].
Moreover, deviations from the states in the influence diagram may identify unintended
activities which may not always lead to a breach of the system [86]. It is thus considered
appropriate to perceive these methods as a type of improvisation or a form of informal
exceptional handling methods [86]. Deviation of activities that poses a threat from
activities that pose no threat to the system could be very small [86, 91]. As observed in
the case of large volume of anomaly logs from commercial systems [92, 93, 94, 95, 96,
97, 98], it may lead to overwhelmingly ominous task for a human being to go through
them and to discern what might be the real attack, and what might be false alarms. A
runtime visualisation tool is a step toward understanding this complex relationship and
devising better detection systems.
This thesis proposes to analyse network activity log data through visualisation with
the aim of finding relationships between attack and normal cases. Towards this end, the
thesis proposes the utilization of a data driven dimensionality reduction method based on a
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particular type of neural networks, called Kohonen’s Self-Organising Map (SOM). Recent
research on self-organizing maps introduced the concept of a high resolution SOM (High
Resolution Self-Organising Map (HRSOM)) [1]. The HRSOM claims to reveal intricate
relationships among high dimensional data [1]. This thesis investigates the suitability of
HRSOM for detecting relationships between attack and normal cases in network activity
logs, and its suitability to serve as a basis for an IDS.
The Kohonen’s Self-Organising Map (SOM) is a popular visualisation tool due to its
topology preserving properties [21]. In other words, any two features which are close
topologically in the high dimensional feature space will stay close when they are pro-
jected to low dimensional display space. This property is very useful in the context of
analysing network activity logs. Each instance of the log can be considered as a feature in
the high dimensional feature space. Thus, if two log instances are close to one another in
the high dimensional space, they will remain to be close when being projected to the low
dimensional display space. What this means is that for activity logs, even if an attacker
attempts to mimic the normal case by making the attack close to normal occurrence in-
stances, when they are being projected onto a low dimensional display space, they will
remain close even though they are representing two different classes, one normal, and one
abnormal. Other classification techniques, might not permit such rapid visualization of the
differences between the two classes, normal and abnormal. The SOM training algorithm
projects high dimensional input vectors onto a lower dimensional, often 2-dimensional,
display space. The quality of the mapping is correlated to the number of neurons in
the display space. The HRSOM extends the concept through algorithmic optimizations
that allow the creation of large and finely granulated display spaces. The large mapping
space allows intricate and complex relationships between attack and normal patterns to
be maintained in the projection. It is suggested that accurate mappings can be leveraged
to improve the accuracy of detection in Intrusion Detection Systems.
A primary goal is to work towards a system that can reliably detect attacks in real-time
so that appropriate responses can be initiated promptly and before any harm is done to
the system. As a first stage of defence, the general problem of IDS can be reduced to a
binary classification problem. Activities are to be categorized into attack (positive) cases
and normal (negative) cases. A secondary stage of IDS would be to identify the type of
attacks. Intrusion can be achieved by a number of different attack patterns, such as denial
of service (DOS), malware, port scanning, and many others. This thesis considers the
categorization of network activities a (machine-)learning problem.
Recent applications of machine learning algorithms in IDS have shown some very
promising results [3, 5, 7, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,
111]. However, due to the black box nature of many machine learning algorithms, there
is little understanding on the obtained results. This can be problematic when claiming
insurance or to prove in a court of law that the breach is not due to negligence [112].
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This thesis will find that the HRSOM helps to obtain some valuable insights to assist in
improving the detection rate while keeping false positive rates low. This thesis proposes to
augment network activity information with these insights and then to model the data with
the help of a perceptron based learning algorithm. This effectively creates a two layered
ensemble method consisting of a HRSOM in the first layer and a perceptron based classi-
fication system in a second layer. Towards this end, the thesis investigates the suitability
of Multi-Layer Preceptron (MLP) and Fully Recursive Perceptron Network (FRPN) as
a classifier in this ensemble. The MLP is a well known machine learning method that
simulates and trains artificial neurons (called perceptrons) that are organized in layers.
It was found in recent years that MLPs with a large number of hidden layers often out-
perform MLPs with fewer hidden layers. This observation gave rise to a research area
known as deep learning. The problem with deep MLPs is that finding an optimal network
architecture is non-trivial [2, 113]. A recent publication introduced the concept of a Fully
Recursive Perceptron Network (FRPN) which claims to simulate arbitrarily deep MLPs
but without using many hidden layers [2]. The FRPN consists of a pool of neurons instead
of layers. This makes the definition of the network architecture trivial. Hence, this thesis
considers the FRPN to investigate the deep architectures suitability in the ensemble.
Given the good results from using HRSOM this thesis introduces a new method that al-
lows the generation of ultra high resolution self-organizing maps (UHRSOM) at very low
computational costs. The method uses an interpolation technique to efficiently estimate
the mappings of data on a UHRSOM. The thesis then investigates whether such increased
resolutions are helpful for further improving insights and accuracies.
The proposed methods are evaluated on three different IDS benchmark datasets. These
are publicly available datasets, which are; (1) KDD99 dataset, (2) CTU-13 dataset, and
(3) UNSW-NB15 dataset. It is found that the proposed ensemble IDS performs at least as
good as the best methods published in recent literature. More importantly, the best meth-
ods in recent literature are specialized systems for only one benchmark problem whereas
the proposed method produces good results on all of the considered benchmark problems.
The thesis will also show that the proposed method can perform IDS in real timeb and
that it has good generalization capabilities that extend to the detection of previously un-
seen new types of attacks. Therefore, the proposed method can be considered a general
framework for IDS.
bThis is assuming that the ensemble model has already been trained offline, and it is used for the clas-
sification of data which were not used in the training process. The classification can be performed in real
time.
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1.4 Thesis Contribution
The research presented in this thesis contributes to further understanding of domain
knowledge for Intrusion Detection System and to the state-of-the-art of Neural Network
(NN) application in IDS. Intuitions about normal and intrusion behaviours are confirmed
as well as novel insights are obtained. The thesis devises a general IDS framework
with visualisation and explanatory capabilities. The classification system results can
be explained with the visualization results of the HRSOM. The thesis evaluates the
proposed approach on multiple well established datasets. Moreover the thesis introduces
a computationally very efficient algorithm to obtaining ultra high resolution projections
to allow the display of intricate relationships among the data.
The contributions of this thesis can be summarised as follows:
1. This is the first application of an NN ensemble method involving very recently de-
veloped High Resolution Self-Organising Map (HRSOM) [1] and Fully Recursive
Perceptron Network (FRPN) [2] to IDS.
2. HRSOM capabilities are investigated in this thesis. We examined its capability
as a visualisation and clustering tool. The thesis demonstrates that the HRSOM
is effective in visualising intricate, previously unknown details about network log
data. The HRSOM is also shown to improve over its lower resolution counterparts
on multiple metrics and across different large datasets.
3. A visualisation component to IDS has been proposed in previous works [3, 4, 5,
6, 7]. However, it is often proposed as another layer of interpretation from the de-
tection system outputs. The HRSOM component for IDS proposed in this thesis
alleviates the need to implement another middle layer. The visualisation of new un-
known sample is instantly visible on the mapping space. System administrators can
feasibly use HRSOM directly as a dashboard as well as pre-processor for detection.
4. Further understanding in the domain is obtained through HRSOM visualisation.
There are two main intuitions in IDS: (1) attacks can be detected using previously
found attack patterns [8] and (2) deviation from normal behaviour may indicate
an attack attempt [9]. The HRSOM provides visualisation on how these intuitions
are realised on benchmark data. Normal patterns in IDS tend to create large well-
formed clusters, which confirm the intuition about how normal patterns would be
uniform. However, given a large enough mapping space, the normal patterns are
often found to be organized in multiple clusters or sub-clusters rather than in a
single large cluster. Attack behaviour is thought to deviate from the normal one
such that it would have been mapped separately from the normal samples. Similar
attack types are also thought to be similar and mapped together. The HRSOM
mapping not only shows how these intuitions about the attack samples materialise
but also provides insights on how attack and normal cases relate, and where samples
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 10
classifications are more likely to be confused. The gaps between normal clusters
indicate potentially vulnerable attack pathways as in some cases attack patterns are
mapped in these gaps.
5. A tool to describe an identified detection resolves the black-box problem in NN
approaches to IDS. Insurance and regulation are necessary in cyber security as an
external deterrence. The ability to explain the implemented security mechanism
is crucial to lower premiums and as a proof compliance. IDS have a traceable
requirement on its detection results which can be difficult to achieve when using
NN black-box approaches. The HRSOM mapping shows where a sample is mapped
in context to other cases to further explain an NN result.
6. The proposed HRSOM encourages better generalisation by identifying areas of
high confusion. Approaches to IDS have a generalization requirement such that
they can detect attack samples not previously found in the training phase of a model.
This thesis uses the mappings of a HRSOM to augment samples before training a
classifier. This allows a classifier to focus the learning effort on cases where the
error rate would otherwise be high. The HRSOM is thus used as a pre-processor
in a neural network ensemble. It is shown that the approach matches and exceeds
the performance of Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) in accuracy while being
much simpler in architecture.
7. The approach described in this thesis has been empirically shown to be a general
framework for the development of IDS. It performed well against three large IDS
benchmark datasets ( KDD99 dataset, CTU-13 dataset, and UNSW-NB15 dataset)
as well as on a dataset from a related domain (viz. Microsofts malware recognition
dataset). No other method has yet been demonstrated to consistently perform at
state-of-the-art level on such a broad spectrum of IDS benchmark problems.
8. The proposed ensemble system is entirely data driven and is shown to have excel-
lent generalization capabilities that extend to previously unknown attack samples.
9. A computational efficient alternative to achieving HRSOM is proposed in this
thesis. The method is analysed and is found useful for improving the visualization
capability of a HRSOM.
10. For the first time a FRPN is deployed as a classifier in IDS. It is shown that
FRPNs produce better results than MLPs while being much simpler in structure
and requiring much less network parameters than an MLP counterpart. The FRPN
is thus found to be a computationally efficient alternative to MLPs (that are often
considered for IDSs) and to be a robust method that performed well on a spectrum
of IDS benchmark problems.
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 gives background knowledge in IDS,
how it fits in the overall security mechanisms and why machine learning algorithm is ap-
plicable in the field. Chapter 3 discusses related machine learning approaches to IDS.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 11
Chapter 4 describes the proposed HRSOM ensemble IDS in detail. Chapter 5 describes
the evaluated datasets. Chapter 6 discusses the result of the proposed HRSOM ensemble
IDS, including comparison to the results obtained in the recent literature. Chapter 8 pro-
vides the proposed scaling method to adjust the resolution of the trained SOM. Chapter 9
provides concluding remarks before discussing future work in Chapter 10.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems
The security goals aim to preserve the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of the
information resources and assets [50, 51]. Availability is about the ability to access assets
and resources to legitimate users and preventing unauthorized destruction, denial of ac-
cess or service. Confidentiality is about only allowing authorised access or disclosure of
information assets and resources. Lastly, integrity is the assurance of the trustworthiness
and accuracy of the information.
There are methodologies available to provide security assurance at design time, such as
ensuring best practices are followed by formulating and enforcing an appropriate security
policies. Unfortunately, identifying and anticipating every possible security threats are
no easy feat. The main challenges of security design are summarised into : connectivity,
extensibility, and complexity [61, 62]. Internet connectivity has become crucial to most
organisations and creates an increased exposure to security threats [63]. Outside intrusion
is most commonly perpetrated through internet connected services [63, 64, 66].
The currently available security best practices would have been effective to prevent
previously known attack methods but not necessarily prevent future attacks. Over half of
surveyed businesses in 2018 followed government cyber security guidance, but breaches
still occur [63]. Furthermore, the cyber security guidance has to keep up with the rapid
rate of technological progress given that most systems are designed to be extensible.
Extensibility of a system refers to the ability to accept add on features or code so that
the system’s functionality can evolve [61, 62]. However, the extension may introduce
vulnerabilities to the system as added functionalities may not immediately be captured by
a given security policy or affected by the implemented TCB. Any applicable extension and
update introduces uncertainty to the system [61, 62, 114, 115]. The Heartbleed exploit is
an example of how functionality can introduce vulnerabilities [116]. The exploit stems
from a feature in OpenSSL called “Heartbeat” that queries an SSL server to ensure its
12
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Figure 2.1: Anti-intrusion approaches adapted from [118]
responsiveness. However, it is exploited to reveal the private key of the server.
As the system extends, it becomes more complex such that the probability of a weak-
ness to be exploited increases [61, 62, 117]. The banking system, for example, has be-
come more convenient due to technological advancement creating a more complex but
user-friendly system. Bank customer used to have to go to their local bank branch at busi-
ness hours to do transactions. Then the automated teller machine (ATM) was introduced
so that a customer can carry out most of the daily transactions even if the bank is closed. It
is convenient but it also increases security risk of fraud and assault. Now internet banking
is available to provide even more convenience, where a customer does not have to leave
the house for his/her common banking needs, but this too exposes customers and banks
to yet other methods of attack such as “phishing”.
Security measures should be in place at system run time to mitigate risk not captured
at design time. Defence-in-depth is one of the ways of providing security assurance. It
is broken down into five components: deter, detect, alarm, delay, and response [112]. A
deterrence is placed as disincentives to security breach. Then methods that can detect any
occurring breach should be in place. These should then be capable of alerting a necessary
agent, and to delay the breach before any damage is done until a response to the breach
can be made. A similar earlier framework with more detailed components is described by
Halme et al. [118] as is shown in Figure 2.1.
There are two types of approaches to security: offensive and defensive. Pre-emption is
an offensive approach to security. For example, to intrude a suspected adversary before
they attack. Unless provoked or unless part of an authoritative investigation, this approach
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can be dangerous, provocative, and possibly unlawful.
Prevention is to minimise the likelihood of a successful intrusion. This can take many
forms such as to limit internet connectivity, verify software before installations, and ac-
cess control (of users to resources). In this thesis, we will only be concerned with the
defensive approach to security, as typified in Anderson’s depiction of an approach [112],
or the more elaborate scheme as indicated in Halme et el. [118].
Deterrence as mentioned is a disincentive to intrusion to stop the continuation of a
breach effort. Deterrence can be internal and external. An internal deterrence can be
steps taken to, such as, devaluing the perceived gain which an intruder might benefit
from the intrusion. External deterrence can take the form of law and regulation to make
sure that intrusion is met with consequences and to motivate organisations to put security
mechanisms in place. Cryptography is an example of internal deterrence as encrypted
data would not be valuable to the intruders. A problem with external deterrence is that
individual organizations have very little control over external measures of deterrence.
Moreover, law makers and regulation of surrounding technology have difficulties with
keeping up with the pace of technological progress and development. Similarly, internal
deterrence can be ineffective if a given adversary has sufficient resources. If internal
deterrence is applied indiscriminately then this might affect the system availability for
legitimate users, or affect the perceived value of a service.
Detection is to identify an intrusion and its intruder so that a response can be evoked.
Deflection leads the adversary to thinking that they are successful but, in fact, they
have been redirected to an area where they would not do much damage, for example, the
HoneyNet project [119], or implementing IDS leading to a virtual environment [120].
Countermeasures actively and automatically counter an intrusion in progress. This is
to delay damage and alert the necessary agents in Anderson’s framework [112].
This thesis concerns in addressing the challenging aspect of detection. Intrusion De-
tection Systems monitor system activities and raise an alarm when suspicious behaviour
is detected. The monitoring aspect is not in the scope of this thesis.
Monitoring and auditing for security was proposed in 1980 by James P. Anderson [8].
It proposed to record accesses to computer systems and to report any exceptions such as
failed log-on’s to the system. It is one of the earliest work in misused detection for main-
frame systems. Misused-based IDS requires each attack pattern to be matched against
known attack signatures. Anderson proposed to identify threats and attack against the
system and to set up procedures on how to recognise them in the audit data [8].
A more general framework is proposed in 1987 by Denning [9]. The framework is an
anomaly-based IDS where a normal behaviour is profiled and deviant behaviour from the
profile raises an alarm. The proposed IDS is to check if the new observation falls outside
the standard deviation of the profile. This strategy does not require prior identification of
attack patterns. Anderson’s misuse and Denning’s anomaly strategies are the most typical
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in IDS implementation.
Misused-based IDS is quite rigid and does not generalise very well in detecting attack
without an existing known signature. Anomaly-based IDS elevates the need for prior
knowledge in attack patterns but deviant behaviour is not necessarily linked to security
threats [9]. This strategy is then prone to false positives.a Both the misused-based and the
anomaly-based IDS strategies could be used concurrently to improve the detection rate.
IDSs can be categorised by the nature of the monitored data. Host-based IDSs monitor
internal system activities as well as network interfaces of individual hosts. Network-
based IDSs monitor network traffic of multiple hosts. There are many different proposed
approaches since, with recent publication such as [90, 107, 110, 121, 122, 123]. The
specific methods proposed in those publications can be found in Chapter 3, and their
comparisons to our proposed method can be found in Chapter 7.
Currently available IDS systems are more commonly host-based IDSs. These imple-
mentations range from free open source to propriety ones. Despite being an important
part in the security defence framework, the detection rate or accuracy of these software
implementations have much room for improvement [84, 90]. The false alarm rate can be
as high as 99%in some of the earlier systems [84, 87, 88, 89].
The two basic strategies of IDS depend on one set of samples. The misuse-based strat-
egy depends on knowing the attack samples, while the anomaly-based strategy depends
on knowing the normal samples. However, there are borderline cases that could easily
be misidentified, such as, port scanning by system administrators, would otherwise be
considered an intrusion if executed by other actors [90]. False negativeb can be caused
by negligible deviations from a normal behaviour in some intrusion activities [90]. There
is an implicit assumption of normal behaviour conformity where legitimate users are ex-
pected to behave in certain ways, but there are always exceptions, especially when human
interaction is involved [86]. Furthermore, if there is no error or exception, the attack might
have been missed [84]. This thesis hypothesises that understanding and identifying the
relationship between normal and attack samples in IDS environment is a key to further
improve the detection rate.
2.2 Machine Learning Approaches
Machine learning approaches to IDS have been proposed in order to deal with the large
volume of data and to overcome the shortcomings of alternative approaches [3, 124, 125,
126]. One of the primary goals in machine learning is to learn from a set of known data
aA false positive identification is said to have occurred when a legitimate event is falsely identified as
an illegitimate event.
bA false negative identification is said to have occurred if an illegitimate event is not identified.
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samplesc how to classify or predict unknown data samplesd. This is generally achieved
in two phases: the training phase and the testing phase. The machine learning algorithm
produces a modele from a data set in the training phase. The testing phase evaluate the
generalisation performancef of the trained model by using data not used in the training
phase. Cross validation is often used in the training phase to choose training parameter
that would likely generalise well.g
There are two main machine learning categories : supervised and unsupervised learn-
ing algorithms. Supervised learning estimates unknown parameters from known labelled
input samples. Unsupervised learning estimates parameters from unlabelled data sam-
ples. There are numerous learning methods for each of the two types of algorithms. A
few examples are given in the following:
Decision tree (DT) algorithms come in many forms [127]. DT is an example of super-
vised learning and it has been proposed for the realization of IDS [128, 129, 130]. The
corresponding algorithms are easily implemented and the results are easily interpreted.
The aim of the DT algorithm is to classify a sample by learning decision rules that fit
the input domain. There are many ways to build the tree but the premise is to come up
with decision rules based on the features and labels of a given set of training data. An
information metric is typically used to generate the decision rules, for example, informa-
tion gain. The entropy of the training data is calculated, i.e, the information held given
the distribution of the classes present in the training set. The training algorithm creates
several candidate decision rules then the one with the greatest information gain (based on
entropy) is chosen. The repeated application of this process creates a set of decision rules
that are organized as a tree. The procedure is iterated until a stopping criterion is met at
which time the leaf nodes in the tree determine the classification of samples.
There are several general limitations of DTs [127]. It is variance sensitive. Small
cThe meaning of this phrase is made more precise as follows: the outcome of the data have been classi-
fied, for example, if the data item pertains to normal behaviour, or suspicious behaviour.
dData items for which the outcome have not yet been identified, as, for example, normal, or abnormal.
eMore precisely, a machine learning algorithm estimates the unknown parameters of a parametric model
from the set of training data.
fMore precisely, the data with unknown outcomes, the testing data, is passed through the estimated
parametric model, and the outcomes are obtained thereof. This is called generalization, i.e., the parametric
model’s capability of generalizing from the trained model, to the data items with unknown outcomes, and
obtain estimated values of the outcome.
gThis is first to divide the given training dataset with known outcomes, into two datasets, one called a
training dataset (note the abuse of nomenclature in using the same name to denote both the original object,
and the reduced object), and the other called a validation dataset. Training of the parametric model uses
the training dataset, and the validation dataset is used to gauge the efficacy of the trained model, as the
validation dataset is equipped with known outcomes, and can be used to assess the efficacy of the trained
model. Therefore, the validation dataset can be used to estimate the parameters of the training algorithm,
e.g., the learning rate, the momentum used in the learning algorithm, etc. Cross validation is to sub-divide
the validation dataset into, say, V validation datasets. The training can be performed on the training dataset
together with V −1 validation datasets, randomly chosen from the V validation datasets, and the remaining
validation dataset is used for validation. This strategy is often used in situations when there are insufficient
number of training data items.
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changes in the data can result in a large change in the tree. It is also prone to overfitting.
The tree may fit the training data so well that it does not generalise. Any changes in the
problem domain can require the regeneration of the complete tree. Some of these limita-
tions can be remedied. Despite these known limitations, DTs and DT based algorithms,
e.g., MARS (multivariate adaptive regression splines) [131], remain popular among prac-
titioners, as they are relatively simple to deploy, and very fast in their operations.
Unsupervised learning refers to the absence of ground truth/label in the training pro-
cess.h This approach might be preferred when the ground truth/label is either not available
or is unreliable [132, 133]. The aim is to arrange data where its global and local proper-
ties are maintained [132, 133]. Manifold learning, for example, aims specifically to pre-
serve the geometric properties in the data, such as Isomap [132], locally linear embedding
(LLE) [133], and Laplacian eigenmaps (LEM) [134]. Isomap uses geodesic distances to
construct a neighbourhood graph of the data [132]. LLE algorithm constructs linear com-
bination of neighbouring data points positions [133]. LEM is similar to LLE, except LEM
combines neighbouring points is in a Laplacian flow.
These algorithms result in dimensionality reduction of non-linear data. Other
more prominent dimensionality reduction method is the principle component analy-
sis (PCA) [135], which works really well with linear data but struggle with non-linear
data, but the resulting map may not be topological preserving, like in the SOM situation.
Kernel PCA is a modified version of PCA to handle non-linear data [136]. However, it
does not preserve the geometric properties, i.e., it does not “unfold” the data.
Another common unsupervised learning methods is clustering the data items in the
training dataset [137, 138, 139]. The objective of such algorithms is to identify a finite
set of categories or clusters from a set of training data. Data in each formed cluster is
assumed to share some general characteristics. A new sample is identified by assigning it
to one of the formed clusters using its similarity with the formed cluster characteristics.
A popular choice among unsupervised clustering algorithms is the K-mean algo-
rithm [140, 139]. Given a priori that the data items can be classified into K clusters,i
the training algorithm partitions the dataset into K clusters by using K prototypes called
centroids. Each cluster consists of data samples most similar to a particular centeroid.
The initial values of the centeroids are random, then, at each iteration, the centeroids are
updated using the following steps:
1. For each data points, find the centeroid it is most similar to. This is typically
achieved by finding the centeroid with the smallest Euclidean distance.
2. Calculate the new centeroid to be the mean of all the data points closest to it.
The steps are repeated until the centroids stabilize. The K-mean algorithm is very simple
hIn other words, the training data items do not come with an associated outcome.
iIn general, K is unknown for a given practical dataset. K is often guessed by trial and error, or guess
from a domain expert knowledge.
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and computationally relatively fast but it forces data clusters into a spherical shape. The
data is organised into clusters based on center points where a data membership to a cluster
is based on its closeness to the center points. Hence, a circular shaped cluster is formed.
Moreover, the algorithm assumes that each cluster is approximately the same size, where
it can be difficult to determine the optimal K value. It may also converge into a local
minima, which may result in counter intuitive clusters.
Clustering can also be based on data density, where a cluster is formed when there
are many data points within certain area, such as Density-based spatial clustering of ap-
plications with noise (DBSCAN). It discovers arbitrary shaped clusters, points that are
at the border of clusters, as well as points that are not part of a cluster (so called noise
points) [141, 142, 143, 144]. DBSCAN assumes that the density of samples in a cluster
is considerably higher than that of the samples outside a cluster. DBSCAN further as-
sumes that noise points may be present and that such points are located in areas of low
density. The algorithm requires two parameters for training: a radius ε and a minimum
point threshold value min pts. Initially, each sample is labelled as noise point. Then, for
each sample it computes the number of other samples that are within a given radius ε . If
the computed number exceeds min pts then the sample is labelled core. If it has less than
min pts samples within the radius ε but one of these samples is a core point, then it is la-
belled a border point. Samples labelled core are then said to be part of a cluster, whereas
samples labelled border are said to be at the border of a cluster. All other samples are not
part of any cluster.
Unlike the K-means clustering algorithm, DBSCAN can detect the number of clusters
in a set of data and each of these clusters can be of arbitrary shape. However, the algo-
rithm does not always produce well-defined clusters: Border points may be at the border
of two adjacent clusters such that it becomes ambiguous which clusters they belong to.
The algorithm also does assume that the various clusters are similar in density. Thus,
depending on the choice of parameters, if there are two clusters where one is very dense
and the other relatively sparse then DBSCAN may only detect one of these clusters and
label the rest as noise.
As this thesis concerns the application of machine learning algorithms to the problem
domain of intrusion detection, there are two types of background, which need to be stated,
before the contributions of the thesis to the field may be appreciated: (1) general theory of
the machine learning algorithms, namely, artificial neural networks, and self organizing
map, which will be used in this thesis, and (2) what are the machine learning algorithms
which had been applied to the problem of intrusion detection, and what are their findings.
In the sections below in this chapter, (1) will be considered, while (2) will be considered
in Chapter 3.
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2.3 Neural Networks (NNs)
NNs are particularly attractive as an approach to realizing IDS [124, 125]. NNs, being a
deterministic parametric model, do not require any underlying statistical assumptions e.g.,
the assumption of a Gaussian distribution of the inputs, or deviations from the norm as
is commonly required in anomaly-based IDSs [124, 125]. Independence from statistical
assumption also alleviates the need to potentially overhaul a software implementation due
to changing statistical assumptions [124, 125].
NNs have been considered for IDS from the early 1990s [101, 109, 110, 111, 124, 125,
145, 146, 147, 148]. NN is inspired by the structure of the human brain which acquires
knowledge differently from that of conventional digital computer algorithms [149, 150].
The human brain is capable to complete complex tasks, such as pattern recognition, per-
ception and motor control, through highly complex, nonlinear, and parallel information
processing in the cortex. It learns to do these tasks through experience that create strong
relationships between its processing units (neurons) through synapses (links). A key as-
pect of a brain is that it can learn to perform complex tasks from sensory inputs. The aim
of NN is to simulate the biological learning processes. The most common definition of
NN is as follow:
An ANN is a massively parallel distributed processor made up of simple pro-
cessing units. It has the ability to learn experiential knowledge expressed
through inter-unit connection strengths, and it can make such knowledge
available for use. It resembles the brain in two respects:
1. A learning algorithm is used by the network to acquire knowledge from
sensory information about the environment.
2. Connection between neurons are adjusted to store the acquire knowl-
edge.
[149, 150]
Multi-Layer Preceptron (MLP) is a type of NNs that are trained in a supervised fashion.
MLP simulates the ability of a brain, in particular, the layered structure in the cortex, to
learn with the help of a teacher.j The processing unit of a MLP is an artificial neuron,
hereafter it will be referred to as a neuron, as different from that of its biological counter-
part. It has a set of weighted connecting links, with summation and activation functions.
A set of weighted links connects the neuron with other neurons. The weights simulate
the synaptic connection strengths between neurons in the brain. The stronger connection
would have the larger weight. The weighted inputs received by a neuron is added by a
jThese assertions are not obtained through demonstration of physiological observations, but are ideal-
ization of the functions of groups of biological neurons, organizing in layers, with many interconnections
among groups of biological neurons.
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summation function and the activation function limits the magnitude of the response (out-
put) of the neuron. A bias is usually included in the summation function. This bias is to
simulate the inherent bias from experience.
A neuron k processes an m vector input by adding to its bias bk the sum of multipli-






The summed value netk is then passed to an activation function f (·) with an output x
′
k,
where its output is passed to other neurons through weighted links.
x
′
k = f (netk) (2.2)
There are a number of different activation functions available, such as the hyperbolic
tangent or the logarithmic sigmoid function if it is a classifier and linear function, for the
output neurons, if it is a predictor [150]. Consider the following example: neuron k = i
receives an input m = 3 vectors {x1 = 0.5,x2 = 0.02,x3 =−0.25}. The neuron has a bias
bi = 0.2 and weights {w1 = 0.15,w2 = −0.3,w3 = 0.6}, so that the summation function
would calculate neti = bi + (x1×w1 + x2×w2 + x3×w3) = 0.119. The output of the
neuron would depend on the activation function. Figure 2.2 shows the result from the
activation function mentioned above.
The unknown parameters in an MLP are the weights. The weights are initialized with
random values. The objective of a training algorithm is to adjust the weights such that
for any given input the desired output is produced. The key aspect in devising a learning
algorithms is thus to devise an algorithm which can decide on how the weights are to be
updated. There are numerous ways to do this. Common ones are the delta rule method
and the Hebbian method.
The delta rule method aims to minimise the difference (error) between the network out-
put and the desired output (the target). The neuron output is compared to the target value
by using an error function E [150]. The weights are then updated in steps by computing
the delta value (which defines the magnitude of the weight change) and the error gradient
of the synaptic weight (to define the direction of the weight change). Given a learning
rate α , a neuron k is stimulated by input x j(n) at time step (epoch) n, and error ek(n),
then ∆wk j(n) = α × ek(n)x j(n), where ∆wk j(n) is the value by which the weight which
connects the j-th input with the k-th neuron is changed. Thus, the new value of a weight
wk j at step n+1 is wk j(n+1) = wk j(n)+∆wk j(n).
The Hebbian rule method aims to learn from its surroundings over time. The learning
process is triggered by a weighted sum of the interactions between both the sending and
receiving neurons. The weights between neurons, the synapse will be stronger when the
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Activity Function f (neti) Graph neti = ∑mi=1 xi×wi
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Figure 2.2: A few common activation functions for a neuron.
neurons on either side of the synapse are activated simultaneously [150]. Given a learning
rate α , neuron k with its pre-synaptic signal x j and post-synaptic signal yk, the weight ad-
justment at time step n is ∆wk j =αyk(n)x j(n). This ∆wk j definition can make the synaptic
weight magnitude to grow very large rapidly. Oja’s rule resolves this issue: the updated
synaptic weight wk j at step n+1 is wk j(n+1) = wk j(n)+αyk(x j−wk j(n)yk) [151].
Multi-Layer Preceptron (MLP) is one of the most common implementations of artifi-
cial neural networks [150]. The neurons in an MLP are organised in layers: one input
layer, an arbitrary number of hidden layers and one output layer. The input layer receives
the sensory input, while the number of neurons in the output layer is determine by the
classification problem. The size and layout of the hidden layer varies and its optimal size
is often problem specific. Each layer of neurons is fully connected with every neuron in a
subsequent layer via weighted links
A standard fully connected MLP layer is trained in two phases: phase (1) feed forward
and phase (2) error-back-propagation by using e.g., delta rule learning [150]. Given a
neural network with, for instance, two hidden layers, the feed forward phase passes the
input value of each neuron in the input layer through synapses to each of the neurons
in the first hidden layer, then, the output of each neuron in the hidden layer is passed to
the neurons in the second hidden layer. Their outputs in turn are passed to the output
layer. The error-back-propagation phase compute from the error gradient starting with
the output layer. The weight in the network is updated according to a given error function
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and the learning method.
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) can be considered an MLP that consists of a
large number of layers and which organises the hidden layer as convolution matrix [22].
The development of CNN was motivated by learning problems in image processing.
A convolution adds each pixel of an image weighted by its kernel. The learning pro-
cess is similar to standard MLP where there is a feed forward phase and an error-back-
propagation phase. The error-back-propagation phase is similar to that described above.
The feed forward phase is a bit different because the hidden layers are organised as ma-
trices. Each hidden layer consists of two alternating sub-layers, a convolution sub-layer
and a subsampling sub-layer where the spatial resolution is reduced while the number of
matrices is increased. The first convolution layer performs its calculation over subsamples
of the input layer then the resulting matrix from the first convolution layer is subsampled
to the next convolution layer and so on until the output layer is reached.
Fully Recursive Perceptron Network (FRPN) is a recursive neural network architecture
with only one fully connected pool of neurons [2]. Each neuron in the pool accepts the
weighted inputs from the input layer as well as the outputs from all other neurons in the
pool including from its own output. This architecture can emulate MLPs with an arbitrary
number of hidden layers [2]. Training an FRPN model is similar to the case of MLPs. The
training algorithm described in [2] uses a gradient descent method in two steps: forward
step and updating step. The forward step is similar to the forward step in MLP above.
Instead of layers, the outputs of the pool of neurons are applied repeatedly until they
converge to a stable point or for a fixed number of recursions. In the updating step, the
weights are updated dependent on the gradients of a given error function with respect to
the weights. The training steps are repeated for each training sample and for a number of
training iterations.
The outputs of the neurons in an output layer determine the solution to the learning
problem, for example, a two classification problem can be represented by a two dimen-
sional target vectors {(1,0),(0,1)}. If an output neuron produces a value other than 0 or
1 then it is compared with a threshold of 0.5; if the value is ≥ 0.5 a value of 1 is returned,
while if it is < 0.5, then a value of 0 is returned. Thus, for example, if the output of a
network is (0.2,0.9) then it is assumed to fit the label (0,1).
NNs are very powerful machine learning algorithms that are known to generalise well,k
are tolerant to vaults and tolerant to noise. A main problem with MLPs is that they are
considered a black-box approach in that the model does not reveal how and why samples
are classified in a particular manner. NNs have been adapted to IDS in some capacity
and is successful in generalizing to unseen inputs, to some extent [101, 109, 110, 111,
146, 147, 148]. We observe improvement can be made on these results. Additionally, this
kThis means when inputs with unknown outputs pass through the trained model, the estimated outputs
will have a high degree of accuracy wjem cpmpare with the actual outputs.
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thesis found a way to explain the results.
2.4 Self Organising Maps
Kohonen’s Self-Organising Map (SOM) is a topology preserving machine learning algo-
rithm to project features in an n-dimension input space to a lower q-dimension display
space [21]. The training algorithm retains the inter- and intra- relationships of the input
space on the display space. Samples close together on the input space are mapped close
together on the display space, while samples far apart on the input space are mapped far
apart on the display space. It is often described as an unsupervised type of NN as the
features in the input space do not come with a label, or outcome, as well as an abstraction
of the biological brain capable of discerning if two input vectors are similar or not [152].
A SOM organizes neurons on a regular grid, called the display space. Associated with
each neuron is a codebook vector. The training process starts with initializing the code-
book vectors on the display space Q with random values. The algorithm then finds the
Best Matching Unit (BMU) for each input sample and updates the best matching code-
book vector and its neighbours in a defined neighbourhood towards the input vector. The
process is repeated until a stopping criterion is met, such as a maximum number of iter-
ations is reached or until a target minimum error is met. The Euclidean distance du,wi =
||u−wi|| between input sample u and the codebook vector wi ∈ Q = {w0,w1, ..,wn} is
typically used as a criterion to identify the BMU.
The neighbours are defined by a topological shape of the map. Common neighbour-
hood relationships include hexagonal or rectangular neighbourhood. The set of codebook
vectors in the neighbourhood of a BMU wi are updated. The magnitude of change is de-
termined by the learning rate α and by the neighbourhood function f (∆wi j) where ∆wi j is
the geographical distance of wi and its neighbour w j. The amount to update the codebook
vectors is calculated as ∆wi = α(t) f (∆wi j)(wi−u). The learning rate α(t) decreases over
time to zero to ensure convergence. The neighbourhood function has two requirements:
(1) to achieve the neighbourhood’s maximum value at the BMU i where ∆wi j = 0 and
(2) to monotonically decrease the amplitude of the topological neighbourhood. Gaussian
neighbourhood function f (∆wi j) = exp(−di j2σ ) is an example, where σ is the radius that
controls the region f (·) operates and the distance di j = ||li− l j|| between winning location
li and the location of jth unit on the map. The consequence of the algorithm is that input
vectors that are similar to each other will be mapped in close proximity on the display
space thus resulting in topology preserving properties.
Note that the SOM does not require a target value in the training process. This makes
the SOM an unsupervised learning algorithm. It has a few advantages over other unsu-
pervised algorithms, such as K-means algorithm. It does not require any a priori infor-
mation. SOM preserves the data similarity property, whereas K-means assumes similar
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data is organized in spherical shaped clusters. SOM does not explicitly cluster data. Its
primary purposes are for dimensionality reduction and visualization. Unlike the manifold
learning [132, 133], SOM dimensionality reduction property does not unfold the data.
The SOM algorithm is computationally efficient and hence the map is relatively fast
to train and quite applicable to IDS. It can easily be utilised as a visualisation tool when
using a display space of 2 dimensions. SOM is often used as a pre-cursor to clustering
as it maps similar samples close to each other and dissimilar ones apart. It can also be
the basis for either anomaly- or misuse-based detection in IDSs. It can learn the normal
behaviour profile. The anomaly is detected based on where the sample is mapped instead
of the amount of deviation [9]. The SOM can be trained with attack behaviour. Each BMU
is labelled according to the majority samples projected (winner-takes-all). An unknown
attack is then labelled accordingly based on which cluster the BMU belongs to.
SOM has also been used independently as a component in IDSs [5, 105, 106, 153]. It
is particularly attractive for IDS applications because it is an unsupervised learning algo-
rithm such that it is not affected by unbalanced datasets. The results indicate the potential
of SOM in IDS applications although the accuracy is limited due to the use of relatively
small mapping spaces. This thesis proposes to improve upon these results through a re-
cently introduced High Resolution Self-Organising Map (HRSOM) method [1]. It will
be found that the increased mapping space not only improves the quality of mapping but
also reveals many more intricate relationships among the data and thus provides further
understanding of the problem domain.
2.5 Ensemble methods
Ensemble learning systems aim at improving the accuracy and reliability of results by
combining results from a set of learning algorithms [149]. In the training phase, a learning
algorithm produces a predictive model using a set of data. The testing phase evaluates the
learned model using a sample not used in the training phase. Each algorithm creates a
model that comes with a set of assumptions that may or may not hold in practice, such that
no single algorithm is assumed to be free of errors. The key aim of an ensemble method is
to reduce the error rate by combining two or more methods suitably such that the results
from the individual methods complement one another to produce imporved accuracies.
The assemble method aims to compensate for errors of some of the individual models in
the ensemble. Therefore, more accurate and robust predictions can be obtained [149].
The ensemble architectures can be horizontal or vertical or a mix of both [154, 155,
156, 157]. Horizontal ensemble combines outputs from a set of trained models via a
single decision gate, for example, averaging or voting. Vertical ensemble feeds the output
of a model as an input of another model. Residual neural networks use such a concept in
order to train models to reduce the error of another model. The last model in such a chain
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of models is taken as the final response to a given input sample.
There are many examples of ensemble systems. For example, bagging and boosting are
ensemble methods that combine outputs from multiple learning modules [149]. Bagging
method refers to bootstraping together multiple version of the training set, that is, sam-
pling with replacement. The output of each trained model is combined by averaging or
voting to create the final output. The decrease in error is achieved by lowering the variance
in the results. Random forest is an example of bagging multiple DT together [155].
Boosting method takes the output of one learning module for the next one. The training
samples are given a uniform weight to train a “weak” learning module, where it performs
slightly better than a random guess. The samples the module learned correctly are given
more weight than the incorrect ones. This weighted training samples then use to train
the next iteration. AdaBoost is an example of the boosting method [156]. AdaBoost
redistributes the weights on the training set based on the result from a “weak” learner
then the re-weighted training set is used to train another learning module. The process
is iterated until certain error threshold is met. The learning modules in AdaBoost can be
one algorithm or more. It tends to be sensitive to noise as the error from one learner could
be propagated to the next. However, it is less susceptible to overfitting in some learning
problems. The idea is to combine several “weak” learners to converge into a “strong” one.
A mixture of experts (ME) architecture was first proposed in [154] and its subsequent
variations is surveyed in [158]. MEs are horizontal ensemble architectures where multiple
modules of learning algorithms or neural networks connected to a gating network, where
each module has been trained to specialise on a sub-problem to become an “expert” model
for the given sub-problem. The gating network partitions the input space and decides
which “expert” to use. The individual expert may be good at representing some portion
of the input space but fails to capture the input space as a whole. MEs are insensitive to
class imbalances. Moreover, the ability to switch among experts in different regions of
the input space can overcome the limitations of a holistic model and improve the overall
performance.
Hierarchical SOM is a layered ensemble consisting of a set of small SOMs [5, 103,
105]. The output of one SOM is used to train another SOM. The horizontal and vertical
architecture can be assembled together, such as proposed in [101]. The outputs of several
SOMs trained with subsets of training data are combined to train an MLP [101].
A two layer ensemble of SOM and NN is also proposed in [157]. The SOM is trained
independently where its output mapping information is concatenated with the data sam-
ples to train an NN using a gradient descent algorithm.
The SOM and MLP ensemble is particularly applicable to IDS:
1. The SOM reveals relationship information about attack and normal patterns. Such
revelations improve the domain understanding and can provide valuable informa-
tion to a classifier.
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2. The relationship information can assist the supervised NN training algorithm on
focusing on areas of high confusion thus increasing its ability to differentiate cases
of attack that resemble similarly looking normal activities. Given a sufficiently lar-
ge SOM the difficult-to-distinguish normal and attack cases are identified by being
mapped relatively close to each other or when such cases are mapped to the same
neuron. These mark the cases where the risk of confusion is particularly high. This
thesis hypothesizes that enabling supervised NNs training algorithm to focus on
high risk cases should reduce both the false positive and detection rates.
2.6 Performance metrics
Table 2.1: Confusion matrix from the actual and classification labels
Actual
Attack Normal Total
Classification Attack T P FN T P+FNNormal FP T N FP+T N
Total T P+FP FN +T N N
This section describes common performance metrics used to evaluate IDS on binary
classification problems where the objective is to differentiate between an attack (positive)
class and a normal (negative) class. The actual label and the predicted label populate
the confusion matrix as shown in Table 2.1. In the table T P denotes the True Positives,
T N denotes the True Negatives, FP: the false positives, FN: the false negatives, and
N = T P+T N +FP+FN.
There are a number of common metrics that can be obtained based on the confusion
matrix. The metrics included in this Section are the most common metrics used in the
machine learning approaches to IDS [5, 7, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 111].
Given a confusion matrix as depicted in Table 2.1, accuracy (ACC) and F1 score (F1)
can be calculated as indicators for the robustness of the model. ACC shows the rate of
correct identifications of both classes relative to the total sample size. ACC is defined as
shown in Equation 2.3.
ACC =
T P+T N
T P+FN +FP+T N
(2.3)
The F1 score gives a trade-off between specificity and sensitivity. F1 is defined as
shown in Equation 2.4. The value for both of these metrics can range from 0 to 1 where
the 1 indicates a perfect result while 0 indicates a complete failure.
Fβ =
(1+β 2)×T P




for β = 1
(2.4)
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IDSs aim to maximise true positive detection rate while keeping false alarms small.
The true positive rate is used as the detection rate (DR) metric, as defined in Equation 2.5.





The false positive rate (FPR) measures the rate of negative to positive identification.







It has been over forty years since Anderson [8] and Denning [9] published their work on
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Since then there have been many approaches proposed
for IDS and there is an increasing paradigm shift towards more reactionary security sys-
tems [121]. This chapter discusses related work in the field and why IDS remains relevant
in the applications of security systems.
Yuan et al. surveyed self-protecting software systems in [121]. It compares the methods
and associated levels of protection. The proposed taxonomy of self-protecting systems
put IDS at the basic level of protection. Yuan recommends more research into automatic
reaction to intrusion, but as was shown in Chapter 2, detection is a pre-requisite to alert
and respond to intrusion. An automatic response to inaccurate intrusion detection may
result in lowered system availability and hence can be exploited for DoS attacks.
Al-Nashif et al. [6] proposed to monitor network traffic at different levels: (1) traffic
flow, (2) packet header, and (3) payload to visualise and detect intrusion. A dedicated
detection system is implemented at each network level, where a decision fusing module
makes the final decision on whether the activity reported is an intrusion. The proposed
decision fusing method is to choose the one with the least square error to a known ac-
tivity. The paper suggested that a visualisation module should be part of the architecture
although no specific visualization method was mentioned.
Several papers suggested that a suitable visual representation model of the information
system can assists in developing complete coverage of the security mechanism [75, 76, 77,
78]. These works were motivated on the basis that a bird’s eye view would provide better
understanding to devise security measures and how intrusion can perforate. Automatic
methods to assist and accelerate the modelling processes are proposed in [79, 80, 81, 82].
We explored automated graph-based modelling as part of this thesis [82]. The enter-
prise is assumed to be in a generic layered architecture where there are process layers that
interact with technological layers. Frequent closed sequence pattern mining is used to
find the tuple between layers as described in [159]. The work was primarily inspired by
process mining where a work-flow graph can be extracted from action logs [160]. Similar
28
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Figure 3.1: SOM mapping for forensic analysis extracted from [4]
data mining approaches was attempted for IDS application in [3, 161].The experiment is
carried out using process mining data and simulated data based on the assumption that
the layers are synchronised. The upper layer would trigger the lower layer such that an
event in the lower layer el should not be associated with an event in the upper layer eu
that happens after el occurs. The resulting sequences are used to model the enterprise
architecture by using the ArchiMate notation [162].
As mentioned before, network traffic could be monitored at different layer [6]. A tcp-
dump file only monitor the network activities up to the internet protocol layer, that is
information about the internet packet without the packet payload. A network DoS at-
tempt would show deviation in packet size but intrusion that occur in application layer
would not be distinguishable at this stage [13, 78]. An unauthorised login using stolen
credential information may evade detection at the access control stage as it may appear
as a legitimate login. However, file access behaviour may deviate from access patterns
of a legitimate user e.g., the intruder may exhibit an increased rate of attempts to open
sensitive files. These two events may be monitored at different systems or log files. The
intrusion detection system that monitors accumulated events should have a better accuracy
in detecting abnormal behaviours [13, 78, 128].
Visualization as a means to assist IDS design and IDS applications have been stud-
ied. For example, a visual dashboard could help an administrator provide security assur-
ances [3, 6, 7]. Graph-based model to represent the link between system nodes, such as
switches, routers, and servers, provides visualisation about where the intrusion happens
and how far it can penetrate the system [75, 76, 77, 78]. However, it cannot visualise
nor provide insight into how an intrusion is related to normal behaviour. The high rate
of false alarm indicates that an insight into the relationship between normal and attack
patterns could be useful to devise better IDSs.
A machine learning approach to visualisation for assisting in cyber security forensic
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efforts is proposed in [4]. The method is based on SOMs. The authors trained a two-
dimensional SOM of size 20× 20 using the KDD99 dataset benchmark dataset. Their
results show that similar attacks are mapped close together. Moreover, the obtained map-
ping shown in Figure 3.1 appears to be organized into four regions: Region 1 is domi-
nated by samples with a denial-of-service characteristic, such as a high volume of open
connections, or attacks involving exhaustive search. The majority of samples in region
2 and 4 show anomalous usage of network features whereas samples within region 3 are
most commonly content-based attacks where the attacker interacts with a web application.
Based on these observations the authors used a hierarchical SOM as a tool for IDS in a
subsequent study [5]. The hierarchical SOM was evaluated on the KDD99 dataset [5].
Three layers of SOMs were trained using only the first six features of the samples in the
KDD99 dataset dataset. The author also trained two layers of SOMs by using the full set
of 41 features. The best reported generalisation accuracy is 89%. Using more layers and
more features can help improve the results. However, due to computational requirements,
the authors did not attempt training hierarchical SOMs with more than 2 layers when
using the full set of features.
SOM as a tool for the visualisation of network attacks is also proposed in [153]. The
aim is to visualise normal traffic, botnet traffic and other malicious attempts, such as
those that try to access a large number of different ports. A one-dimensional SOM with
1,000 neurons is trained on labelled firewall log data from administrative workstations.
The trained SOM is then used to visualize wireless connected devices [153]. The normal
labelled samples are shown to be projected as a large uniform cluster. The botnet traffic
and other malicious attempts are shown to form separate clusters as dictated by their
labels. The wireless network traffic is most mapped to malicious attempts. An analysis of
this result revealed that wireless devices request new IP addresses for each connection so
that the same device could have multiple IP addresses which can be mistaken as a peer-
to-peer (P2P) botnet. Thus, the described approach could be prone to a high false positive
rate. In terms of visualisation quality, the SOM projection space were limited due to the
use of a one-dimensional SOM. The formed clusters are crude in that a more detailed
insight into complex relationships between data cannot be obtained.
A survey on SOM based IDSs found that the accuracy improves with the number of
neurons in the display space [5, 105, 106]. It is also found that two and three layer SOMs
outperform a single layer SOMs [5, 105]. Three incremental SOM output grid size, which
are 5× 5, 7× 7, and 10× 10, were trained separately and their performance improved
with the size of the SOM [106]. Larger resolutions were not attempted due to time and
computational resources required to train a larger number of neurons in the display space.
Various attempts were made to improve the granularity of the display space. These are
based on hierarchical SOM structures [163, 164], based on a social hierarchy structure
(i.e. a tree SOM) [165, 166], or achieved by data partitioning [167]. These approaches
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adapt the topology of each hierarchical layer according to the properties of the input
vectors, starting with a SOM of grid size 1×1, then growing [163, 164] or enlarging [165,
166] the display space in areas where the quantization errors are high. Data partitioning
method involves training multiple SOMs with sub-samples of the data then merged onto
a SOM while preserving the topology properties [167].
Similar methods have been applied to circumvent prevalent size limitations of SOM in
IDS applications. A hierarchical SOM was proposed to allow better separation between
attack and normal samples [5, 103, 104, 105]. An output from one SOM is used to train
another layer of SOM such that (a) either one SOM is trained for each of the features [103,
104], or (b) SOMs are trained on features organized in groups [105]. The output of the
trained set of SOMs is consolidated and then used to train another SOM. Alternative
approaches select dense mapping areas in one SOM to train another [5], or train a SOM
only on normal samples [102, 103, 104] or only on attack samples [106, 168]. Another
way to overcome the shortcomings of low resolution SOMs is by adding another machine
learning method such as an MLP [101] or an Artificial Immune System (AIS) [106].
The SOM training algorithm scales linearly with the number of neurons N and the
number of data samples M, such that the computational time requirement to train a SOM
is O(NM) [21]. In practice, there is a link between N and M in that the number of neurons
should increase with the number of data entries in order to provide sufficient mapping
space [169]. The computational complexity is thus quadratic rather than linear which
imposes practical limits on the applicability of SOM to large learning problems. The
problem with the rapidly increasing training times is circumvented to some extent by
keeping the mapping space smaller than those recommended [169] or by training several
smaller SOMs in parallel, although the use of smaller SOMs will affect the quality of the
results [5, 105, 106]. Hierarchical SOMs improve the situation, although improvements
are restricted to certain areas (i.e. high density areas) on the map such that it no longer
reflects the overall properties of the input space [1].
Recent advances in computing technology and advances in software methods allowed
the development of more advanced algorithms that can efficiently train an High Reso-
lution Self-Organising Map (HRSOM) [1]. These algorithms are effective in utilising
resources on massively parallel computing infrastructure such as those encountered on
Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) hardware. The time complexity is reported to be re-
duced to O(M log(N)) which makes it possible to train SOMs that are several orders
of magnitude larger when compared to traditional SOM training algorithms. For ex-
ample, the training of a SOM of size 1000× 1000 on a large set of 70-dimensional in-
put vectors has been demonstrated to be feasible with acceptable wall-clock time for its
turnaround [1]. An HRSOM has been trained on the KDD99 dataset as part of the work
presented in this thesis [170]. A two dimensional SOM with 42,300 neurons (240×180)
is trained with the first six feature of the KDD99 dataset in [170]. The training data con-
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sists of 238,256 entries with 88 dimension after transforming the symbolic features to
hot binary encoding. Training the SOM of size 240×180 with this dataset took approxi-
mately four days. The SOM mapping in Section 4 of the paper reveals among many other
things that normal samples form multiple different clusters instead of just one uniform
cluster. The attack samples were shown to be sparsely mapped across the display space.
This is in stark contrast to the results from previous publications. This thesis will find that
the larger display space provides a degree of freedom that is required to show complex
relationships between samples which could not be observed in [4, 5, 153].
The HRSOM mapping also provides more insight into results obtained in [4, 102, 104].
For example, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks were observed to be scattered over a large
area on the smaller SOMs whereas on the HRSOM these samples were mapped in close
proximity and formed an appearant cluster unlike some other types of attack which re-
mained more scattered such as password guessing or port scanning [170]. Some obser-
vation made on the lower resolution SOMs were retained in HRSOM. For example, the
attacks involving buffer overflow are commonly mapped far away from normal samples
although some infrequent normal samples may be misidentified. Such observation could
already be made from earlier results such as those shown in [4, 104]. Despite the in-
creased display space with HRSOMs we still observe that there are outliers of normal
cases which are mapped far from well-formed clusters of normal cases and which tend
to be mapped close to some cases of attack [170]. On the other hand, the attack regions
observed in [4] were spread much wider on the HRSOM. This is observed, for example,
for the samples mapped to region 1 shown in Figure 3.1.
The thesis will demonstrate that the HRSOM contributes to obtaining improved IDS
domain knowledge. However, as a detection method, it is affected by some the same
disadvantages associated with SOM [171]. The quality of the results depend on the ini-
tial conditions of the map. A change in the initial condition can produce very different
mappings such as mappings that are rotated or flipped versions of another SOM. The
interpretation of results, therefore, needs to take into account that the mappings may be
rotated of flipped. Moreover, the SOM is an unsupervised learning algorithm. Ground
truth information that may be available is not used by the training algorithm. Addition-
ally, the winner-takes-all strategy to classifying an unknown sample can be inappropriate
in cases where attack and normal cases are mapped to the same neuron location as this
can increase both the false positive rate as well as the false negative rate. The HRSOM is
limited in its ability to serve as a classification tool and hence it is appropriate to consider
methods that are more suitable for classifying samples.
Neural Network (NN) have been proposed as a component in next generation IDS ex-
pert systems [124, 125, 145]. NN are considered particularly applicable to IDS because of
their flexibility and adaptability when compared to misuse- and anomaly-based IDS [124,
125, 145]. The NN component was proposed to extract features and enhance its real
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time monitoring in [124, 125, 145]. NNs in IDS continue to be studied in very recent
research contributions [146, 147, 148]. An NN approach is used as a feature extraction
method [110] and as a detection component in itself [109, 111]. Successes of an NN de-
tection component has been demonstrated by training them on partitioned data [109, 111].
A CNN was used to extract features for a Support Vector Machine (SVM) and K-Nearest
Neighbour (KNN) classifier [110]. The training and testing datasets from KDD99 dataset
were used separately to train a four layer CNN [110]. The CNN output layer weights
were used to train and evaluate an SVM and 1-NN classifier [110]. The data was divided
into the maximum decomposition allowed by a wavelet transform function on each fea-
tures in [111]. The training algorithm proposed was to iteratively use the Hebbian training
rule [111]. A cascaded NN produces a tree-like classifier [109]. The training algorithm
divides the dataset into two and for each partition an AdaBoosted NN was trained where
each node was labelled with the dominant class [109].
Many other machine learning approaches to IDS have been proposed. For example the
use of DT [100, 107], distributed random forest in [7], and rule-mining [161]. In fact,
the C4.5 decision tree algorithm won the original KDD99 dataset competition [100]. The
winning authors re-sampled the dataset and then trained an ensemble of DTs.
The distributed random forest approach placed an emphasize on feature extraction from
captured network traffic in the CTU-13 dataset [7]. Statistical information is calculated
based on a multiscaled time window for each IP addresses. The distributed random forest
implemented in Apache Spark was trained, and, in its application, the final decision is
made through majority voting.
Rule mining, called RIPPER, was proposed to discover the rule set for a misuse-based
IDS [161]. Labelled event-based logs are used to train RIPPER. The logs are divided into
different subsets based on the number of features (cost). Threshold value is applied for
every class to determine the tolerable precision required for a prediction to be made.
One of the advantages of decision tree and rule mining algorithms is that results are
straight forward to understand since the corresponding tree can be traversed and rules can
be explained. There is also some visualisation possible when drawing on a corresponding
decision tree. However, the methods are not as effective when the tree becomes very large.
Moreover, decision tree and rule mining algorithms are rigid and tend to over fit. Lastly,
high variance may produce different trees as they are sensitive to outliers and noise.
This thesis argues that a SOM is much better suited as a visualisation tool for IDS. A
SOM retains the properties of data on the display space as long as the display space is
of sufficiently large size [1, 21]. The visualization is parametrised and projections can
be made into convenient two or three dimensional spaces. Moreover, most NNs (such as
SOMs, MLPs, FRPNs, etc.) are known to be insensitive to outliers and noise.
The use of an ensemble of neural networks has been demonstrated successfully for IDS
applications [101, 106]. The KDD99 dataset was partitioned into 8 sets to train 8 different
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SOMs [101]. The mappings are then used as input to a three layered MLP [101]. An AIS
was trained using only samples labeled as normal in the KDD99 dataset. An anomaly
to these normal samples was fed to a SOM to further classify the attack types and to
correct false identifications [106]. An ensemble consisting of a SOM and a Graph Neural
Network (GNN) has been proposed for detecting web spam [157]. SOM was trained and
its mapping information was concatenated to the input vector to then train a GNN as a
web spam detection system [157].
This thesis proposes an NN ensemble consisting of a HRSOM and MLP or FRPN [172].
The ensemble architecture was motivated by the work presented in [157]. The thesis will
show that the proposed approach produces robust results and improves detection accu-
racy [172]. The next few chapters will show how the improvements can be attributed to
the information gained from training an HRSOM and which are beneficial to a supervised
classifier.
Our survey of related work in contemporary IDS demonstrated that novel detection
methods are needed to advance the field of IDSs. There is a push towards more reac-
tionary based security systems [121], but detection is still an integral part of any run time
security mechanism. Moreover the detection accuracy should be improved further. A vi-
sualisation tool and explanatory facility would help acceptance of results, lead to further
understanding of complex relationship of attack and normal patterns, and to identify areas
of high confusion. The HRSOM shows great promise to exert such capabilities. The high
volume and variety of data from network traffic logs suggests that NN based machine
learning algorithms are applicable. Network ensembles show great promise in enhancing
the quality of results [172].
Further discussion on how these approaches performed under IDS metrics can be found
in Chapter 5 where the evaluation data is described. The performance results from the





Detecting intrusions can be challenging. An adversary can obfuscate activities to avoid
detection. Stealth attack operations are designed to mimic behaviour that is similar to
normal behaviour. Moreover, uncommon behaviour of legitimate users or activities on
the fringe of normal behaviour may be mistaken as a malicious attempt. It is not always
clear which attack patterns specifically are hardest to detect by a computer assisted IDS.
Visualisation can help to reveal complex relationships between the different types of at-
tacks and normal patterns and should thus be among the first steps to take in order to
understand the domain and devise better detection systems.
The corresponding evaluation of this method on the datasets described in Chapter 5 is
discussed and analysed in Chapter 6, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8.
4.2 Problem formulation
The IDS problem can be stated succinctly as follows: given a set of feature vectors V =
vi, i = 1,2, . . . ,NTotal , where v ∈Rn is an n vector, with the elements vi j, j = 1,2, . . . ,n
and vi j ∈R. In other words, where the feature is a category, e.g., the protocol type in the
KDD99 dataset (see Chapter 5), it can take values, like TCP, UDP, these will be converted
into numerical values first (see Chapter 5 for details of such conversion on various datasets
studied in this thesis). V may contain the class of normal behaviour or attack (abnormal)
behaviours. There may be more than one class of attacks.a
The problem is: from such a set of feature vectors, can the occurrence of certain types
of attacks be detected? In other words, V can be decomposed into the following sub-
sets: V = N ⊕A1⊕A2⊕ ..⊕Am, where N is the set of normal behaviour, and Ai,
i= 1,2, . . . ,m denote the set of attack class i. It is known that one of the attack classes may
aFor more details concerning the structure of the dataset, please see Chapter 5.
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be grouped together, to form a family. Taking a common popular dataset used for bench-
marking intrusion detection algorithms, KDD99 dataset, m = 22, and they are: “back”,
buffer overflow”, “ftp write”, “guess passwd”, “imap”, “ipsweep”, “land”, “loadmod-
ule”, “multihop”, “neptune”, “nmap”, “perl”, “phf”, “pod”, “portsweep”, “rootkit”, “sa-
tan”, “smurf”, “spy”, “teardrop”, “warezclient”, “warezmaster”. It is known that these 22
attack types belong to four families, “dos”, “r2l”, “u2r”, and “probe”. Thus, e.g., “back”,
“land”, neptune”, “pod”, “smurf”, “teardrop”, all belong to the family of “dos”. In other
words, F` = Ai1 ⊕Ai2 ⊕ ..⊕Ai` , where i1, i2, . . . , i` are integers in i = 1,2, . . . ,m, and
each family F` contains i1, i2, . . . , i` members. There are F families.
The question can be asked:
Question 1 Can all or a subset of m types of attacks be detected?
Question 2 Moreover, there may be more than m types of attacks as contained in the dataset, is
it possible to detect these hitherto unsuspected unknown attacks? This is called a
“zero day attack”.
In other words, the detection problem may be decomposed into two cases:
Case 1 : if there are m known attack patterns, Ai.i = 1,2, . . . ,m, for a given set of feature
vectors, b j, j = 1,2, . . . ,J, b j ∈Rn, if
∀ j=1...Jb j∩Ai 6= 0, for any i = 1,2, . . . ,m (4.1)
then we say that we have detected an attack has occurred. Note that we have not
addressed the more difficult question: the identification of the attack type, if an
attack has been detected. For this identification, we will need to identify an attack
type κ , where κ is such that the argument of Eq(4.1) for which the intersection of
the two sets is non-zero. In the set theoretic manner in which we formulate the
problem, this might be quite difficult.b
Case 2 : for feature vectors: ck, k = 1,2, . . . ,K, ck ∈Rn,
∀k=1,2,...,Kck∩Ai = 0, ∀i (4.2)
and
∀k=1,2,...,kck∩Ai1⊕Ai2 · · ·⊕Ai` 6= 0, (4.3)
In other words, these are the zero day attacks, for which there were no prior knowl-
edge. In this case, the zero day attacks belong to the union of a family of attacks,
bIn a later chapter, when we applied the visualization tool high resoltuon self-organizing map, we find
that in some cases, we are able to conclude the likely membership of the attack type. But this is not a general
approach, and therefore we refrain from presenting it as being a solution of this more difficult problem of
identification.
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rather than an individual attack type. If the zero day attack type belongs to a com-
pletely new family of attacks, then it will not be possible to identify it using existing
techniques, as it must be classified manually.c
Obviously in this general setting, one would depend on some prior knowledge of what
an attack pattern looks like. Indeed, if it is known that b1 is an attack pattern in the class
of attacks, then one could easily do a simple distance evaluation ∀i=1,2,...,NTotal α = b1 ·vi.
If α ≥ τ , where 0 < τ < 1, a preset threshold, then we say that vi is an attack. The
problem with this approach is that it is an art to set the threshold properly, to give a
small false positive, and a small false negative. As these are conflicting requirements, and
thereofre the setting of threshold often would be quite a “tricky” exercise, by trial and
error methods. Secondly, even though the evaluation is relatively simple, it will need to
go through the whole set V for each attack prior known vector. As NTotal is sually large,
this evaluation may take some time. It is for reasons like this that we propose to use more
advanced methods from the field of neural networks to study the detection problem.
4.3 Overview
Clustering methods can provide some insight into the similarity within and between attack
and normal samples. Such methods are trained unsupervised and are thus not affected by
the unbalanced nature of IDS data. Data labels can be used to investigate how well the
detected clusters align with the labels. If there are one or more clusters of data with a mix
of different labels then this would refer to a set of samples which are similar to each other
but belong to different categories. Such observation in turn can provide an indication on
which type of samples are easily confused.
Unsupervised learning methods should generalise well in order to account for new at-
tacks which may not occur in the set of training samples (i.e. zero day attacks). A zero
day attack may not strictly conform to known samples. Methods such as K-means or
DBSCAN (see Chapter 2) should not be considered since K-means assumes that clusters
are spherical in shape and is sensitive to outliers that may represent unusual or new cases.
DBSCAN is sensitive to clusters of varying densities which given that the value distri-
bution in IDS data logs is commonly non-linear (some access patterns are much more
common than other patterns) this limits its application to IDS learning problems.
This thesis suggests Kohonen’s Self-Organising Map (SOM) as a more appropriate al-
gorithm than K-means clustering algorithm, or DBscan. It provides a topology preserving
property to project high dimensional input vectors to low dimensional display space. Pro-
jections can be made to a two-dimensional display spaces to aid visualization. It has been
cThis is the reason why whenever there is a new family of attacks being released on the network, it will
take considerable time manually to study them, and then to decide that it belongs to a new family of attack,
rather than a variation of the current known attack types.
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demonstrated that it is suitable as a component in IDS on several occassions (see Chap-
ter 3). However, the quality of past results are limited due to the very low granularity of
the display space in the proposed SOM.
Two-dimensional display space High Resolution Self-Organising Maps [1], or two di-
mensional SOMs, in short, show promise to improve the quality of results particularly
with respect to its visualisation capabilities [170]. A SOM at high resolution, meaning
that the display space has a much smaller granularity than the low resolution SOM, should
be capable of displaying complex relationships of data in the IDS environment. It should
thus be able to shed more light into the historical SOM results as surveyed in Chapter 3,
and should be able to offer novel insights into the problem domain. To verify such ca-
pability this thesis will engage multiple different IDS benchmark datasets as well as a
benchmark problem from a related domain, viz., malware detection.d
Projecting both normal and attack cases onto the two-dimensional display space, could
highlight the difficulties in distinguishing borderline cases, although this by itself may
be insufficient to classify samples into their respective classes. The identification would
rely on a winner-takes-all strategy where the winner in the high-confusion areas could
be ambiguous. A dedicated supervisedly trained classifier would be more appropriate to
make the final decision. A supervised learning algorithm would be the best candidate to
determine the class of feature vectors with no labels yet, as it would take into account
known training labels to create a model that distinguishes different categories of samples.
However, the training algorithm of supervised classifiers are commonly affected by class
imbalances, e.g., there are more feature vectors being labelled as “normal” than “attacks”.
While there are effective balancing techniques, a general problem remains in that a learn-
ing algorithm treats all training samples equally. This can be a problem in situations where
samples are easily confused (i.e. very similar samples that belong to different classes). It
should thus be advisable to introduce a mechanism that would allow a classifier to focus
the learning effort on high confusion areas.
Since the HRSOM can distinguish samples that are easily confused and hence this the-
sis proposes to “annotate” training samples with the result of the HRSOM before training
a supervised classifier. The reason to why this would help the training algorithm can be
demonstrated by using the following simple example: Assume that there is a subset of
samples all belonging to the same class and which are so similar that they are mapped
by a HRSOM to the same neuron location c1. Assume that there is a second subset of
samples belonging to different classes but are also so similar to each other that they are
mapped to the same neuron location c2. Assuming that the two subsets are dissimilar such
that c1 6= c2 then we can say that the samples in c1 are not likely to be confused with sam-
ples from another class while samples in c2 are easily confused. Since all samples in c1
belong to the same class and hence it suffices to know the value of c1 in order to classify
dThis will be considered in an appendix of this thesis.
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samples that are mapped to c1. In order to classify samples in c2 the classifier needs to
consult additionally available features. Thus, by augmenting each feature vector xi with
its mapping coordinate ci the classifier can learn to classify samples based on information
conveyed in ci in situations where there is no confusion associated with mappings to ci
whereas in all other cases, the classifier can consult additional information as is available
in x. In other words, the augmentation technique allows a classifier to classify easy to
distinguish cases based on the augmented value whereas difficult cases would be distin-
guished based on the original feature values. When compared to traditional approaches
where all samples are distinguished solely based on feature values the proposed method
allows the classifier to focus the use of feature values for distinguishing difficult samples.
The resulting architecture is an NN ensemble Intrusion Detection System (IDS), con-
sisting of an HRSOM and a classifier (i.e. MLP and FRPN [2]). NNs are particularly
suited to real-time IDS because the corresponding algorithms scale very well with the
number of samples when implemented on parallel computing infrastructure. It will be
shown that the proposed method can classify samples in real time without requiring very
expensive computing systems. The proposed ensemble is modular in nature which sim-
plifies the implementation of future updates.
Deep learning neural networks are also considered in this thesis due to recent successes
in many other application domains. Deep neural networks can be considered similar to
MLPs that consist of many hidden layers. However, a number of problems arise with the
use of many hidden layers: Standard gradient descent methods are ineffective in training
deep neural network architectures due to the long term dependency problem [150]. The
problem refers to the error gradient that can become vanishingly small for deep neural
networks and is hence no longer effective for updating the network weights. While there
are effective solutions to the vanishing gradient problem, another problem is how to obtain
an optimal network architecture. One needs to determine for a given learning problem the
number of hidden layers as well as the number of neurons in each of the hidden layers.
The optimal depth and the optimal set of neurons in each layer is problem dependent.
Obtaining the ideal number of neurons for each hidden layer is a combinatorial problem
and there is no known method that would determine the number of required neurons in
each hidden layer, nor the number of hidden layers for a particular problem.
The Fully Recursive Perceptron Network (FRPN) does not organize neurons in lay-
ers and is capable of emulating MLPs featuring any number of hidden layers [2]. The
FRPN model uses a recursive architecture that requires just one pool of neurons and thus
avoids the need to define a problem specific architecture. Moreover, the FRPN was shown
to require less neurons to match the capability of a deep MLP. The corresponding algo-
rithm can be implemented very efficiently and paired with the fact that fewer neurons
are required, this makes the FRPN particularly suitable for studying the effects of deep
networks in real time IDS.
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Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [22] has shown good results as an IDS compo-
nent [110]. However, we consider an HRSOM pre-processor is much more suitable than
CNN because of its visualisation capability. The thesis will find that the performance of
the proposed ensemble is very competitive with that of an CNN [110] while being simpler
in architecture as well as capable of providing explanatory facilities via visualization.
4.4 High Resolution Self-Organising Map
A HRSOM is a SOM with a large number of neurons in the display space [1]. The main
objective of the SOM algorithm is to project n-dimensional input onto a q-dimensional
display space. While the HRSOM retains the properties of Kohonen’s SOM algorithm,
the training algorithm is adopted so as to take advantage of multi-core computing infras-
tructure so as to vastly improve processing speed when training large maps. The larger
number of neurons in the display space on a HRSOM provide a higher degree of freedom
for the projection of data, thus, helping to retain and reveal intrinsic inter- and intra- rela-
tionships among the data. Otherwise, if the number of neurons is small, then, mappings
are forced into simpler structures thus resulting in a loss of information. This could be
detrimental to an IDS application where there can be complex relationships between at-
tack and normal access patterns, patterns may overlap, or may be very similar. The nature
of such relationships would be lost when the display space is too small. Furthermore, as
the thesis will find, if the SOM is too small then this creates little advantage when used
in the proposed ensemble. The number of neurons has to be sufficiently large in order to
separate attack patterns from normal samples that are similar in feature space. This results
in an overall lower error rate and provides more detailed information on borderline cases
to the supervised NN in the ensemble.
Algorithm 1 shows a two dimensional SOM training algorithm given dataset X and N
neurons that are organized in a 2-dimensional lattice of size nx×ny. Associated with the
i-th neuron is a codebook vector wi. The distance between each sample x ∈X and each
codebook wi ∈ N is calculated, which results in N distance for each sample. The neuron
with the smallest distance is the Best Matching Unit (BMU). The codebook vectors are
then updated by using the equation wi = wi +α(t)‖wi− x‖∆(wi,wBMU), where α(t) is
a learning rate, and ∆(·) is a function that computes the geographical distance between
the two given codebook vectors. A common definition is ∆(wi,w j) = e−
‖c(wi)−c(w j‖
σ , where
c(wi) and c(w j are the coordinates (location) of the codebook vector wi and codebook
vector w j respectively, and σ is a radius which is often set to σ = max(nx,ny)/2. To
ensure convergence, α(t) reduces towards zero with the number of training iterations and
σ reduces towards 1 with the number of training iterations [21].
The computational time complexity of the algorithm scales linearly with the number of
samples and with the number of neurons: O(N×|X |). However, there is a link between
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Algorithm 1 The 2D SOM algorithm [21]
Input:
1: Training set X
2: N = nx×ny map of codebook vectors
3: procedure SOM(X ,nx,ny)
4: Initialise nx×ny codebook vectors (N)
5: while stopping criteria not reached do
6: for each sample x ∈X do
7: Calculate ‖x−wi‖ for all wi ∈ N.
8: Find BMU = mini{‖x−wi‖}




N and |X |. The display space should be appropriately large for a given number of sam-
ples [169]. It has been suggested that a SOM should be of size 5
√
(|X |) which would
mean that the computational time complexity of the algorithm is polynomial [169]. How-
ever, as this thesis will show, the number of required neurons for tasks requiring accurate
visualization is closer to kN for some problem dependent constant k. Thus, the computa-
tional complexity of a SOM when used for visualizations is quadratic. This prevents the
training of high resolution SOMs that feature large number of neurons, say, much beyond
10 million, if a reasonable turnround time is required.
Chapter 3 and Section 5.7 discuss several attempts, like using hierarchical SOM, at cir-
cumventing the limited number of neurons in SOMs. These methods can either compro-
mise the SOM’s topology preserving property or impair visualisation capability because
improvements are restricted to certain areas such that it may not offer a good representa-
tion for all input data. The limited area improved upon may distort results and may hence
be misinterpreted. The HRSOM mapping improvement is data driven and uses the entire
display space. The corresponding results are shown and discussed in Chapter 6.
A bottleneck of the SOM training algorithm is to find the BMU which requires O(N)
time [1]. This bottleneck can be addressed through a parallel algorithm and its corre-
sponding implementation on GPU infrastructure [1]. Graphical Processing Unit (GPU)
has a large number of computational cores that can be used to improve speed performance
for problems that required high-performance and highly-parallel computations. Currently,
the GPU model GEFORCE GTX TITAN Z has the highest number of cores (5760 cores)
e and can run as many as 10 threads per core. This means that a GPU can run up to 57500
threads concurrently. These threads communicate using GPU’s global memory, which
also facilitates communication between GPU and CPU. The CPU host system defines
ehttps://www.nvidia.com/gtx-700-graphics-cards/gtx-titan-z/, last accessed 21 May
2019
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and calls the GPU’s kernel functions using the SIMT (single instruction, multiple-thread)
architecture, which allows for the same instructions set to be executed by all concur-
rent threads and process different data. GPU implemented NN training algorithms have
become very popular in recent years. The GPU-based SOM training algorithm reduces
the computational time requirement by finding the BMU in parallel and by updating the
codebook vectors in parallel [1]. The algorithm 2 uses two mechanisms: (1) massively
parallel computations and (2) maximization of the use of available memory bandwidth by
prioritizing the use of fast access memory on-board the GPU [1].
Algorithm 2 shows the 2D GPU-based HRSOM training algorithm [1]. The input and
codebook vectors are copied to the GPU’s fast access memory. The training data is loaded
into the GPU memory as one single array to reduce the number of data transfers to and
from the GPU. Training HRSOM with large number of neurons is made efficient through
parallel computations shown in line 8 and 10 respectively. These operations can be im-
plemented as GPU kernel functions. Each GPU kernel has limited memory resources so
that the number of kernel instances launched is kept small. The computation of distances
between the input and the codebook vectors along with their adjustment of the codebook
vectors is performed in parallel. This should make the computational complexity of the
algorithm independent of N. However, finding the smallest value among a set of distances
(line 9 of the algorithm) needs to be performed by reduction using parallel processes. Re-
duction takes log2(N) time. Thus the parallel implementation reduces the computational
time requirement to O(|X |× log2(N)). This results in a very significant improvement in
time requirement as the following example shows: Training a SOM of size 1000×1000
would require 106k×|X | time steps whereas the parallel implementation would require
just 19.93k′×|X | time steps for some implementation specific constants k and k′ (which
are omitted in the big-O notation). Thus, the HRSOM algorithm allows the training of
much larger maps at greatly reduced time.
Note that Algorithm 2 gives the training algorithm. Once training is completed the
HRSOM can map new samples by just executing the lines 8 and 9 of the algorithm. The
capability of HRSOM on other benchmark data can be found in Appendix C.
4.4.1 Quantifying the Mapping Quality
A quantitative metric can assist in evaluating and comparing one result from another.
Quantitative metrics allow comparisons between SOM of different sizes, initial condi-
tions, and training datasets.
A very common metric is the quantization error (qerror). The q-error is the distance
between an input vector and its BMU averaged over the sample size (Equation 4.4). Let
x j ∈ X be a vector from a set of training vectors, its best matching codebook vector wBMU ,
and d(x j,wBMU) is the (i.e. Euclidean) distance between x j and wBMU . q-error provides
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Algorithm 2 The 2D HRSOM algorithm [1]
Input:
1: Training set X
2: nx×ny map of codebook vectors
3: procedure HRSOM(X ,nx,ny)
4: Initialise nx×ny codebook vectors (N) randomly on CPU
5: Batch move N and X to GPU
6: while stopping criteria not reached do
7: for each sample x ∈X do
8: GPU computes ‖x−wi‖ for all wi ∈ N in parallel.
9: BMU = min{(d, wi)} using reduction on GPU
10: GPU updates all wi ∈ N toward BMU in parallel.
11: end for
12: end while
13: Batch move X to CPU
14: end procedure








The q-error can be used to quantify the mapping quality [171]. The caveat with q-error is
that the metric would depend on the datasets’ upper and lower bound, such that the metric
would depend on the data scaling method. Therefore, the q-error is used normally only to
choose the best SOM when trained using the same dataset.
While SOMs are trained unsupervised, the method will be used in conjunction with a
supervised classifier. Hence, data labels can be assumed available for a set of training
data and it is possible to consider measures that indicate how well the properties of the
data align with the different classes. A SOM can be used to classify samples by labelling
the neurons which they are mapped to. Three cases need to be considered when labelling
neurons in the display space:
Case 1: Multiple labelled samples are mapped to the same neuron. The neuron is la-
belled according to the most frequently occurring class label among the samples
that are mapped to the same neuron; a method that is called winner-takes-all. Alter-
natively, the neuron can take the label of the sample that best matched the associated
codebook. Either of the two strategies produce similar results because it is a con-
sequence of the training algorithm that the best matching sample is commonly a
description that represents the majority of cases. This thesis will take the winner-
takes-all method.
Case 2: Only one training sample is mapped to a neuron. The neuron is labelled ac-
cording to the label of the sample.
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Case 3: No training sample is mapped to a neuron. The neuron is labelled according
to the label of a sample that best matched the associated codebook vector.
Labelling neurons in this fashion produces a semantic map [21] in that the neurons in the
display space are no longer unlabelled, but instead, they are labelled by the imputation
of the labels associated with the training dataset. New samples can then be classified by
finding the BMU, then returning the label of the BMU.
Assuming that samples are assigned to one of m classes, the number of samples is
|X |, the number of samples that belong to the i-th class is denoted |ai|, and ni is the
total number of samples that belong to class ai and which are mapped to a neuron that is
labelled by the same label ai then the metrics: micro purity and macro purity can be

















Micro purity, macro purity, and grouping index are complementary metrics to evaluate
SOM mapping quality with respect to the true label [15]. Micro purity is the average
of correctly labelled samples and hence indicates the classification ability of the SOM.
Macro purity computes the individual label classification performance normalized over
each label size. The grouping index takes into account the local relationships between
neurons on the display space. This also reduces the sparsity problem when the number of
neurons exceed the sample size.
Grouping or clustering index is calculated based on groups of neurons G =
{g1,g2, ...g j}. There is a group for each neuron that is created by including neurons
that are a direct neighbour of the said neuron. Then we compute the number of samples
that are labelled according to the labels of the neurons in the group |ck|. The result is









Limitations of the afore-mentioned metrics need to be known when analysing the re-
sults. micro purity is affected by class imbalance. For example, if there are 100 samples
and 90 of these belong to one class while the remainder belong to another class and the
mapping of these samples are randomly distributed on a SOM, then, the micro purity will
be close to 0.9 Given that a micro-purity of 1.0 indicates a perfect result and hence this
incorrectly suggests a close to perfect result given that none of the samples in a minority
class may have been classified correctly. Micro-purity is thus not suitable in applications
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(such as IDS) where class imbalance can be expected. macro purity compensates this
shortcoming by normalizing results with respect to the size of individual classes. How-
ever, macro-purity says little about the differentiation of pattern classes. Adjacent neurons
may be labelled differently, thus, the samples mapped to these neurons are not well dif-
ferentiated and could be easily confused. Macro-purity cannot express how well samples
from different classes are separated on the display space.
The grouping index, on the other hand, does not penalise putting the the same labelled
samples into many groups. It might yield poor results when the samples are spread so thin
that there are multiple labels mapped in a group and the label denoting the majority class
has a very small margin.
An indicator of the mapping quality can also be measured by the information gain
method. Information gain and the Gini impurity measure are typically used in the process
of creating decision trees. Information gain based entropy is the average rate at which
information is produced by the probability of the respective class occurrences in the data.
The Gini impurity measures how often a randomly chosen sample from a set of samples
would be incorrectly labelled if it was randomly labelled according to the distribution of
labels in the subset. Therefore, the desired outcome is a large information gain and a low
Gini impurity measure.
The information gain for a SOM Y would be the entropy H(T ) of dataset T subtracted
by the conditional entropy H(T |Y ) for SOM s as shown in Equation 4.8. Suppose dataset
T has m classes i∈m = {0,1} and let pi represent the percentage of samples labelled with
class i in the dataset T , the entropy of T is calculated as H(T ) = |∑mi=0 pi× log2(pi)|. The
SOM semantic mapping is used to produce a confusion matrix such that the corresponding
conditional entropy for labels H(T |i) can be calculated.
The Gini impurity gain for SOM IG(T |Y ) is calculated similar to the information gain
by subtracting the Gini impurity for dataset T and the conditional Gini impurity of the
SOM Y as shown in Equation 4.9. The probability for positive and negative classes
i∈ J = {0,1} are used to calculate the Gini impurity measure for dataset T . The confusion
matrix based on the semantic SOM is populated to calculate the conditional Gini Impurity
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IG(i|Y ).


































IG(T,Y ) = H(T )−H(T |Y )
(4.8)
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These metrics provide us with the means to measure and compare the quality of map-
ping of SOMs. The micro and macro purity provide a metric on how well the input
samples are separated with regards to their labels. The group index provides a metric on
the purity of mappings i.e, how well samples fit a neighbourhood on the SOM. Informa-
tion gain and Gini impurity measure show how well information is projected by taking
into account samples that fit the majority class and those that do not fit a majority class. It
is expected that each metric would have a tendency to improve with an increase in the size
of a SOM. Although the grouping index may start to decay for very large maps (i.e. when
the number of neurons is much larger than the number of samples) as this can prevent the
grouping of mappings to adjacent neurons. The larger SOM increases the available map-
ping space thus increasing the likelihood of samples from different classes to be projected
onto separate neurons. The ability to project complex data relationships to form mapping
as displayed in the display space, given sufficient neuron sizes, should also produce a
better information gain.
4.4.2 Cluster analysis using HRSOM
It is worth noting that the SOM and HRSOM algorithms do not detect or extract from the
data possible existence of clusters. The algorithms perform a dimensionality reduction
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which can be observed to be a topology preserving approach to compressing information.
For example, if there are NT samples, each of dimension n, the SOM essentially projects
this information onto a two dimensional display space described by Q = N×M neurons,
each being characterized by a codebook vector of dimension n. So the dimensionality
reduction occurs in the projection of NT samples onto a two dimensional display space,
characterized by Q neurons–usually NT >> 2×Q. Due to this compression of informa-
tion and the toplogy preserving mapping from high dimensional feature space to the two
dimensional display space, a SOM can simplify the task of cluster analysis, as feature
vectors close to one another in the feature space, will be projected to vectors which will
remain close in the display space, assuming that the display space is sufficient in size.
Note that at no time there is clustering detection occurred in the display space.
The clustering is the interpretation of the user placed on the two dimensional display
space in observing that some vectors are closely related. In other words, clustering is the
result of interpretation of the projections onto the display space by the user, through a
visualization process. This approach to clustering overcomes some of the inherent diffi-
culties of other clustering approaches, e.g., in needing to determine the number of clusters
a priori, in needing to assume that the clusters are spherical in shape. Moreover, it over-
comes the inherent assumption in some clustering analysis, that the clusters are linearly
separable. The SOM approach is a data driven approach, and that the clusters formed are
the results of interpretation by the user, and thus, clusters can form intricate intertwined
relationships of one another, if the display space is of sufficiently high resolution, without
the need for assuming them to be linearly separable. It is in this sense that the projections
of high dimensional feature vectors onto a HRSOM can be used as an effective mecha-
nism for unsupervised learning of the formation of clusters, as the HRSOM, by definition
provides a sufficiently high resolution for the display of the intricate possibly intertwined
relationships among the projected vectors. The high degree of freedom in a large display
space allows for the retention of complex relationships as well as for a better segmentation
of the input data. This approach to cluster analysis can also be used to label codebook
vectors and/or data samples. Each cluster, once identified visually, can be assigned a
unique label. Neurons that are part of a cluster can then be labelled accordingly. Simi-
larly, samples that are mapped to a neuron within a cluster can then be labelled. If ground
truth is available – in the testing dataset, there are labels, which can be used to assess the
accuracy of the clustering algorithms – for a set of samples then it also becomes possible
to identify how well the classes align with the formed clusters.
Cluster analysis on SOMs can be performed in a variety of ways:
• The SOM is used to map each sample to its corresponding BMU. Cluster analysis
can be applied to the coordinates of these BMUs. This effectively clusters the
samples by using their projected values. This method is best suited in cases where
samples are to be clustered. Given that this uses reduced dimensions and hence this
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can significantly speed up the process of clustering the samples.
• Cluster analysis can be applied to the codebook vectors on the map. This clusters
the prototypes, i.e., the codebook vectors that represents the samples, rather than
the samples and hence performs cluster analysis on the value distribution of the
prototypes. This method is best suited in identifying and extracting clusters on the
display space (i.e. clusters which could be observed through visual inspection).
K-means and DBSCAN are common clustering algorithms. K-means has been used as
part of a prototype-based clustering algorithm [140]. Although for K-means clustering,
the underlying assumption is that the input data is uniformly spherical in shape, i.e., each
cluster is of similar size and round in shape. The algorithm does not work very well
on clusters that are not spherical, or are of different densities or sizes. As will be ob-
served later in this thesis IDS data are almost never organized in globular clusters, or of
similar size and density, thus violating the K-means clustering algorithm’s assumption.
Moreover, since K is a constant and hence the higher degree of freedom when investigat-
ing increasingly large HRSOMs may not be well reflected by clusters formed using the
K-means clustering algorithm.
In contrast, DBSCAN can detect arbitrary shaped clusters [141]. However, the datasets
used to train SOMs and HRSOMs tend to skewed towards one class (see Chapter 5). The
minority class samples may not be dense enough to create a cluster of its own even though
they are mapped well-separated from the normal samples on the HRSOM, which would
result in outlier points or being absorbed by clusters of normal samples. The clustering
performance of HRSOM mappings may not be well represented under DBSCAN.
The K-means clustering algorithm and the DBSCAN algorithm are said to be partition-
based clustering algorithms as they segment the data/feature space into partitions. Hier-
archical clustering algorithms create a hierarchical decomposition of data into clusters.
An advantage of hierarchical clustering techniques is that these are not affected by data
density and do not require knowledge of the number of clusters [173]. Clusters can be
organised in layers. For example a cluster encompassing all cases of attack may be further
broken into sub-clusters corresponding to the type of attack. Hierarchical clustering aims
to build a cluster hierarchy which are commonly depicted by a dendrogram. The number
of clusters would depend on how the maximum desired depth of the dendrogram.
There are numerous approaches to hierarchical clustering. The clustering algorithm can
start from a top-down direction, dividing larger clusters into smaller ones, or a bottom-up
direction, grouping small clusters into bigger ones. Ward’s method is a popular bottom-
up clustering method based on minimising the cost of merging clusters [173]. The basic
steps are (1) each sample starts as its own cluster then (2) find the closest pair of clusters
and join them together into the same cluster. This process is repeated until there is only
one cluster left. The resulting dendrogram represents the cluster-mergers, or the number
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of clusters in one layer, until the final layer is reached.
The Ward’s method to find the closest (with respect to the Euclidean distance) pair
of clusters is obtained by calculating the merging cost δ (A,B) of two clusters A and B as





(m j− m̄)2 (4.10)
where m j is the value of observation j and m̄ is the mean of all the observations in the
cluster with |m| vectors.






The merging cost starts at 0 and grows with every merge. The Ward’s method only
merges at the minimum cost to keep the increase of SSE as small as possible. In other
words, the method merges clusters that are closest to each other. The number of clusters
would depend on how many branches one wishes to keep. It is possible to define a thresh-
old K indicating a desired number of clusters, or to define a cut-off maximum distance
value. Determining the number of clusters can be automated by finding the biggest ac-
celeration growth of SSE (known as the elbow method). However, the elbow method has
to be used with caution as it might be “ambiguous” or “aggressive” in determining the
number of clusters required [174].
A problem with hierarchical clustering algorithms is that they are computationally more
expensive than partition-based clustering algorithms. Their suitability to large data mining
or big data applications is often limited because of this increase in the computational
demand. Moreover, the algorithms (including Ward’s method) are often biased towards
the creation of clusters that are spherical in shape.
One of the measurements of cluster quality is silhouette coefficient [175]. It measures
how well a sample belongs to a cluster. The coefficient values range [−1,1], where nega-
tive values indicate the sample is in the wrong cluster, values near 0 indicate overlapping
clusters and high positive values approaching 1 indicate the sample belong to the correct
cluster. Silhouette coefficient s(i) is calculated for each sample i. Let A(i) be the aver-
age distance between sample i with other samples in the same cluster. Let B(i) be the
minimum average distance between sample i and samples in clusters not belonging to i.
The silhouette coefficient for sample i can be defined as is shown in Equation 4.12. The
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silhouette index is then the average of all silhouette coefficients.
s(i) =

1−A(i)/B(i) if A(i)< B(i)
0 if A(i) = B(i)
B(i)/A(i)−1 if A(i)> B(i)
(4.12)
A problem with the silhouette index is that it tends to prefer spherical clusters. Thus,
the silhouette index often indicates a better performance for clustering algorithms that are
biased towards producing spherical clusters (such as the K-means algorithm and Ward’s
method). If an observation i is projected into a cluster that is surrounded by another
i.e. ring-shaped cluster then the silhouette coefficient might become zero or negative as
the average intra-distance A(i) would be positive while the inter-distances B(i) would be
negative. Thus, regardless whether or not the topology property is correct, the silhouette
coefficient measure would not appropriately reflect the quality of clusters formed.
Nonetheless, the silhouette index can be expected to improve with the size of a SOM
when using the appropriate clustering algorithm to analyse the cluster quality of SOM.
Ward’s hierarchical clustering is most suitable as it find compromises and not being af-
fected by cluster size or density and biased towards globular shaped clusters.
This thesis will apply Ward’s clustering methods to codebook vectors rather than to the
projections. The main reason being that the number of samples used in this thesis exceeds
that which can be processed in reasonable time by hierarchical clustering methods. Since
trained codebook vectors are a representation of the input vectors and due to the topology
preserving properties of a SOM, hence the greater the number of neurons the better input
vectors are represented. This should improve the preservation of topological information
and be observable as an improvement in the silhouette index.
4.5 HRSOM and NN ensemble
This thesis will deploy a layered ensemble of NNs consisting of the HRSOM in its first
layer and a classifier in the second layer. Each layer is trained independently. The
HRSOM is trained on the available input samples. Then, once training is complete, the
feature vector of each sample is augmented with the mapping of the HRSOM. Thus, for
example, the HRSOM mapped the feature vector x of a sample to coordinate ci then a
new set is created which represents the sample by the concatenated values xnew = (x;ci).
This concatenation is called augmentation. Thus, each sample is augmented by the cor-
responding HRSOM mapping. For two-dimensional HRSOMs the dimension of each
sample would then increase by 2.
The augmented data would be normalized then used to train a classifier. The classifier
represents the second layer in the ensemble. Test samples would be treated similarly.
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Figure 4.1: The HRSOM and NN classifier ensemble training phase
For each test sample, find its BMU on the trained HRSOM, concatenate the location of
the BMU to the feature vector of the test sample, then pass the augmented vector to the
classifier.
There are a number of advantages that arise out of the use of the HRSOM in this man-
ner: The HRSOM is an unsupervised learning algorithm that the learning process is not
affected by the unbalance nature of IDS datasets. The large display space can reveal com-
plex relationships among data and help identify areas of likely confusion. The classifier
in the second layer is then trained with the augmented data. The mapping information
would enrich the data with information that allows the classifier to focus on high confu-
sion areas. This should improve the overall quality of results when compared to training
standalone classifiers. The improvement should be particularly noticeable for samples
that are easily confused with cases from another class.
Figure 4.1 shows the architecture of the proposed ensemble. The HRSOM projects
n-dimensional training data set into q-dimensional display space. Then each dataset is
augmented with the HRSOM mapping, forming a p-dimensional dataset where p = n+q.
The augmented p-dimensional dataset is used to train and evaluate a classifier. This thesis
will use the FRPN as a classifier and the MLP as classifier for comparisons. The validation
and testing mapping data sets are obtained through the described augmentation process
with the help of a trained HRSOM.
The proposed ensemble will be able to produce results that are at least as good as those
that can be obtained from a standalone classifier or from a standalone SOM. The reason
can be explained as follows: In the worst case scenario, the augmentation would not con-
vey any useful information to a classifier. The training algorithm would consider such
information as noise. The MLP and FRPN training algorithms are well-known for being
insensitive to noise. As a consequence, the classifier would then model the feature vector
component of the input vectors in the normal manner. Thus, if the augmentation does
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convey some useful information then the classifier can take advantage of this in order to
reduce mapping errors. A possible risk is that the augmentation contributes information
that is so concise that this would lead to overfitting the training samples. This would
suggest that there is an optimal size for the HRSOM which would maximise the classi-
fiers performance without compromising on its generalization capabilities. This will be
investigated in this thesis and the thesis will find that overfitting is not an observed prob-
lem. This is quite possibly due to the large sample size that is typically available to IDS.
Moreover, the thesis will find that the HRSOM produces mappings that assist the clas-
sifier. Thus, the HRSOM produces mappings that are informative to the classifier. The
thesis will find that this is due to the additional information provided through the HRSOM
mapping results, which highlights the problem areas.
It is anticipated that the mapping can be (1) completely separated from samples of
another class, (2) the mapping can be close to mappings of other samples of the same
class, and (3) mappings of samples from different classes may be in close proximity
or overlapped where multiple class samples are mapped to the same location. These
mapping outcome can help the classifier in the following manner: For case (1) and (2) it
is sufficient to know the mapping location in order to classify the samples. For case (3) the
classifier needs to consult the feature component of the input vectors. Thus, the classifier
would be biased towards the use of feature values when classifying difficult cases while
simple cases would be classified on the basis of the augmented values. In other words,
the classifier is given the means to focus on difficult samples without compromising its
ability to classify simple cases.
The described property of the proposed ensemble method should be particularly useful
to IDS as some attack patterns are designed to avoid detection and would hence be easily
confused with patterns that represent normal behaviour. Standard methods weigh easy-
to-detect cases similar to hard-to-detect cases whereas the proposed method increases
the likelihood of detecting hard-to-detect cases. IDS data are typically balanced heavily
towards normal cases since attacks are normally the exception rather than the norm. Us-
ing the HRSOM makes the proposed system less sensitive to unbalanced nature of some
datasets. In fact, the thesis found that by using the proposed ensemble it is not necessary
to balance some datasets when training the classifier as no observable improvement in
results were made when using sampling to balance the data when training the classifiers.
The details of evaluation results are shown and discussed in Chapter 7, including com-
parison to previous work described in Chapter 3.
4.6 An Alternative method to train the HRSOM
This thesis proposes an alternative method to training HRSOM by scaling the result of
a lower resolution SOM. The GPU implementation has improved much of the compu-
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tational requirement of training a HRSOM. However, it is still very much limited to
the hardware capacity such as memory, and number of cores. The proposed alternative
method can generate a HRSOM of any arbitrary size given a well-trained SOM of a lower
resolution. Its grid size can be increased by using a bilinear filtering technique (to scale
to a size of up to twice the original size) [176, 177, 178] or trilinear filtering technique (to
scale to a size larger than twice the original size) [177, 178, 179]. The scaling technique
is not meant to replace natively trained HRSOMs as filtering is not a learning method
and hence does not learn anything new about the data. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that
scaling can greatly improve the visualization aspects of a SOM.
Bilinear and trilinear filters are normally applied to scaling images [176, 177, 178,
179]. Each image is assumed to consist of a finite set of pixels that are organized on a
regular lattice. For grayscale images each pixel is one dimensional vector, i.e., a scalar.
For color images each pixel is represented by a three dimensional vector. When increas-
ing the resolution of images the corresponding scaling algorithm needs to estimate the
pixel values (called texels). Bilinear filters achieve this by using bilinear interpolation to
compute texels. Similarly, trilinear filters apply a trilinear filter to compute the texels.
A SOM can be considered similar to a q-dimensional image where the n-dimensional
codebook vectors correspond to pixels. We have adapted the bilinear and trilinear filter
algorithms so as to work for q-dimensional spaces and n-dimensional “pixels”. Then the
adapted algorithms are applied to scaling the codebook vectors of a SOM. The scaled
version of a SOM would keep existing structures (the topology of the mappings would
remain unchanged). But the increased resolution can reveal some new structures since
there may be several different samples mapped to the same location and these mappings
would spread out on a scaled SOM. The scaling method would spread the mapping to
adjacent neurons such that the general mapping may not significantly changed. However,
it may be enough to separate samples that belong to different classes but were originally
mapped to the same neuron. Thus, scaling can improve the mapping quality. The scaled
mapping can provide some approximation about what could be expected on larger SOMs.
It can be expected that the rate of improvement in mapping quality may slow as the size
of a scaled SOM increases. The thesis will find that the quality of the mapping depends
heavily on how well the source codebook vectors were trained. The main advantage of
the proposed method is that the algorithm is very scalable requiring only a small fraction
of time when compared to training a SOM at the target resolution.
A more detailed description of the adaptation of the bilinear and trilinear filters will be
given in Chapter 8. The chapter will also present experimental results and discussions on
scaling SOMs. Results of scaled SOMs will be compared with trained HRSOMs by using
the metrics information gain, Gini impurity and silhouette index.
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4.7 Experimental Procedure Overview
The methods described in this chapter are evaluated against three IDS benchmark datasets:
KDD99, CTU-13, and UNSW-NB15 dataset. They represent different IDS network en-
vironment. The specific training parameters will be given in Section 6.1. The appendix
will present a fourth benchmark problem from a related domain, detection of malware, in
order to demonstrate suitability of the proposed methods to serve as a general framework.
In this thesis the HRSOM projections will be limited to two dimensions (2D) to aid
illustration of results. While the dimensionality of a HRSOM can be arbitrary it suffices
to demonstrate the effects of the proposed concepts by using 2D SOMs in this thesis. It
may be possible that results, in particular in the proposed ensemble, may improve further
by using 3D or 4D SOMs. However, the SOM dimensionality shall not be in the scope of
this thesis and will be left for future studies.
Trained SOMs are evaluated against quality metrics described in Section 4.4.1 and
Section 4.4.2. The number of clusters K is determined by the elbow method and by a
method that selects next available peak.The best performing trained SOM (using metrics
for unsupervised methods) is used for augmentation and then to train the MLP and FRPN.
The thesis will evaluate MLPs with two and three hidden layers. Three hidden layered
MLP and FRPNs are evaluated to observe effects of deeper architectures. A validation set
is used to determine the number of neurons in each MLP hidden layer or to determine the
size of the neuron pool for FRPNs.
It is known that FRPN do not require as many neurons as MLPs. While the thesis will
find that MLPs may require as many as 100 neurons in some hidden layers (depending on
the datatset) it is found that an FRPN requires less than 25 neurons. For the experiments
the thesis will vary the number of neurons in the MLP from 1 to 25 to show effects of the
size of the neuron pool on the results.
The proposed methods results are also compared with those in current literature that
use the same dataset, comparable performance metric, or alternative ensembles methods.
Chapter 5
Benchmark Data
This chapter describes the benchmark datasets which will be used to evaluate the proposed
methods. The datasets chosen for evaluation have these characteristics:
1. Relevant to current IDS research and has been used in recent literature
for benchmarking algorithms
2. Publicly accepted benchmarks and readily available for free use.
3. The sample size is large, varied and labelled.a
4. It includes both normal and attack samples.
These characteristics were chosen for the following reasons: The dataset has to be pub-
licly and readily available to allow for reproduction of results reported in this thesis. The
normal and attack samples have to be included in the dataset so as to allow comprehen-
sive evaluations to be conducted. Since the aim of this thesis is to contribute in the IDS
domain knowledge and since the two prevailing IDS strategies are based on knowledge
about either attack and/or normal and hence this thesis investigates what can be learned
from the evaluation of both types. Additionally, both types of samples, with the associ-
ated labels of normal or attack, have to be present when evaluating the false positive rate
and false negative rate. The data size has to reflect the real world IDS challenges where
the data volume is large and varied and hence this will demonstrate the scalability of the
proposed methods. The dataset has to be used by contemporary literature so to reflect
commonly accepted characteristics of data in current IDS, and to allow for comparisons
of results obtained by the proposed method with results published in literature.
This thesis identified three datasets that match these criteria: The KDD 1999 dataset
(KDD99 dataset), the Czech Technical University dataset CTU-13 dataset, and the UNSW
dataset UNSW-NB15 dataset. Other datasets were also considered as will be reported
below. KDD99 dataset is a popular IDS evaluation data benchmark [5, 14, 101, 105, 110,
180]. CTU-13 dataset is a collection of real world labelled data. UNSW-NB15 dataset
aThe availability of labels for both the training and testing datasets would be important in the evaluation
of the performence of the algorithms.
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Table 5.1: Statistics of redundant records in the KDD 1999 dataset [182].
Num. of Records Unique Records Amount of Redundancy
Whole Dataset 4898431 1074992 78.05%
10% Subset 494020 145586 70.53%
Corrected Dataset (test set) 311027 77289 75.15%
is the most recently published among the three datasets. The characteristics of these
datasets, data preprocessing methods, and the current state-of-the-art results for each of
these data benchmarks will be described in the following sections.
5.1 The KDD99 Dataset
The KDD 1999 dataset (KDD99 dataset) [11] is one of the most commonly used IDS
benchmark datasets. It is originally derived from DARPA 1998 IDS evaluation dataset
released by the MIT Lincoln Lab [12]. The lab recorded TCP dump data from a simu-
lation of typical U.S. Air Force local-area network (LAN) over seven weeks. A derived
dataset introduced by [13] became the learning problem at the third International Knowl-
edge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition. It is available at the University of
California, Irvine (UCI) websiteb. Despite its age the dataset remains popular in contem-
porary literature since it defines, among many others, a challenging problem that includes
samples of zero-day attacks as part of the test set. The dataset is made available in three
sets: the whole dataset, a 10% subset, the corrected dataset. Table 5.1 shows the number
of samples in each of these sets and the amount of redundancy in each set. The whole
dataset consists of 4,898,431 single connection entries that include 24 attack types. The
dataset publisher provided a sampled 10% subset from the whole dataset. It consists of
494,020 entries, and it is commonly used as a training set [5, 181, 182, 183]. The cor-
rected set is commonly used as the test set. The test set has gone through label correction
such that it is commonly called “corrected” dataset. The set consists of 311,029 entries
including 14 attacks that are neither in the whole dataset nor in the 10% subset.
Each entry is described by a 41-dimensional feature vector and is labelled as either
normal or by attack type, e.g., smurf, ftp write, and ipsweep. Each of these labels belongs
to one of four different attack categories:
1. DoS: denial-of-service, which include: apache2, back(door), land, mailbomb, nep-
tune, pod (ping-of-death), processtable, smurf, teardrop, udpstorm.
2. R2L: remote-to-local is an unauthorized access from a remote machine, which in-
clude: ftp write, guess passwd, httptunnel, imap, named, phf, sendmail, snmpge-
tattack, snmpguess, worm, xlock, xsnoop, spy, warezclient, warezmaster.
bhttp://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html, accessed 24 September 2018.
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3. U2R: user-to-root is an unauthorized access to local superuser privileges, which
include: xterm, buffer overflow, httptunnel, loadmodule, multihop, perl, ps, rootkit,
sqlattack, rootkit.
4. PROBE: surveillance and other probing, which include: mscan, nmap, saint, satan,
portsweep, ipsweep.
The 10% samples subset oversampled the minority attacks such as Remote-to-local (R2L)
and User-to-Root (U2R). These three sets do not share the same probability distribution,
and the test dataset includes attacks not appearing in the 10% subset nor the whole dataset
but still belong to the four attack categories. This is to simulate the zero day attack that
may occur in a real world environment.
The dataset is still used in recent literature despite it being almost 20 years old [14,
110]. It remains to be the largest IDS evaluation dataset. A subset of KDD99 dataset
called NSL-KDD dataset is compiled to address some of the original dataset criticism
in [182]. The subset is about 10% of the whole dataset aimed to present more balanced
training set. This thesis decided on using the original dataset because we are interested in
studying the relationship between normal and attack samples. The mapping of the original
dataset would give us better insight about the relationship between normal and attack
patterns of runtime environment. It provides one-to-one performance evaluation against
previous proposed approaches as surveyed in Chapter 3. Additionally, its properties are
still relevant as IDS data benchmark. The dataset is skewed towards normal samples
which is in line with the anomaly based IDS [9]. This dataset would show if anomaly
detection is the best approach to IDS. The attack patterns for example DoS, U2R, and
R2L, etc are still occurring in recent real-world attacks [49].
Table 5.2 shows a summary of the 41-dimensional features in the KDD99 whole
dataset. The first six features are the TCP dump published by DARPA 1998 and which
formed the original IDS evaluation dataset. Stolfo et al. [13] identified higher-level
features to help differentiate normal connections from attacks. Time-based features are
added, which consist of “same host” and “same service” features. The “same host”
features examine the connections with the same destination host as the current one in the
past two seconds, and calculate statistics related to protocol behaviour, service, etc. The
“same service” features covers the connections with the same service as the current one
in the past two seconds. These features can indicate the attacks that consist of connection
sequences, such as probing attacks. It scans the hosts or ports using time intervals much
larger than two seconds, such that hosts-based traffic features are constructed using a
window of 100 connections to the same host.
The rest of the features are domain knowledge inference. The R2L and U2R attacks
are normally involve only a single connection, and embedded in the data portions of
packets. Unlike DOS and probing attacks, which may involve many connections to the
same hosts in a very short period of time. There appears to be no sequential patterns that
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Table 5.2: KDD99 Whole Dataset Feature Summary
No. Feature Name Data Type MIN/COUNT MEAN MAX STDEV
1. duration Integer 0 134.851 58329 1317.71
2. protocol type Symbolic 3
3. service Symbolic 70
4. flag Symbolic 11
5. src bytes Integer 0 5,832.13 1,379,963,888 2,009,610
6. dst bytes Integer 0 4,876.32 1,309,937,401 1,376,850
7. land Integer 0 0.00002419 1 0.00491784
8. wrong fragment Integer 0 0.00273582 3 0.0883179
9. urgent Integer 0 0.00003628 14 0.0154016
10. hot Integer 0 0.0542795 77 0.996088
11. num failed logins Integer 0 0.000146048 5 0.0155804
12. logged in Integer 0 0.630845 1 0.485756
13. num compromised Integer 0 0.0357081 7,479 8.23196
14. root shell Integer 0 0.000302329 1 0.0173823
15. su attempted Integer 0 0.000167443 2 0.0172517
16. num root Integer 0 0.0587529 7,468 8.4058
17. num file creations Integer 0 0.0054168 43 0.264996
18. num shells Integer 0 0.000338608 2 0.0186462
19. num access files Integer 0 0.00431997 9 0.0733631
20. num outbound cmds Integer 0 0 0 0
21. is host login Integer 0 0.00000186 1 0.00136399
22. is guest login Integer 0 0.00380269 1 0.0614402
23. count Integer 0 49.0979 511 85.098
24. srv count Integer 0 13.0402 511 29.3911
25. serror rate Real 0 0.189776 1 0.388639
26. srv serror rate Real 0 0.190449 1 0.392534
27. rerror rate Real 0 0.0781562 1 0.268587
28. srv rerror rate Real 0 0.0779682 1 0.267627
29. same srv rate Real 0 0.782579 1 0.392443
30. diff srv rate Real 0 0.0316133 1 0.116912
31. srv diff host rate Real 0 0.117822 1 0.264604
32. dst host count Integer 0 162.383 255 102.042
33. dst host srv count Integer 0 159.484 255 109.994
34. dst host same srv rate Real 0 0.671179 1 0.425758
35. dst host diff srv rate Real 0 0.0493501 1 0.130551
36. dst host same src port rate Real 0 0.0929464 1 0.229373
37. dst host srv diff host rate Real 0 0.0217551 1 0.0564777
38. dst host serror rate Real 0 0.190322 1 0.391629
39. dst host srv serror rate Real 0 0.189812 1 0.389131
40. dst host rerror rate Real 0 0.0795506 1 0.263655
41. dst host srv rerror rate Real 0 0.0782997 1 0.262562
42. Labels Symbolic 23
are frequent in these attacks. Stolfo et al. [13] therefore constructed “content” features by
adding features that look for suspicious behaviour in the data portions based on domain
knowledge, such as the number of “su” commandc attempts.
All 41 features are used in this thesis, which include the TCP dump, time-based, and
domain knowledge features. The feature segments are indicative of the different attack
types. The TCP dump features are considered enough to differentiate DoS attacks, where
cIt is a *NIX based command that allow user to act as root
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Table 5.3: Charateristics of the botnet scenarios as seen in [10]
Scenario Bot name IRC SPAM CF PS DDOS FF P2P US HTTP NOTE
1 Neris X X X
2 Neris X X X
3 Rbot X X
4 Rbot X X X UUD and ICMP DdoS
5 Virut X X Scan web proxies
6 Menti X X Proprierty C&C. RDP
7 Sogou X Chinese hosts
8 Murlo X Proprierty C&C.,
Net-BIOS, STUN
9 Neris X X X X
10 Rbot X X UDP DdoS
11 Rbot X X X ICMP DdoS
12 NSIS.ay X X Synchronization.
13 Virut X X X X Captcha. Web mail
packet sizes are outside of normal packet range. The time-based features indicate higher
levels of attack that take longer to execute, consist of multiple connections and do not
show any deviation from the normal connection based on TCP packet information alone.
The domain knowledge feature is essential for the minority attack types R2L and U2R
where the network connections and sequences may look normal.
5.2 CTU-13 Dataset
CTU-13 Dataset [10] is a collection of thirteen botnet scenarios, curated by the Czech
Technical University (CTU) in the Czech Republic. Each scenario is a representative of a
particular virtual machine infected by specific malware. The network traffic was captured
live, converted to NetFlow format, and labelled. The features included in the datasets are
Start Time, Duration, Source IP address, Source Port, Direction, Destination IP address,
Destination Port number, State, SToS, Total Packets and Total number of Bytes.
There are three labels in this dataset: background, normal and botnet. The background
label is assigned to all network traffic. Then, network traffic that originated from known
and controlled systems in the network, such as routers, proxies, laboratory workstation,
etc, are assigned the label ’normal’. Lastly, the botnet label is assigned to all traffic com-
ing from known infected IP addresses. This means that for traffic labelled “background”
it is unknown whether it is normal or botnet.
Table 5.3 shows the main characteristics of each botnet malware [10]. It describes
the protocol used, which are Internet Relay Chat (IRC), peer-to-peer (P2P) or Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), the activities the botnet carries out, which are sending SPAM,
Click-Fraud (CF), port scan (PS), Distributed DoS (DDoS), and if Fast-Flux (FF) tech-
nique is used or if they are custom compiled.
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Table 5.4: CTU-13 Dataset Training Feature Summary
No. Feature Name Data Type MIN/COUNT MEAN MAX STDEV
1. Duration Real 0 37.1895 3599.999756 292.747
2. Protocol Symbols 5
3. Src port number Integer 8 39554.8 65535 17280.2
4. Direction Symbols 3
5. Dst port number Integer 1 1389.24 65535 6348.53
6. State Symbols 100
7. sTosf Integer 0 9.98E-05 3 0.0159186
8. dTosf Integer 0 7.68E-06 2 0.00391902
9. TotPkts Integer 1 18.7912 235853 774.397
10. TotBytes Integer 120 12810.1 277753869 874280
11. SrcBytes Integer 60 2429.97 136546777 356174
12. Labels Symbols 237
The first scenario, for example, represents Neris malware. It consists of NetFlow sam-
ples recoded over 6 hours for healthy and infected machines with resulted in 2.5 millions
of network flows were collected. The Neris malware is an IRC-based Command-and-
Control (C&C) server. The infected machine (botnet) communicates using several C&C
channels then tries to send SPAM and perform click-fraud using advertisement services.
The training, validation, and testing set generation for CTU-13 dataset is described
in [10]. Botnet families used in training and validation sets should not be used in the
testing set [10]. This is to evaluate the model’s generalisation performance to detect new
attacks. The training and validation set is approximately 80% of the dataset. The back-
ground label dominates the dataset, such that in this work the only background samples
included are the ones with normal or botnet IP addresses. The binary learning problem is
defined as follows: the positive class consists of the attack samples and the negative class
consists of all samples labelled as normal or background.
A summary of the features in the training set is shown in Table 5.4. This thesis uses the
readily available features instead of extracting them from the raw packet capture using the
Argus software suite d as described in [10]. Carbon copies and start time are excluded.
The IP address is also removed because they are easily spoofed [107]. The start time is
specific to the time when the traffic is recorded, which is not a very descriptive feature to
generalise. The labels are encoded according to the binary learning problem.
The dataset is available from Stratosphere Lab which is maintained by the Czech Tech-
nical University (CTU) e. The dataset has been used as a benchmark for evaluations in
recent literature [7, 107, 122].
dhttps://qosient.com/argus/index.shtml
ehttps://www.stratosphereips.org/datasets-ctu13/, last accessed on 24 September 2018
fType of Servie (ToS) is the second byte of IPv4 header calculated by Argus Software that encode packet
capture data into human-readable one.
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5.3 UNSW-NB15
Table 5.5: The distribution of labels in the UNSW-NB15 dataset.
Label Total Sample Training set Testing set
Normal 93000 56000 60.22% 37000 39.78%
Analysis 2677 2000 74.71% 677 25.29%
Backdoor 2329 1746 74.97% 583 25.03%
DoS 16353 12264 75.00% 4089 25.00%
Exploits 44525 33393 75.00% 11132 25.00%
Fuzzers 24246 18184 75.00% 6062 25.00%
Generic 58871 40000 67.95% 18871 32.05%
Reconnaissance 13987 10491 75.01% 3496 24.99%
Shellcode 1511 1133 74.98% 378 25.02%
Worms 174 130 74.71% 44 25.29%
TOTAL 257673 175341 68.05% 82332 31.95%
The UNSW-NB15 dataset [16] is published by Cyber Range Lab of the Australian
Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS). The data was collected over 15 hours by an IXIA Per-
fectStorm tool g. The tool simulates a virtual network environment with three machines,
where two machine generated normal network traffic, while the third one generated mali-
cious network traffic. The captured packets were preprocessed and labelled. Normal and
attack samples are included. This dataset was created to update and address some of the
criticisms on KDD99 dataset which mainly concerned the distribution of different attacks
and the type of attacks included in the training and testing sets [16, 182, 184]. As a con-
sequence UNSW-NB15 dataset includes the same set of attack labels in both the training
and testing sets:
1. Fuzzer : feeding random input to crash the target system through security loopholes.
2. Analysis : web application intrusion via unsecured ports, email and web scripts.
3. Backdoor : unauthorised remote access to a device and plain text files.
4. DoS : denial-of-service, typically through flooding.
5. Exploit : intrusion by taking advantage of defects in the system.
6. Generic : attack by hash function collision.
7. Reconnaissance : system probing to gather information to avoid security controls.
8. Shellcode : taking control over the machine through the shell.
9. Worm : self-replication to spread across the network.
The dataset is divided into approximately 60:40 ratio for training and testing sets [108].
The training set has 175,341 entries, while the testing set has 82,332 entries. Redundant
ghttps://www.ixiacom.com/products/perfectstorm
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records are omitted. Each class label is included in both sets as shown in Table 5.5.
The sampling of training and testing sets were not fully described in [108]. The normal
samples have an approximately 60:40 ratio for training and testing set. However, the
attack samples ratio is approximately 75:25 for training and testing sets, which brings the
total ratio closer to 70:30 division. The training set ends up having approximately 60:40
ratio of normal to attack samples, while the testing set has approximately 45:55 ratio.
Each sample is described by 42 features as is shown in Table 5.6. It can be observed that
the set of features is similar to those in the KDD99 dataset and CTU-13 dataset datasets
which makes sense given that these datasets all consist of network-based information. The
Argus software suite d was used to extract features from the raw packet capture. Bro-IDS
tool h was then used to filter the malicious activities by generating connection records
from the packet capture (pcap) files, HTTP requests and replies, as well as File Transfer
Protocol (FTP) activities. The output from the two software are matched using the IP
addresses and network port numbers to make up features number 1 to 26. The rest of the
features are inferred from the timing and sequences of connections, for example ct srv src
is the number of connection on the same service and source addresses in 100 connections.
Table 5.6: UNSW-NB15 Training set Feature Summary
No. Feature Name Data Type MIN/COUNT MEAN MAX STDEV
1. duration Real 0 1.35929 59.999989 6.48377
2. protocol type Symbolic 133
3. service Symbolic 13
4. state Symbolic 9
5. spkts Integer 1 20.3105 9,616 136.891
6. dpkts Integer 0 18.9783 10,974 110.223
7. sbytes Integer 28 8,842.47 12,965,233 174,653
8. dbytes Integer 0 14931 14,655,550 143,634
9. rate Real 0 95,372.80 1,000,000 165,373
10. sttl Integer 0 179.648 255 102.944
11. dttl Integer 0 79.61 254 110.533
12. sload Real 0 73,436,800 5,988,000,256 188,302,000
13. dload Real 0 671145 22,422,730 2,422,430
14. sloss Integer 0 4.95465 4,803 66.014
15. dloss Integer 0 6.94982 5,484 52.7269
16. sinpkt Real 0 985.942 84371.492188 7238.4
17. dinpkt Real 0 88.2122 56716.824219 987.336
18. sjit Real 0 4976.13 1,460,480 44950.7
19. djit Real 0 604.321 289388.28125 4060.13
20. swin Integer 0 116.332 255 126.958
21. stcpb Integer 0 967700000 4295000000 1353202037
22. dtcpb Integer 0 968600000 4295000000 1355204302
Continued on next page
hhttps://www.bro.org/sphinx/broids/index.html
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Table 5.6 – continued from previous page
No. Feature Name Data Type MIN/COUNT MEAN MAX STDEV
23. dwin Integer 0 115.086 255 126.796
24. tcprtt Real 0 0.0413953 2.518893 0.079351
25. synack Real 0 0.0210217 2.100352 0.0434205
26. ackdat Real 0 0.020373 1.520884 0.0404916
27. smean Integer 28 136.831 1,504 204.681
28. dmean Integer 0 124.208 1,458 258.446
29. trans depth Integer 0 0.105959 172 0.776487
30. response body len Integer 0 2144.26 6,558,056 54,176.50
31. ct srv src Integer 1 9.31254 63 10.7051
32. ct state ttl Integer 0 1.30477 6 0.954197
33. ct dst ltm Integer 1 6.19757 51 8.0481
34. ct src dport ltm Integer 1 5.38633 51 8.05063
35. ct dst sport ltm Integer 1 4.20922 46 5.78575
36. is ftp login Integer 1 8.7349 65 10.9589
37. ct ftp cmd Integer 0 0.0149482 4 0.125949
38. ct flw http mthf Integer 0 0.0149482 4 0.125949
39. ct dst src ltm Integer 0 0.133044 30 0.70066
40. ct src ltm Integer 1 6.95956 60 8.32124
41. ct srv dst Integer 1 9.10654 62 10.7567
42. is sm ips ports Integer 0 0.0157524 1 0.124662
43. Labels Symbolic 10
The UNSW-NB15 dataset has been used in recent literature [109, 111], and can be
obtained from the University of New South Wales (UNSW) i.
5.4 Other available datasets
This Section describes datasets that, while available as a benchmark for IDS, will not be
used for evaluations of intrusion detection capabilities of proposed methods in this thesis.
The Cyber warfare competition dataset can be considered as a benchmark dataset [185].
Sangster et al. [185] explains the setup of the network warfare competition and how the
ITOC Cyber Defense Competition 2009 (CDX 2009) dataset is generated and collected.
The network warfare competition is characterised by the target setup and network traf-
fic generated. In the defensive setup, each participating team is required to maintain
a secure network and provide consistent network services. Attacks are carried out only
from officially sanctioned neutral offensive teams. In the offensive setup, the participating
teams attack each other’s network or they attack a common target. There are three types
ihttps://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/unsw-canberra-cyber/cybersecurity/ADFA-NB15-Datasets/,
last accessed on 24 September 2018
CHAPTER 5. BENCHMARK DATA 64
of traffic generated, either from human interaction or automatically generated, which are
offensive (red) traffic, defensive (blue) traffic, and user/non-malicious (white) traffic. In-
ternet background traffic is absent as much of the competition is run offline, such that
there is disproportionate high volume of malicious traffic generated.
The CDX 2009 competition was running over the course of four days within a Virtual
Private Network (VPN). The white traffic is automatically generated as is the human
interaction of participating 20 people. Red traffic is generated from the activities of a 30-
people National Security Agency (NSA) red team. The participating teams are instructed
to run a secured operational network that integrates with three untrusted workstation. In
masking their attack, the red team generates white traffic. Three network sensors collect
the data where one of these is dedicated to capture the red traffic.
Sangster et al. compared the CDX 2009 with 1998 DARPA intrusion evaluation
dataset [185]. The CDX 2009 dataset differs in data and traffic generation, the scale of
the dataset and the accompanying artefact. The 1998 DARPA dataset is fully synthetically
generated while CDX 2009 consists of a mix of human generated red and white traffic.
The CDX 2009 dataset is lacking diversity as it was running in an isolated network. The
paper referred to the HoneyNet project describes a possible tool for introducing more
diversity in the red traffic. The authors claim that the CDX 2009 dataset has a bigger
scale and is more varied than the 1998 DARPA dataset. However, the time scale is limited
to the 4-days the competition was run. The CDX 2009 has accompanying artefacts with
the network traffic, such as logs aggregated from network monitoring devices, hosts, and
servers on the internal competition network as well as detection log and email traffic.
CDX 2009 dataset is not used as evaluation in this thesis because despite having real-
time data collection, it is lacking in traffic diversity due to it being run offline. The CTU-
13 dataset dataset is much larger, more recent and collected from a live online system,
therefore it is a more suitable alternative for the purposes of this thesis.
Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge [186] is a dataset published for a competi-
tion hosted by Big Data Innovators Gathering 2015, which is a satellite event of the World
Wide Web 2015 conference. It was curated by the Microsoft groups: Microsoft Malware
Protection Center, Microsoft Azure Machine Learning and Microsoft Talent Management.
The dataset consists of 9 different malware families as shown in Table 5.7. The feature set
of the data is not published. Instead each sample consists of two files : (1) the sterilised
hexadecimal representation of the file’s binary content and (2) the corresponding IDA
disassembler tool output file. The compressed training set is 17.52 GB which consists
of 10870 malware samples. The training set is labelled but the testing set is not. This
dataset is not suitable for IDS evaluation because there are no normal samples included.
However, the dataset will be used in this thesis to demonstrate multi-label capability of
the proposed approach [172]. This will be demonstrated in Appendix A.
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Table 5.7: Distribution of labels in the MS Malware Dataset.
























This thesis partitions the data as necessary j into training, validation, and test sets.
The purpose of the training set is to create a model, while the validation set is used as
generalisation indicator and to fine tune training parameters. The testing set evaluates
the generalisation performance after fine tuning. The KDD99 dataset and UNSW-NB15
dataset provided training and testing sets. The KDD99 dataset provided the training set in
the 10% set but we used the whole dataset as it is available to us, and because the proposed
methods are sufficiently scalable to handle a large amount of data. The validation set
consists of 20% randomly selected samples from the training set for each dataset. Samples
selected for validation are removed from the training set. The CTU-13 dataset has to
be manually partition. This is done according to a procedure described by Garcia et.
al. [10] and is shown in Table 5.8. Its validation set consists of scenario 4, 5 and 7 (see
Table 5.8). Carbon copies from each dataset are removed as is much of the background
traffic. Background traffic kept have a known IP address in either source or destination IP
address field. A summary of the partitioned datasets are shown in Table 5.9, Table 5.10,
and Table 5.11 for the KDD99, CTU-13 and UNSW-NB15 dataset datasets respectively.
The datasets then undergo preprocessing to suitably encode and normalise data values.
The machine learning algorithms in this thesis require numeric values, so symbolic fea-
tures have to be appropriately encoded. Numerical features are scaled either using the
jPartitioning data is not always necessary since some datasets have already been suitably partitioned.
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Table 5.9: KDD99 dataset label breakdowns
Phase Attack Normal TOTAL
TRN 196634 (24.39%) 609610 (75.61%) 806244
VAL 65544 (24.39%) 203204 (75.61%) 268748
TST 29378 (38.01%) 47913 (61.99%) 77291
Table 5.10: CTU-13 dataset dataset label breakdowns
Phase Attack Normal TOTAL
TRN 36676 (16.16%) 190232 (83.84%) 226908
VAL 944 (2.82%) 32585 (97.18%) 33529
TST 173534 (53.58%) 150370 (46.42%) 323904
Table 5.11: UNSW-NB15 dataset label breakdowns
Phase Attack Normal TOTAL
TRN 95414 (68.02%) 44859 (31.98%) 140273
VAL 23927 (68.23%) 11141 (31.77%) 35068
TST 45332 (55.06%) 37000 (44.94%) 82332
min-max method (normalisation) or the z-score method (standardization) to minimise the
effect of outlier data points.
The SOM implementation [17] commonly uses the Euclidean distance metric, such
that any attribute with a large value range would be more influential than attributes with
small value ranges. For example, values of the feature sload in the UNSW-NB15 dataset
(as shown in Table 5.6) can be almost 6 billion times larger than values of the feature
is sm ips ports. If left untreated then this can create a very significant bias in the map-
pings of the SOM. Scaling the features would allow each of the feature to contribute
proportionally to the computation of distance values in the algorithm. Scaling data also
benefits supervised NN algorithms. Training algorithms of supervised classifiers that use
the gradient descent method were shown to converge faster by using scaled features [150].
For training the HRSOM, the symbolic features are transformed by using a one-hot
binary encoding. This was done to ensure that feature values are equidistant in Euclidean
space given that there is no particular ordering or similarity among the various symbolic
values. For training MLP and FRPN, symbolic features are encoded via a simple sequen-
tial integer encoding since the supervised nature of the training algorithm and non-linear
mapping capabilities of the MLP and FRPN do not require one-hot-encoded values. In
fact, a one-hot-encoding can introduce sparsity into data vectors to which methods such
as MLP and FRPN are sensitive.
Numeric values are then normalized. There are numerous normalisation techniques
available. Some of the more commonly used techniques are normalisation and standard-
ization. Normalisation transforms numeric features into a fixed range. Given an attribute
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x, target range trange = max(x′)−min(x′) (i.e. max(x′) = −1, min(x′) = 1), and a raw
value range range = max(x)−min(x), then the normalised value x′ can be computed as
shown in Equation 5.1.
x′ = 2× (x−min(x))× trange
range
−1 (5.1)
Standardization aims to transform the data such that its standard deviation is 1 and
its mean is 0. The transformed values are not bounded, unlike normalisation. Given a
numeric attribute x, the mean x̄ and the standard deviation σ(x) then the standardised





The data in KDD99 dataset and CTU-13 dataset are normalised. For the UNSW-
NB15 dataset dataset the recommended feature transformation is standardization [16].
The UNSW-NB15 dataset features have such a wide range between the minimum and
maximum values that they are deviate significantly from the mean. Normalisation into a
specified interval may create noise distribution because it is difficult to estimate the central
tendency variance of the distribution. If the features are normalised between [-1, 1], there
is no guarantee that the number of samples with feature values ≥ 0 is the same as ones
with feature values ≤ 0. Standardization allows for outliers to be scaled and minimise
their learning effects without being bounded into a certain range.
The data labels are discarded when training the SOMs. For the supervised methods the
labels are binary encoded to represent the positive (attack) and negative (normal) samples.
The class distribution of the three datasets is unbalanced. We found that balancing
was not necessary for the CTU-13 dataset and UNSW-NB15 dataset datasets. A closer
inspection into possible reasons showed that the standard deviation of the feature values
are quite dissimilar as was shown in Table 5.4. This implies that they can be deterministic
enough without requiring sampling. Of the three datasets the distribution between attack
and normal samples in the UNSW-NB15 dataset are the least skewed [16] and the features
are well distinct as shown in Table 5.6 such that sample balancing was not necessary.
However, the class distribution in the KDD99 dataset is very skewed, and the class
distribution in the training set differs significantly from the class distribution in the test
set. Additionally, we observed that the features are more similar in values as shown by
the standard deviations in Table 5.2. This thesis found that balancing will produce a more
robust model. There are numerous balancing techniques available. This thesis will use the
negative binomial distribution method [187]. The method trains X models. Each model
is trained using a subsampled set of the training set. The classification result is calculated
by averaging the model outputs.
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Table 5.12: The KDD99 dataset NBD matrix for different parameter n when X = 10
n X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10
0.25 588635 591035 591462 588979 588901 591290 589600 588227 590088 589966
0.3 458916 459752 459528 461181 457151 458934 458169 460450 460934 460587
0.35 365107 364479 365314 365391 363874 363363 366461 363612 364721 365346
0.4 294171 296183 294888 293834 294611 295978 295124 295274 295037 295499
0.45 239570 241281 239614 241462 240642 239876 241188 239241 239025 239740
0.5 195869 196583 196981 196811 196622 195724 197425 196634 196272 196913
0.55 160497 160166 161179 160428 160834 160618 162010 160369 160747 160556
0.6 130783 131109 131515 131725 131342 130874 130974 130706 130692 131296
0.65 105831 106798 106048 106523 105892 106297 105765 105936 105438 105619
0.7 84123 84807 84718 84534 84021 84043 84614 84796 84189 84603
0.75 65098 65302 65440 65153 65543 65571 65544 65280 65176 65199
0.8 49077 48718 49174 49083 49340 49331 48970 49488 49082 49378
0.85 34559 34307 34687 34404 34738 34615 34817 34813 34674 34651
0.9 21726 22029 21918 22026 21733 21610 21705 21748 21989 22152
0.95 10313 10347 10308 10366 10360 10296 10310 10582 10411 10493
A X subsampled sets are generated as follows: First, choose the distribution probabil-
ity n then generate X random numbers chosen from an Negative Binomial Distribution
(NBD) according to n, i.e, the number of minority samples in this case the attack cases.
Table 5.12 shows the KDD99 dataset NBD matrix for different parameter n when X = 10.
If n = 0.7 and X = 10 shown in bold, this means each of the 10 subsampled training sets
would have all of the attack samples to make up 70% of the set and the remaining 30%
are randomly selected normal samples.
5.6 Learning problem complexity evaluation
Moustafa et. al. demonstrated the learning complexity of the UNSW-NB15 dataset by
training a set of different out-of-the-box classifiers [108]. This section discusses the learn-
ing difficulty of the three datasets by using a similar set of classifiers [108]: Decision
Tree (DT), Naive Bayes (NB), MLP, Logistic Regression (LR), and SOM. The scikit-
learn software [20] is used to train the DT, NB, and the LR while an in-house software
implementation is used to train the MLP [18] and SOM [17]. We followed the training
and evaluation procedures described in [108].
Table 5.13 shows the classification performance when using the KDD99 dataset dataset.
Most classifiers exhibit a very good training performance achieving over 99% accuracy,
except for naive bayes. NB uses the training set distribution to classify the test samples.
The KDD99 dataset training distribution is unbalanced (since we followed the procedure
as described in [108]) so this explains the relative poor performance of the NB classifier.
The validation performance follows the trend of the training performance. DT and MLP
give the best results with respect to generalisation capabilities. While NB produced the
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Table 5.13: Out-of-the-box classifier performance on KDD99 dataset
Classlifier Parameters Training (%) Validation (%) Testing (%)
ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
DT Max depth = 15 99.88 99.76 0.00 99.52 99.85 99.69 0.01 99.43 92.75 89.55 0.58 81.84
NB prior=’none’ 97.55 95.08 2.28 97.04 97.54 95.06 2.30 97.04 92.71 89.80 2.23 84.46
MLP 100:20 99.90 99.80 0.01 99.65 99.89 99.77 0.02 99.62 92.85 89.72 0.60 82.17
LR C=1, penalty=’l2’ 99.31 98.58 0.23 97.89 99.30 98.56 0.22 97.82 91.77 88.14 1.29 80.46
SOM 32×24 99.55 99.08 0.10 98.46 99.54 99.05 0.08 98.38 91.23 87.25 1.20 78.90
Table 5.14: Out-of-the-box classifier performance on CTU-13 dataset
Classlifier Parameters Training (%) Validation (%) Testing (%)
ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
DT Max depth = 15 99.97 99.91 0.01 99.86 99.85 97.34 0.07 94.92 98.98 99.04 0.07 98.17
NB prior=’none’ 94.40 85.13 6.51 99.12 98.98 99.04 0.07 98.17 71.63 74.65 6.63 61.41
MLP 100:20 98.82 96.44 1.23 99.06 99.70 99.35 0.38 100 99.32 99.36 0.90 99.51
LR C=1, penalty=’l2’ 94.50 83.56 3.94 86.41 99.74 95.64 0.26 100 99.19 99.24 1.08 99.41
SOM 32×24 98.70 96.04 1.05 97.41 99.63 93.81 0.37 99.58 99.19 99.24 0.92 99.28
Table 5.15: Out-of-the-box classifier performance on UNSW-NB15 dataset
Classlifier Parameters Training (%) Validation (%) Testing (%)
ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
DT Max depth = 15 96.17 97.22 8.56 98.40 95.02 96.40 10.6 97.63 86.36 88.38 23.2 94.17
NB prior=’none’ 71.63 74.65 6.63 61.41 71.44 74.50 6.43 61.14 72.68 70.88 12.2 60.37
MLP 100:20 95.29 96.58 9.57 97.58 94.97 96.35 10.1 97.35 86.52 88.87 27.2 97.15
LR C=1, penalty=’l2’ 93.24 95.23 19.5 99.22 93.03 95.10 20.2 99.20 80.59 84.71 40.3 97.66
SOM 32×24 91.99 94.39 23.3 99.17 91.91 94.36 23.6 99.15 77.17 82.70 49.7 99.08
highest detection rate it also exhibited the highest false positive rate. We noted that DT
and MLP produced the lowest false positive rate on the test set.
The training performance from these classifiers indicates that the KDD99 dataset would
be difficult to improve as the results are quite close to perfect. The generalisation perfor-
mance, however, has room for improvement as it is only peaked at i.e. ACC = 92.85%. It
will be interesting to study how the proposed methods would compare to these baseline
results as (a) the unbalanced training and validation data would be compensated by the
data balancing method described above, and (b) data augmentation with the assistance of
a HRSOM should assist the classifier.
Table 5.14 shows results when using the CTU-13 dataset dataset. The table shows
that DT produces the best training performance while NB and LR produced the lowest
training performance. The validation accuracy ranges between 98-99% as the distribution
is skewed heavily to normal samples. The detection rate reached 100% for some of the
classifiers. This is because the validation set includes all of the botnet type that appear
in the training set. Unlike the KDD99 data, the generalization performance of DT is not
CHAPTER 5. BENCHMARK DATA 70
among the best. This is an expected result since the tree can fit the training set perfectly
(as is observed in Table 5.14) but may not generalise well. MLP however again shows an
overall generalisation performance that is among the best.
The poor training performance of NB and LR implies that the CTU-13 learning problem
is not linear and the training data distribution is heavily unbalanced. HRSOM mapping
will offer a better insight later in the thesis of these classifiers results. The performance
observed also indicates that tuning the model would be difficult as none of the attack
samples in the testing set are included in either training or validation sets.
Table 5.15 shows the classification performances when using the UNSW-NB15 dataset
dataset. For each of the classifiers the training and validation results are quite similar. The
accuracy ranged from 71% (NB) to 96% (DT). DT correspondingly outperformed MLP
in the training and validation accuracy. However, with respect to generalization capability
the MLP generalised best overall.
UNSW-NB15 dataset generalisation performance appears to be the most challenging
of the three datasets, despite having the same set of attack types appear in both training
and testing sets. The data distribution is also the most balanced.
This section demonstrated the different difficulty levels of the three learning problems.
The KDD99 dataset performance improvement is challenging as it is so close to 100%.
Additionally, the distribution between training and testing sets are so different that 100%
accuracy in the training performance may not indicate similarly high generalisation per-
formance. The CTU-13 dataset is collected from real world network traffic such that there
are some ambiguous pattern such as the background labelled traffics are unknown whether
they are normal or attack samples. The proposed general purpose IDS should be able to
handle this realistic dataset. Lastly, the UNSW-NB15 dataset generalisation performance
indicates a challenging learning problem as this set produced low ACC and high FPR.
The results support the proposed ensemble. The MLP consistently produced results
that were among the best of these classifiers. No other classifier exhibited such a degree
of consistency. Hence, this should render the MLP (and the proposed FRPN) best suited
as a classifier in the proposed ensemble.
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Table 5.16: The generalisation performance of these datasets in contemporary literature.
Dataset Model Metric Performance (%)
KDD99
Bagged DT C4.5 [100, 99] ACC 92.71
hierarchy SOM [5] DR 90.60FPR 1.38
CNN and SVM [110] ACC 94.62
Neptune ∈ KDD99
SOM and MLP [101]
DR 99.72
FPR 0.06
satan ∈ KDD99 DR 90FPR 4.5
portsweep ∈ KDD99 DR 97.9FPR 4.19
CTU-13 dataset BClus [10] ACC 42
C4.5 Decision Tree [107] DR 98.72FPR 1.24





SOM [188] DR 73.2FPR 15.2
Local Outlier Factor (LOF) [188] DR 38.3FPR 5.3
K-Nearest Neighbour (K-NN) [188] DR 91.3FPR 5.1
CTU-13 Neris cost-sensitive linear classifier [122] ACC 99.97
DR 75
FPR 0.031
UNSW-NB15 Decision Tree [108] ACC 85.56
Boosting-based NN[109] ACC 86.40
HTTP ∈ UNSW-NB15 Multiscale hebbian neural network[111] ACC 93
5.7 Results in current literature
Table 5.16 summarises the IDS performances that are reported in related literature (please
refer to Chapter 3 for a summary of corresponding methods). Several authors used NN
methods as part of a component of their proposed IDS [5, 101, 109, 110, 111]. DT is also
a popular choice and is often shown to produce competitive results [7, 99, 100, 107, 108].
It is interesting to observe that the winners of the KDD99 competition re-sampled the
whole dataset and trained bagged decision tree C4.5 [99, 100]. The generalisation accu-
racy is 92.71%, which is similar to the generalisation performance obtained by us when
training standard DT as was shown in Table 5.13.
There are a number of SOM and NN approaches such as SOM and NN ensemble
in [101], hierarchy SOM in [5] and CNN ensemble in [110]. The high performance
obtained in [101] is because the attack types evaluated were limited. Only Neptune, satan
and portsweep probes are included in their evaluations [101]. The hierarchy SOM per-
formed quite well on the KDD99 dataset [5]. The generalisation performance reported
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in [5] is based on redundant entries as carbon copies from the test set were not removed.
The CNN is utilised as a feature extractor in [110]. The features from CNN are then used
to train a Support Vector Machine (SVM) and by using a 1-Nearest Neighbour classifier.
The best result obtained was from the SVM classifier as shown in Table 5.16.
The CTU-13 Dataset was used to evaluate currently available botnet detection meth-
ods [10]. The metric used was at least one positive identification of botnet IP address,
which is also used in [7, 122]. The evaluation is typically carried out one scenario at a
time [7, 10, 107, 122]. This thesis evaluates CTU-13 dataset as a whole to gain some
insight if the different botnets may be related. Table 5.16 shows the average best results
for CTU-13 dataset generalisation scenarios (1, 2, 6, 8, 9) reported in [7, 10, 107, 122].
The pre-processing and the evaluation method varies. Ten-fold cross validation is used
to evaluate each scenario in [107]. Negative samples from outside of CTU-13 dataset are
added in [107]. Statistical features at some time window is used as features in [7, 122].
Unsupervised approach by using only the normal samples is explored in [188]. There are
8 features extracted and additional derived ones from 11 most frequently occurring des-
tination port numbers. The detection mechanism is based on how far is the sample from
the normal model. The algorithm used are SOM, Local Outlier Factor (LOF), and K-NN.
The SOM was used as visual inspection but it was limited to a 10× 10 resolution. It is
difficult to use some of the results in Table 5.16 for comparisons as some authors used
additional features which are not part of the original set.
The UNSW-NB15 dataset was evaluated against several machine learning algorithm
in [108]. The machine learning algorithms used are similar to the ones included in Sec-
tion 5.6. The average reported generalisation accuracy was 82.12% [108]. AdaBosted
NN was proposed to identify attack types in [109]. Multiscale hebbian neural network
proposed in [111] was trained and evaluated against the HTTP protocol subset of the
dataset. Their evaluation method was a 5× 2 cross validation, that is 5 cycles of cross-
validation where each cycle has two alternated subsets as the training and testing set. The
reported average accuracy is 93% in [111].
The performance result from our experiments in evaluating the proposed methods are
discussed in the next two chapters. The comparison between the classification perfor-
mance reported in this Section can be found in Chapter 7.
Chapter 6
Experiments and Results
The results and analysis of the proposed ensemble system for Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) in Chapter 4 are presented in three separate but related chapters: (1) A descrip-
tion of the datasets which will be used in the evaluation of the proposed algorithms. The
proposed method is evaluated using the benchmark datasets which were detailed in Chap-
ter 5 and (2) this Chapter evaluates the SOM results. This chapter is organized as follows:
Section 6.1 gives an overview of the experimental procedure. Section 6.2 demonstrates
the visualisation capabilities of the High Resolution Self-Organising Map (HRSOM) and
offers comparisons with Lower Resolution Self-Organising Map (LRSOM). (3) The next
Chapter 7 evaluates the ensemble method for IDS.
6.1 Experiment Procedure
Our hypothesis is that relationships between normal and attack patterns could be more
complicated than the common intuitions suggests (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). Visual
inspection of the HRSOM projections should provide an insight into such relationships
and hopefully novel observations can be made. The visualisation capability of small and
large SOMs are examined. The larger SOM should reveal much more details about the
data, and could provide further understanding to findings made in prior work (see Chap-
ter 3), to the general properties of the datasets, and to the IDS environment in general.
Previous work considered SOM of size 20× 20 sufficient when evaluating KDD99
dataset [5]. For the investigations in this thesis each of the three datasets will be used to
train a two dimensional SOM of incremental size: 32× 24, 64× 48, 96× 72, 128× 96,
and 192× 144. Note that this follows the golden rule of a rectangular shaped mapping
space [171]. The training parameter σ(0) is set to 0.75 of the diagonal d of the size of the
map, and the learning rate α(0) = 0.6. σ and α were chosen so that distant neurons are
updated effectively so as to reduce the likelihood of entangled maps [171]. The number
of iterations is adjusted according to the number of neurons in the SOM and the size of
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Figure 6.1: SOM mapping is concatenated then used to train and evaluate NN
training sets. The larger the SOM, the more iterations will be used to allow for appro-
priate adjustments of the increasingly distant neurons. The neighbourhood relationship is
hexagonal and the Gaussian neighbourhood function is used for all experiments.
The mapping quality of the different SOMs will be discussed using metrics that were
described in Section 4.4.1 and Section 4.4.2 respectively. The clusters of the projections
are evaluated on the basis of the silhouette index metric using Ward’s hierarchical cluster-
ing method as was described in Section 4.4.2.
Figure 6.1 shows the general procedure for training and evaluating the proposed en-
semble network. The procedure consists of six steps:
Step 1: Concatenate each input vector ui = (v0,v1, ...,vn) where ui ∈ X , the correspond-
ing SOM display space location li = (x,y) of the BMU wi, which resulted in aug-
mented data u′i ∈ X ′ where u′i = ui⊕ li = (v0,v1, ...,vn,x,y).
Step 2: Augment the training, validation and testing set in a similar manner as indicated
in Step 1.
Step 3: Train the NN component with the augmented training set T RN′.
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Step 4: Evaluate the trained NN model with the augmented validation set VAL′.
Step 5: Choose the NN model that yields the best accuracy on validation set max(VAL′).
Step 6: Evaluate the generalisation performance of the chosen Neural Network (NN)
model using the augmented testing set T ST ′ for the final results.
Supervised learning training of the NN architectures evaluated are: a two layer and a
three layer MLPs, as well as a FRPN architecture to simulate MLPs of arbitrary depth,
i.e., arbirtray number of hidden layers. The number of hidden neurons on each layer of the
MLP is empirically determined by using the validation performance. An incrementally
increasing number of hidden neurons are used when training the FRPN to show the effects
of larger and deeper neural classifiers. The learning rate is adjusted to a given architecture
and the learning problem will be mentioned in the subsequent Sections. All results shown
in Chapter 7 are the average of three models that were trained using different random
initial conditions. The HRSOM mappings are investigated before and after training the
classifiers in order to explain the results.
6.2 HRSOM training and analysis of results
This Section examines the mappings of the HRSOM through visual inspection and via the
quality metrics described in Section 4.4.1.
6.2.1 Data projection and visualization
Previous work showed SOMs sized 20×20 when trained on the KDD99 dataset [5]. Their
SOM was used as a classifier and it yielded a classification performance which was rea-
sonable at the time of publication in 2007. However, a visual inspection of the mappings
showed a significant overlap of mappings between classes which explain the false posi-
tive rate which is much higher than would be acceptable in real world applications. To
demonstrate the observation we trained a similarly sized SOM of size 32×24. The map-
pings of the trained SOM are shown in Figure 6.2. Shown are the mapping locations (the
two plots on the left in Figure 6.2) and the density plots (the two plots on the right in
Figure 6.2). The location plots show the location of the winning neuron for each of the
training samples. We use two different symbols to show whether the samples belonged to
the class normal or attack. Since there is a significant overlap in the mapping of normal
and attack samples and hence we plot the mapping of normal and attack cases separately
(top-left plot shows the mapping of samples belonging to the class normal whereas the
bottom-left plot shows the mapping of samples belonging to the class attack). The plots to
the right indicate the number of samples that were mapped at each of the neuron locations
where darker colours indicate a larger number of samples mapped to a given neuron. It









































Figure 6.2: Result after training a SOM of size 32×24 on the KDD99 dataset. Shown
are the location plots (left), density plots (right) for normal cases (top row) and attack
cases (bottom row) respectively.
can be observed in Figure 6.2 that there is a separation between the majority of attack and
normal samples, and that the mappings of the normal as well as the mapping of attack
cases form coarse clusters. However, the clusters are not well separated which indicates
some overlap in the feature space of attack samples with that of normal samples. It can
also be seen that the mapping of attack samples is most dense on the left edge of the map
while the normal cases are mostly mapped to the opposite side of the map. The results
shown in Figure 6.2 are consistent with the plots presented in [5]. These observations
explain the relative good performance obtained in [5]. Moreover, the visualization also
explains the high FPR rate given that there are many normal cases mapped in regions that
are dominated by the mapping of attack samples.
There are some more interesting observations that can be made from Figure 6.2: For
example, the normal samples are mapped to a larger portion of the display space than the
attack samples. This implies that the normal samples cover a larger feature space when
compared to the feature space of attack cases. This observation can also be a result of
the fact that there are many more normal samples than attack samples. Moreover, it is
observed that there are normal and attack samples that are mapped far from each other
while there are cases where attack and normal cases are mapped in close proximity. This
shows that some attack samples are well distinct from normal cases (and are hence easily









































Figure 6.3: CTU-13 dataset trained 32× 24 SOM, normal and attack mapping are on
the top and the bottom respectively.
distinguishable) while other samples are easily confused due to their similarity to each
other. Such observation is useful when designing a classification system as a particular
focus needs to be placed on samples that are mapped to areas where confusion is likely
to occur. However, the expressive power of this result is limited due to the low resolution
of the SOM. There are only 32×24 neurons for mapping 806,244 samples in the dataset.
Thus, there are approximately 1,165 samples mapped to each neuron on an average. This
creates a very significant data compression ratio and may force mappings to become very
close to each other. Increasing the display space would reveal how well samples from
the different classes are separable based on the feature values. Moreover, an increase in
the resolution of the display space should reveal more detailed relationships between the
data, the shape and relationship of clusters, and may reduce the size of the overlapping
area. This expectation arises due to a higher degree of freedom that would come with
larger display spaces. This aspect will be studied later in this Section.
For comparison, Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show mapping of the same sized SOMs after
training on the CTU-13 dataset and UNSW-NB15 dataset respectively. Figure 6.3 reveals
that the samples are organized in clusters. The normal cases are broken into three clusters
across the display space, while the attack cases are clustered close to the edges of the dis-
play space. There are many densely overlapping neurons as can be expected from using
such limited resolution on a large dataset. The details of the two case labels are only visi-









































Figure 6.4: The mappings of the UNSW-NB15 dataset on a trained SOM of size 32×24.
Shown is the density map (right) and location map (left) for normal samples (top) and
and attack samples (bottom).
ble when plot separately. There is not enough display space to capture the differentiation
between the projection of both samples. The figure explains why a previously reported
SOM of size 10×10 produced the worst performance [188]. the most likely explanation
is that a 10× 10 is too small to allow sufficient differentiation between pattern classes.
Moreover, the SOM in [188] was trained only on normal samples. Unknown samples
were classified as attack if it was mapped far away from the normal samples. However,
since the SOM spreads mappings across the display space and due to the very limited
size of their SOM it was observed that every neuron was involved in the mapping of a
number of normal samples. It was thus not possible to have attack cases mapped ‘away’
from normal samples. The increase in display space to 32× 24 shows the potential of
improvement for a similar mechanism as the plot reveals some gaps between the mapping
of normal samples in Figure 6.3.
Similarily, the UNSW-NB15 dataset was reported to be a difficult learning prob-
lem [108]. Figure 6.4 gives an insight into reasons for the difficulty. While the Figure
reveals three well-formed clusters it is also observed that these clusters do not correspond
to class membership. Thus, the feature space of normal samples largely overlaps the
feature space of attack samples. There is no decision boundary that can be drawn to
separate the normal and attack clusters. In fact, the mapping shows that attack and normal
samples appear to occupy the same space most of the time. The only difference between
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Figure 6.5: Result after training SOMs larger than 32× 24 on the KDD99 dataset.
Shown mappings are the SOM of twice (left), and of thrice the size (right) respectively.
the mappings is one attack cluster on the bottom left hand corner of the display space.
The results of the lower resolution SOMs provided some insight into each of the learn-
ing problems. It has become evident that these three datasets have different characteristics
and hence define three rather distinct IDS environments. It was demonstrated that a SOM
can provide insights into a learning problem that could not be captured by the standard
i.e. statistical methods. The following will further investigate the properties of the data
and investigate the capabilities of the SOM by increasing the display space.
The HRSOM provides a more finely grained display space and should hence help with
obtaining a better domain understanding. This can relieve the burden of the black box
problem where the cause of misclassification may otherwise be difficult to determine.
When mapping data to a lower resolution SOM; this can result in the loss of information
that is vital to the understanding and differentiation of samples that are easily confused
with samples from another class. A HRSOM reduces the information loss and the larger
display space is able to show more complex relationships between the normal and attack
samples within each dataset.
Figure 6.5 shows the increased SOM mapping trained on KDD99 dataset. Shown map-
pings are the SOM of size 64× 48 which is twice the SOM of size 32× 24 (left), and
96× 72 which is thrice the SOM of size 32× 24 (right) respectively. SOM mappings
generally have no orientation. The image of the SOM mappings maybe rotated and/or
flipped but it does not affect their quality. The SOM mapping of 96× 72 is a rotated
image of the SOM of size 64×48. The mapping quality progression from 32×24 as the
mapping space increased is shown clearly. The mapping on 32× 24 barely showed any
distinct grouping of the data. There were no clear observable boundaries. Additionally,
more complex structure starts to emerge with the increased in the mapping space. The
attack and normal samples started to separate into multiple groups.
We trained a HRSOM of size 192×144, which is 6 · (32×24), on the KDD99 dataset.
The result is shown in Figure 6.6. The large display space allows us to show the mapping














































































































CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 81
of all samples as well as the different attack categories in a single plot. The improve-
ment in mapping quality becomes evident immediately. Not only is the relationship be-
tween normal and attack patterns much more detailed, but also the relationships within
respective pattern classes become much more distinct. The normal and attack types are
distinguished much better when compared to the mapping of the SOM of size 32× 24.
The majority of pattern classes are mapped in well distinct regions. The inter-class re-
lationships among the samples are now easily observed. The normal cases mapped on
the opposite ends of the y-axis shows there are normal patterns which are well distinct
from one another. The HRSOM revealed that normal behaviour tends to exhibit grad-
ual behavioural changes, which is shown by the elongated shape of clusters consisting of
normal samples. The normal sample on one end of a large normal cluster is very differ-
ent to the normal sample mapped on the opposite end of the same cluster while samples
mapped in-between indicate that changes from one extreme to another can be gradual
without changing the nature (class) of the pattern.
A closer inspection of the results reveals that the clusters are predominantly formed by
the symbolic features: protocol type, service, and flag. This was observed, for example,
the gaps between the normal clusters around lower center. The samples on either side of
the fracture have a different service value with the same protocol type and flag values.
The HRSOM in Figure 6.6 also shows that the different types of attack cases tend to
group together. For example, DoS represents the larger portion of attack samples. It
formed the largest attack cluster on the right side of the mapping with additional clusters
wedges in between normal clusters throughout the display space. There are two major
PROBE clusters. One PROBE groups near the DoS cluster on the right hand side of the
mapping and toward the center of the display space. Interestingly, the R2L and U2L attack
cases appear to be overlapped on the fringe of clusters of normal samples. While affected
attack samples are only represented by 0.40% of all the attack samples, the observation
shows that these samples are particularly difficult to distinguish from normal network
traffic. Their features may be insufficient for a classifier to distinguish them.
The corresponding density map is shown in Figure 6.7. For clarity, the Figure shows
the density mapping of KDD99 dataset normal on the top and attack on the bottom. It
can be observed that the attack clusters are often more dense than the normal cases. This
can be attributed to the normal samples that are more numerous than attack samples. The
clusters near the center of the map tend to be more circular in shape and tend to be more
dense around the perimeter of the cluster. There are several fin-shaped normal clusters
that tend to be more dense than many of the other clusters. The attack clusters on the right
are more uniformly dense. These are the DoS and PROBE attack types that make up most
of the attack samples. Overall, the results are indicative of the distribution and frequency
of occurrence of features in the dataset.
Given the size of the SOM and the number of samples in the dataset there are only

































Figure 6.7: The density map of the HRSOM of size 192× 144 trained on the KDD99
dataset. Shown is the density plot for normal samples (top) and attack samples (bottom).
about 5 mappings to each neuron on an average. Figure 6.7 has shown that a HRSOM
has more display space for the samples to spread out such that there are less chances of
overloading a neuron; thus reducing the likelihood of confusing a sample with samples
from another class. If the HRSOM is used as a detection system using the majority-
win strategy, it would perform better than its LRSOM counterpart because there is less
overlap between classes and hence the neurons have a higher confidence in classifying
samples. Only 5% of the neurons on the 192× 144 HRSOM map have an approximate
ratio of 50:50 of the two classes (attack and normal) in contrast to 26% neurons for the
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Figure 6.8: A close look into the mapping of KDD99 samples on a 192×144 HRSOM.
Highlighted are the mapping of samples that were previously mapped to single neuron at
location (16,4) by the 32×24 SOM (left), and to neuron at location (0,23) (right).
32×24 SOM. Cases where there are samples from different classes are mapped to close
proximity by the HRSOM indicate cases that are particularly hard to distinguish and are
a possible reason for a sub-optimal result of classifiers. The apparent improvement in
mapping quality will be quantified and discussed in Section 6.2.2.
The increased display space allows samples to disperse on the map. Samples that
were mapped to the same neuron by a low resolution SOM may spread on the HRSOM.
We investigate the dispersion as follows: Select a neuron from a LRSOM, find samples
that were mapped to that location, then check where these samples are mapped on the
HRSOM. We select two neurons at coordinate (16,4) and (0,23) respectively from Fig-
ure 6.2. There are 675 samples mapped to (16,4). These 675 samples were mapped by
the HRSOM to locations as shown in Figure 6.6 (left). The plot shows a zoom into a
region of the HRSOM where these 675 samples were mapped. The mapping of the 675
samples is color coded according to class membership. The gray symbols correspond to
the mappings of samples in the training set that are not part of the 675 samples. It can be
observed that there is an improved separation by class membership. Moreover, it is ob-
served that these samples are at the border points between a normal cluster and a PROBE
attack cluster. Thus, the HRSOM provides an insight into a cause of the likely confusion
of these samples as these cases correspond to borderline situations where a minute differ-
ence separates normal from attack behaviour. A further investigation revealed that over
half of the feature set of these samples are identical with the exception of those three sym-
bolic features (protocol type,service,flag), and the rest of feature individual value ranges
are within the value of the range of normal samples.
A similar investigation is made for samples mapped to (0,23) by the LRSOM. Fig-
ure 6.2 (right) shows the region where these samples were mapped by the HRSOM. It is
observed that the larger display space separated the mapping of these samples by class,
and that each class formed its own cluster. This shows that the limited display space of
the LRSOM forced some of the distinguishable samples to be mapped to the same neuron
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Figure 6.9: Result after training SOMs larger than 32× 24 on the CTU-13 dataset.
Shown mappings are the SOM of twice (left), and of thrice the size (right) respectively.
thus affecting the mapping quality.
Subsequently, we trained SOMs with CTU-13 dataset and UNSW-NB15 dataset with
the same size interval to investigate if any mapping improvement would apply to the other
datasets, which are 64×48, 96×72, and 192×144 respectively.
The SOM mapping of size 32× 24 trained using CTU-13 dataset showed some data
grouping. Figure 6.9 shows the increased SOM mapping trained on CTU-13 dataset.
Shown mappings are the SOM of size 64× 48 which is twice as big as the SOM of
size 32× 24 (left), and 96× 72 which is thrice as big (right) respectively. The visual
improvement is similar to the SOM mapping trained with KDD99 dataset. There are
better separations between the attack and normal samples when the SOM grid is increased
to 64×48 and 96×72. There are new structure emerged with each increase. There is also
some rotation on the mapping image but as mentioned, this is expected from a different
initial condition the SOM was trained and had no effects on the quality of the mapping.
Figure 6.10 shows the HRSOM of size 192×144 when trained on the CTU-13 dataset.
Similar to the observations made on the KDD99 dataset, the samples are organized in
clusters that largely correspond to the pattern classes. However, the location, shape, and
orientation of the clusters differ. With the exception of the Sogou botnet the various
different botnet types formed separate clusters. Sogou botnet is the smallest of the classes
in the dataset. Nevertheless, the Sogou botnet samples are still mapped near other botnet
samples such that confusion with normal cases could be avoided. A closer inspection
revealed that cluster formation is motivated by the symbolic features, which are protocol,
direction and TCP flag. The HRSOM shows that given a large enough display space the
normal cluster break into multiple sub-clusters. Interestingly, the literature reported that
the various cases of botnet traffic are related to each other [153] whereas the mapping of
such samples on the HRSOM is organized into two clusters that are separated by a large
number of normal cases. This implies that there is botnet traffic that exhibit two sets of
different features (corresponding to the two Botnet clusters in Figure 6.10). This is a new









































































































































Figure 6.11: CTU-13 dataset trained 192× 144 HRSOM normal (top) and attack (bot-
tom) density mapping. The samples are spread thin across the mapping space. There are
approximately one neuron is available for every 8 samples.
discovery since previous work was based on a low resolution SOM which only revealed
one cluster of botnet samples [153].
The corresponding density mapping is shown in Figure 6.11. It is observed that the
HRSOM resulted in an apparent improvement in the quality of mappings similar to those
experienced with the KDD99 dataset. There are only 3.91% neurons to which samples
from different classes are mapped compared to the 50.39% on the LRSOM of size 32×24.
Given that the size of the HRSOM and the size of the dataset, there is approximately one
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Figure 6.12: CTU-13 dataset trained 192×144 HRSOM zoomed into the samples previ-
ously mapped to (0,15) on the trained SOM sized 32×24 (left plot) or to neuron (25,22)
(right plot).
neuron available for every 8 samples. Although only 16,264 (59%) are activated neurons.
There are thus 12-13 samples mapped to each activated neuron on an average compared
to 490 samples for the LRSOM shown in Figure 6.3.
As was shown in Figure 6.3 there are samples which are mapped to the same neuron
but belong to different classes. Since the HRSOM spreads the mapping of samples and
hence it will be interesting to study how samples that were mapped to the same neuron by
a LRSOM are spread on a HRSOM. This is illustrated on two examples in Figure 6.12.
The left plot in Figure 6.12 shows the region to which samples from the CTU-13 dataset
that were mapped to the neuron located at coordinate (0,15) by the LRSOM (shown
in Figure 6.3) are mapped by the HRSOM. The LRSOM mapped 3,517 samples to the
neuron at location (0,15); 1,072 of these are normal samples and 2,445 are attack samples.
Since the majority of samples are attack samples and hence the LRSOM would, for any
new sample that is mapped to the same location, assume that it is most likely a case of
attack. This could raise the false positive rate since 30% of the training samples that
are mapped to this location are normal samples. In contrast, the HRSOM spreads the
mapping of these samples over a larger area. As is observed in Figure 6.12 (left) the
spread separates samples that belong to different classes. Moreover, the different attack
types form separate clusters. The HRSOM thus revealed that there are different types of
samples and that there are different types of attacks. These attack samples (previously
undistinguishable by the LRSOM) turned out to consist of Virut and Rbot botnets. There
is a normal cluster on the right hand side which indicate these are boundary samples
that correspond to normal samples that have features that are similar to features of attack
samples. Closer inspection revealed that these normal and attack samples share the same
value of three symbolic features and have a very small variance in the numeric features.
Similarly, the plot on the right of Figure 6.12 shows the region to which samples are
mapped by the HRSOM that were previously mapped by the LRSOM to a single neuron
at coordinate (25,22). These consist of 62 normal and 61 attack samples. The ratio is
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Figure 6.13: Result after training SOMs larger than 32×24 on the UNSW-NB15 dataset.
Shown mappings are the SOM of twice (left), and of thrice the size (right) respectively.
so close to 50% that it is ambiguous on how to label an unknown sample when using the
LRSOM. If the LRSOM mappings were used in an IDS then this could increase both the
FPR and the FNR. In contrast, the HRSOM shows that these samples are actually quite
different as they are mapped to different and distinct regions and that the attack cases
are mapped close to a cluster of NSIS botnet samples. It also appears that the normal
samples are unusual cases (outliers) of normal cases due to their distance to the closest
cluster of normal samples. Closer inspection revealed that the deterministic feature for
these mappings is the port number, which is in the private range (7600) while the normal
cluster above it has port number 53 (DNS service).
The UNSW-NB15 dataset trained SOM mapping of size 32×24 has shown very little
grouping. Increasing the SOM resolution should greatly improve the mapping as shown
with previous datasets. Figure 6.13 shows the increased SOM mapping trained on UNSW-
NB15 dataset. Shown mappings are the SOM of size 64× 48 which is twice the SOM
of size 32× 24 (left), and 96× 72 which is thrice the SOM of size 32× 24 (right) re-
spectively. The SOM of size 64×48 shows larger normal cluster on the right hand side,
with more attack samples are mapped separately from the normal samples compared to
the smaller SOM. Even though much of the mapping space still projects both attack and
normal samples on top of one another. The SOM of size 96× 72 shows similar general
structure but there are substructures that was not visible in smaller SOMs.
The mapping of the UNSW-NB15 dataset is considered next. Figure 6.14 shows the
mapping of the samples on a trained HRSOM of size 192×144. It is observed that about
60% of the display space is utilised (69% of neurons are activated). This is a higher rate
than for the other two datasets and and indicate that the feature space is more uniform. It
can also be observed that the mapping of attack and normal samples do not form clusters
that correspond to the classes as well as for the other two datasets. Nevertheless, the
mapping quality is much improved when compared to the 32× 24 SOM. The HRSOM
reveals numerous clusters that were not observable in the low resolution SOM. While the











































































































































































Figure 6.15: Density map of the HRSOM of size 192×144 when trained on the UNSW-
NB15 dataset.
separation of attack cases and normal cases is improved in the HRSOM, there is still a
very significant overlap between the classes.
The corresponding density map provides further insights. Figure 6.15 shows that the
majority of normal samples are mapped in a distinct cluster that is located in the upper
left hand corner of the map. Similarly, there is a significant number of generic attack
samples mapped to the distinct cluster in the lower left hand corner of the map. In fact,
82% of attack samples and 69% of normal samples are mapped on the left third of the
display space. The rest of the samples are spread more evenly across the display space
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Figure 6.16: Zoom into the HRSOM of size 192×144. Shown are areas where samples
that were mapped to (0,13) by the LRSOM (left plot) or mapped to (7,7) (right plot) are
found on the HRSOM.
forming fractured clusters that heavily overlap samples of different types of patterns. The
plot reveals that (1) there is an evenly distributed number of samples from different classes
that cover a large portion of the feature space and (2) that there is another group of samples
that are distinct in feature space as well as in type but cover a compact area of the feature
space. Thus, the dataset consists of two data populations.
The HRSOM trained on the other two datasets showed reduction in ambiguous neurons,
i.e., neurons where about 50% of samples belong to class normal while the remaining 50%
are cases of attack. Interestingly, the HRSOM trained on the UNSW-NB15 dataset ex-
perienced an increase in the number of ambiguous neurons. There are 5.58% ambiguous
neurons on the HRSOM of size 192×144 compared to 1.04% ambiguous neurons on the
32×24 SOM despite the increase of dispersion of the mappings.
The samples projected on the right two-thirds of the map formed clusters of fractured
appearance. Closer inspection revealed that these clusters are caused by features with
large dispersion of values, i.e., large standard deviation. The feature dbytes, for example,
has the standard deviation sd(dbytes)=143634, such that it could be observed that the
samples mapped on the coordinate (130,74) have a maximum dbytes=612 whereas the
samples mapped nearby to coordinate (130,80) has a minimum dbytes=956. The gap in
values across a number of features with large standard deviation causes the samples to be
projected on different neurons forming small gaps that resemble fractures.
Similar to the previous situation with the KDD99 dataset and the CTU-13 dataset
datasets, an investigation is made on how the HRSOM diversified mappings when com-
pared to the LRSOM. This is performed by selecting a set of neurons that mapped samples
which belonged to attack and normal classes respectively. For example, the SOM of size
32× 24 (shown in Figure 6.4 mapped 2,975 samples to the coordinate (0,13). 2,836 of
these samples are labelled as normal the remaining 139 were cases of attack. We then
investigated where these samples were mapped by the HRSOM. This is shown in Fig-
ure 6.16 (left). The Figure shows the mapping of the 2,975 samples in color while the
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gray symbols correspond to the samples in the remaining training set that are not part
of the 2,975 samples. It is observed that most of the normal samples have spread and
separated from the attack samples but still mapped close to each other, maintaining their
topological relationships with one another.
We selected another neuron from the 32× 24 SOM for the UNSW-NB15 dataset
dataset. The neuron at location (7,7) mapped 1,140 samples consisting of 543 normal
and 597 attack cases. Figure 6.16 (right) shows in color where those samples are mapped
on HRSOM, while the gray symbols correspond to the samples in the training set that are
not part of the 1,140 samples. A similar observation to the cases of the KDD99 dataset
and CTU-13 dataset datasets can be made: The mappings of the samples is more spread
out and produced an increased separation of sample types. Many of the samples consist
of similar Fuzzer attack types and are hence mapped close to each other, and close to
other samples that are also labelled as attack. The few normal samples remain to be
mapped close to the attack samples but there is a normal cluster nearby, shown in the top
left corner of the zoomed in area.
It can be observed that a visual inspection of the mappings of the HRSOM offers much
more detailed representation of the datasets and reveal insight into intricate sub-structures
thus helping to improve domain knowledge. The KDD99 dataset trained HRSOM shows
how the different attack types are organised as well as their relationship with normal sam-
ples. The CTU-13 dataset trained HRSOM shows similarities in with patterns observed
for the KDD99 dataset. Lastly, the UNSW-NB15 dataset trained HRSOM shows that the
pattern classes occupy an overlapping feature space hence revealing the reasons for the
difficulty of distinguishing normal from attack samples.
The mappings of the HRSOM of these three IDS datasets show that much of the data is
organised in clusters. The clusters are often complex and there are more clusters than the
number of classes. Several clusters of the same class are often observed in close proximity
of one another. Elongated clusters that spread across the display space are observed in
each HRSOM, which indicate gradual change between the samples mapped on opposite
ends of the clusters. We often found these elongated clusters consist of normal samples,
which means there is certain range of values in the features indicating normal behaviour.
The multiple clusters formed by attack samples often correspond to their respective
attack types. From this observation, we learn that the various attack types have some
similarity to the normal pattern class and with one another in the different attack classes.
On the mapping of KDD99 dataset, there are PROBE and DoS samples that are similar
such that they are mapped closer to each other than to other attack types. Similarly, DoS
samples can often be found near or mapped to the same neuron as Exploit samples in the
UNSW-NB15 dataset. The different botnet malware in CTU-13 dataset are mapped in
close proximity to each other. There are outlier attack samples which are often mapped to
sparsely populated spaces in between normal clusters or on the edges of clusters formed
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by normal samples. These areas indicate a potentially high misclassification rate, where
attack cases may be confused easily with normal cases and vice versa.
The mappings of the HRSOM illustrates some of the pitfalls of the two most common
IDS strategies. There are signatures that can be extracted from well formed clusters of
attack samples to deploy misused based IDS [8]. However, not all attack cases create a
cluster. There are attack samples that scatter rather than forming clusters. The normal
samples tend to create very uniform clusters and the data tend to skew towards normal
samples such that an anomaly based IDS [9] could work well. Although the deployment
would be sensitive to the threshold of deviation from the normal behaviour as there are
normal and attack cases that are mapped away from the clusters of normal samples.
The HRSOM can be utilised as the visualisation component for IDSs. This is motivated
by earlier works that proposed a dashboard tool to follow up red flags from an IDS [6,
123]. If an unknown sample is detected as attack, the administration can see where it
has been mapped on the HRSOM with some confidence value. This confidence value
may consist of the percentage of attack to normal samples mapped on the same neuron
or to neurons in close proximity of one another, as well as its overall similarity to the
prototype vector (the codebook vector) through its Euclidean distance. Furthermore, each
feature can be investigated as to whether it is the cause of the mapping since the mappings
maintain the meaning of the various features.
The next section evaluates the mapping quality on the basis of metrics described in
Section 4.4.1. The effects of increasing the SOM size is evaluated. Visual inspection sug-
gested that the mapping quality would increase with the size of the SOM since the large
mapping space would provide higher degree of freedom for the projection to separate nor-
mal and attack cases. Moreover, visual inspection of the SOM projections revealed that
the data is organised in clusters. It will be interesting to observe how these observations
are reflected by the proposed performance metrics.
6.2.2 Mapping quality
This Section presents an analysis of the mapping qualities by using the micro purity,
macro purity, Grouping or clustering index, information gain, and the Gini impurity mea-
sure as were described in Section 4.4.1. The performance values will be illustrated using
whisker and box plots [189] that give the minimum, mean, and maximum values obtained
from the analysis of three training sessions. In other words, each experiment is repeated
three times starting with different initial conditions. The performance metrics are com-
puted for each of the three sets of experiments and the minimum, mean, and maximum
of the computed values are reported. It is expected that the SOM performance metrics
reflect and improve with the increase of the size of the SOM. It is also expected that the
KDD99 dataset and CTU-13 dataset trained SOM show better results than SOMs trained





















































Figure 6.17: The mapping quality of different sized SOMs when trained with the
KDD99 dataset.
on the UNSW-NB15 dataset.
Figure 6.17 compares the mapping quality of different sized SOMs that were trained on
the KDD99 dataset. It is observed that the SOM’s micro and macro purity performance are
very similar and are close to 1. The KDD99 dataset is composed of 75% normal samples.
Thus, some of the high performance can be contributed by the skewness towards normal
samples. On closer inspection, the micro and macro purity measures actually improve as
the SOM size grows. The micro purity improved steadily from 99.58% for the 32× 64
to 99.86% for the 192× 144 SOM. The steepest increase is observed when increasing
the size of the SOM from 32× 64 to 64× 48. The macro purity follows a similar trend
reaching 99.87% for the highest resolution SOM used in the experiments. The grouping
index improves significantly from 90.27% on an average for the SOM of size 32× 64
to 98.36% for SOM of size 192× 144. This indicates that the HRSOM is significantly
less likely to map samples from different classes to nearby neurons thus, reducing the
likelihood of confusion between classes.
The information gain also improves steadily with the size of the SOM. The difference
in information gain between the smallest and the largest SOMs are approximately 0.2%.
Similarly, the Gini impurity measure also improves with the size of the map which shows
that the neurons on the larger SOM are less likely to be labelled incorrectly. The improve-
ment in the Gini impurity measure and the improvement of the grouping index indicate
that the larger SOM would generalise better than the smaller SOMs.
Figure 6.18 shows the result of the performance metrics for different sized SOMs that
have been trained using the CTU-13 dataset. It can be observed that the micro and macro
purity improvement is more noticeable than were observed with the KDD99 dataset. The
average micro purity measure improved from 98.88% to 99.71%. The most significant
improvement is observed when increasing the SOM size from 32× 64 to 64× 48 and
plateaus for the largest SOMs. The grouping index shows a continuous and significant
improvement with the increase in SOM sizes. The grouping index approaches 1 for the
SOM of size 192×144 and can be expected to plateau for even larger SOMs. The infor-















































































































Figure 6.19: UNSW-NB15 dataset trained SOM mapping quality
mation gain criterion improves steadily with the size of the SOM although the increase
starts to level out at 128×96. The information gain criterion improved most significantly
from 96× 72 to 128× 96 by 1.79% whereas the improvement in information gain from
128×96 to 192×144 is only 0.65%. The Gini impurity measure decreased steeply when
the SOM sizes increased. The difference in the Gini impurity measure between the small-
est and largest SOMs is 4.35%. The curvature of the Gini impurity measure mirrors that
of the grouping index. Very noticeable is also that the larger SOMs appear generally less
sensitive to initial conditions as the difference between the maximum and minimum val-
ues decreases for all metrics. Thus, the HRSOM can be expected to reliably generalise
better than the soms with a lower resolution.
Figure 6.19 shows the performance metrics of SOMs trained on the UNSW-NB15
dataset. Similar to observations made for the other two datasets there is a general upward
trend in the micro and macro purity measures for increased SOM sizes. Interestingly, the
grouping index shows a downward trend despite the improvements in micro and macro
purity measures. One explanation can be derived from Figure 6.15 which shows that
more than half of the display space is quite sparse, and, feature samples from different
classes mapped in close proximity of one another. Specifically, 52.59% of the display
space maps 5 samples or less to a neuron. Therefore, the neighbourhood may not have a
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clear or reliable majority.
The information gain criterion shows an upward trend which accelerates as the size of
the SOM increases. The SOM of size 192×144 improved the information gain by 4.31%
when compared to the SOM of size 128×96. This shows an acceleration in separation of
the various pattern classes. This implies that for a more reliable classification of samples
the SOM needs to be of a very high resolution. Similarly the finding implies that a clas-
sifier needs to be able to model data that come in the form of the UNSW-NB15 dataset.
The Gini impurity measure shows that each neuron on the larger SOM has been mapped
almost exclusively to one label, even though, the neighbourhood becomes more mixed.
This observation is supported by the UNSW-NB15 dataset trained SOM 192× 144 den-
sity mapping as shown in Figure 6.15. The Gini impurity measure improves more rapidly
the larger the SOM is which again indicates that SOMs larger than 192× 144 would be
appropriate for this dataset.
There are several observations which can be made from these mapping performance
metrics. There is a consistent improvement in multiple metrics and for all datasets with
the increased SOM sizes. Moreover, the ideal size of a SOM differs for different datasets.
In other words, a good choice for the size of a SOM is problem specific although there
appears to be no harm in choosing larger than necessary SOMs. The SOM can be consid-
ered high resolution when it is equaled to or greater than the point at which greatest bend
in the performance curve is observed (i.e. the size at which the performance metrics start
to plateau). For the KDD99 dataset and the CTU-13 dataset a good choice for the SOM
size is 96×72 whereas for the UNSW-NB15 dataset the SOM should be at least 128×96
or larger in size.
When comparing the results of visual inspection of mappings and the performance
metrics for the three datasets we can conclude that the classification of samples in the
KDD99 dataset should be easiest. Many of the performance metrics reach or exceed 99%
of the optimal value. The Gini impurity measure and grouping index results indicate that
training HRSOMs would yield better generalisation performance. The CTU-13 dataset
shares many similarities with the KDD99 dataset but the CTU-13 dataset benefits more
from HRSOM as is reflected by the increase in the information gain criterion and the Gini
impurity measure. Lastly, the UNSW-NB15 dataset is the most difficult out of the three
datasets; as it requires larger SOMs and corresponding processing power.
6.2.3 Cluster quality
The visualization of data by the SOM revealed that the data is often organised in clusters.
This section evaluates the quality of the clusters (i.e. how well the clusters correspond
to the classes) and how the cluster quality changes with the size of a SOM. A hypothesis
is that the ability of smaller SOMs to maintain a good reflection of clusters among the






























































































































































































































































Hierarchical Clustering Dendrogram (truncated)
Figure 6.20: Ward’s hierarchical clustering result of projections of the KDD99 dataset
by a SOM of size 32×24 (left) and of size 192×144 (right).
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Figure 6.21: Changes in inter-cluster distances for a SOM of size 32× 24 (left) and of
size 192×144 (right).
data may be compromised due to the high level of compression. Increasing the size of the
SOM may improve the cluster quality. It is important to recall that the SOM performs a
topology preserving mapping. Thus, the analysis of clusters is as much about identifying
the cluster quality of the data as it is about the SOMs’ ability to preserve that quality. This
thesis studies the effects of the SOM size rather than the effects of the SOM dimension
given that the SOM is used predominantly for visualization purposes.
Clusters are extracted from SOMs of varying size by using Ward’s hierarchical cluster-
ing method as was described in Section 4.4.2. The clusters are then evaluated using the
silhouette index (see Section 4.4.2 for a description of the silhouette index). Hierarchical
clustering can extract an arbitrary number of clusters. A common method for identifying
the number of clusters is by the elbow method, or the second peak method. This Section
present the results of the Ward’s hierarchical clustering method and the number of identi-
fied clusters by using dendrogram plots. The elbow method and the second peak method
are applied to the second derivative of the distance growth changes in the dendrogram.
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The largest acceleration determines the elbow and hence the number of clusters K. In
many cases, the acceleration rate tends to peak several times. While the elbow method
typically captures the first peak, the second peak method generally uses the occurrence
of the second peak in the curve. Once the clusters are identified the silhouette index is
calculated for each of the two clustering outcomes, for each of the SOM sizes, and for
each of the three datasets.
Figure 6.20 shows the hierarchical clustering tree (dendrogram) produced by Ward’s
hierarchical clustering method when applied to codebooks that were trained using the
KDD99 dataset. The two plots correspond to the results obtained from a SOM of size
43× 24 (left) and a SOM of size 192× 144 (right). The x-axis shows the number of
samples in each branch, while the y-axis shows the distances between the branches. The
number at each split represents the merging cost. For example, for the dendorgram on the
left the split at the top has a merging cost 71.6 involving 692 codebooks. If the 32× 24
codebooks are to be merged into two clusters, then the left cluster (shown in green) would
have the merging cost 9.44 and 124 codebooks and a right cluster (shown in red) with
a merging cost 48.3 and 644 codebooks. The HRSOM of resolution 192× 144 on the
right shows if the codebooks are to be merged into one cluster it would have the merging
cost 455 and would consist of 27,648 codebooks. If the HRSOM is merged into two
clusters, then one cluster (shown in green) would have the merging cost 46.13 with 4,606
codebooks and the a second cluster (shown in red) with a merging cost 302 with 23,042
codebooks.
Figure 6.21 shows how the changes in inter-cluster distances as the number of extracted
clusters increases as well as the second derivative of the distance curve for the two SOMs
that were shown in Figure 6.20. It can be observed that the decrease in the distances
is greatest when the number of clusters increases from one to two for both SOMs. A
second occurrence of rapid decrease in distances is observed when increasing the number
of clusters from three to four for the 32× 24 SOM and when increasing K from four
to five for the 192× 144 SOM (as is reflected by the corresponding peaks in the curve
depicting the second derivative). There are thus multiple observed peaks, which make the
K decision ambiguous [174]. Correspondingly, we compute the silhouette index for K = 2
(as determined by the elbow method; the first peak) for both maps, and K = 5 and K = 4
as determined by the second peak method for the LRSOM and HRSOM respectively. The
procedure is repeated for the different sized SOMs and which were trained on the other
two datasets although the corresponding denrograms (15 in total) are not shown here to
avoid clutter.
Figure 6.22 presents an overview of the silhouette index of the different sized SOM
when trained on the three different datasets and when using the elbow method to deter-
mine the number of clusters (the plot on the left) and the second peak method (the plot on
the right). It can be observed that the silhouette index increases with the size of a SOM for












































32x24 64x48 96x72 128x96 192x144
Figure 6.22: Silhouette indexes of the SOMs trained on different datasets when using
the elbow method (left) and the next second peak (right).
Table 6.1: UNSW-NB15 dataset Silhouette index
SOM q-error Average density Activated codebook K-clusters Silhouette Index
64×48 904.24 51.29 86.68% 4 0.4911
96×72 517.81 23.42 89.06% 4 0.4480
128×96 438.08 14.01 81.51% 4 0.5041
the KDD99 dataset and for the UNSW-NB15 dataset respectively. The results correspond
to earlier observations which showed that the samples are organized in clusters according
to their membership of the class and that these clusters increase and become increasingly
distinct as the size of the SOM increases.
For the SOM of size 96×72 trained on the UNSW dataset and when using the second
peak method experienced a sudden drop in the silhouette index when compared to the
SOMs of size 64× 48 and 128× 96. The drop is not reflected in other metrics. We
investigated this unusual result.
Table 6.1 summarizes some of the properties of SOMs of size 64× 48, 96× 72, and
128× 96 that were trained on the dataset. It can be observed that the quantization error
decreases with the size of the SOM which indicates that the maps were properly trained.
The mapping density (number of samples per neuron) also declines as would be expected.
The number of clusters detected by Ward’s method remained the same for the three SOMs
although the ratio of activated codebooks is highest for the 96×72 SOM. This indicates
that the clusters are more spread and that the intra-cluster distances would be greater thus
affecting the silhouette index.
Another unexpected observation is the drop in silhouette index for SOMs that were
trained on the CTU-13 dataset and when K is determined by the elbow method. In this
situation, it is found that the larger map performed worse than the smaller maps. The
results are due to the elbow method which detects the first peak increasingly early for
larger maps as can be seen in Table 6.2. For example, the elbow method identified K = 5
clusters for a SOM of size 64×48 whereas only K = 2 clusters for the 192×144 SOM.
This contradicts the observations made earlier in this section which clearly showed an
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Table 6.2: CTU-13 dataset Silhouette index when using the elbow method (left) and the
second peak method (right).












increase in clusters for this set of data as the size of the SOM increases. The finding
implies that the elbow method may not be the best for identifying the optimal number of
clusters in a SOM. Overall it can be observed that the cluster quality tends to increase
with the size of a SOM. This is an expected result. The silhouette index is largest for the
SOMs trained on the CTU-13 dataset because it has the least overlap of classes on the
map, as shown in Figure 6.10. The clusters tend to be well-separated with some overlap
areas on the right hand side of the display space.
Chapter 7
The Ensemble Architecture
SOMs perform a topology preserving compression of data through projection to q-
dimensional display space (2D in this thesis). The previous chapter has shown that a
HRSOM can project data in such a way that relationships between classes become more
evident in the high resolution display space.
This Chapter augments the input data with their corresponding projection from the
high dimensional feature space, then it uses the augmented data to train a classifier. It is
expected that this will allow a classifier to produce improved results. In fact, it can be
expected that the performance of the classifier will be at least as good as the performance
of the classifiers that were trained on non-augmented data given that the feature set re-
mains the same. The augmented portion of the data should provide the classifier with
information that can help distinguish between difficult and simple cases and hence, this
should help the classifier to improve its overall performance. The rationale is based on the
observations from Section 6.2.1 which revealed that same labelled samples are often well
distinct and hence can be easily categorised while there are samples from different classes
that share very similar properties such that they are difficult to distinguish. By augmenting
the data the classifier can distinguish the simpler cases by solely using the corresponding
mapped coordinates. The classifier should then be able to focus on separating the more
difficult cases by using data feature values.
One interesting question is why do we like to augment the feature vectors with its pro-
jected mapped coordinates in the display space, at all, given the general accepted wisdom
that the classifier, in this case, it is often a multiple hidden layer MLP, that given suffi-
cient number of hidden layers, it can untangle exactly the situation which is mentioned
here: different classes of attack patterns are very similar to one another, and very similar
to the normal cases. In other words, even though the feature vectors of different classes
could be very similar to one another, the current wisdom is that given sufficient number
of hidden layers in a MLP, this classifier will be able to untangle these similarities, and
produce good generalization results on the unseen testing dataset. So, why do we need to
introduce this intermediate step in finding a good projection of the feature vectors onto a
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two dimensional display space, and augment the data accordingly by the coordinates of
the projected feature vector. This is a good question, and the answer of which leads us to
motivate why we propose the ensemble system to classify the features. The main reason is
that by being provided with projected coordinates of the feature vector, this will make the
learning problem using supervised learning, like the one using the MLP easier. In other
words, instead of requiring a large number of hidden layers in the MLP to dis-entangle
the similarities of feature vectors of different classes, it might be possible to do so, with a
smaller number of hidden layers. As is well-known, the determination of the number of
hidden layer neurons, and the number of hidden layers, for a particular problem, is an art
rather than a science. One needs to select the number of hidden layers, and the number of
neurons in each of these hidden layers “judiciously”, meaning through a very tedious trial
and error process, and finally come up with a particular set of parameters, like the number
of hidden layers and the number of neurons associated with each hidden layer. On the
other hand, if we can provide each feature vector with a “hint”, that this feature vector
belongs to a particular class, then the learning problem might become simpler, i.e., may
be requiring less number of hidden layers in the MLP. While such “hint” is already pro-
vided through the class labels, another “hint” which can be provided would be how close
such a feature vector to another feature vector could be, and still maintain a different class
distinction. This is facilitated through the high resolution SOM. As might be anticipated
through this extra “hint” the training of the MLP becomes much easier, requiring fewer
number of hidden layers. This is exactly what this chapter will show in applying such an
idea to the three datasets at hand.
Another line of thought occurs to us, in implementing this idea. The major issue in
using a MLP with multiple hidden layers, and the number of neurons at each hidden layer.
What if we can find a method in which we are not required to determine the number of
hidden layers, would this help the situation. The FRPN is exactly such a technique [2]. It
does not require the determination of the number of hidden layers for a particular problem.
Therefore, it is relatively easy to implement this idea and apply it to the three datasets.
Here, as may be anticipated, the FRPN alleviates the tedious task to determine the number
of hidden layers in a MLP, therefore its application to the three datasets would yield
similar results, to the ones obtained using the extra “hint” and the simpler MLP (i.e., the
one using less number of hidden layers). This is exactly what the results in this chapter
will show.
The previous chapter revealed that there is a good separation between pattern classes
for the CTU-13 and KDD99 datasets whereas for the UNSW-NB15 dataset there is a con-
siderable overlap. From this it can be predicted that the advantage of data augmentation
will be more pronounced for the CTU-13 and KDD99 datasets than for the UNSW-NB15
dataset. To investigate the effects of data augmentation, and the effects of the size of
the SOM in this chapter we train classifiers on (a) non-augmented data, and (b) on data
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that has been augmented by SOMs of various size. More specifically, input vectors are
augmented with the mappings of a good LRSOM (of size 96×72), or with mappings of
SOMs in a higher resulution of 128× 96 or 192× 144. The SOMs used are those that
were presented in the previous Chapter. MLPs and FRPNs are then trained on each of
the augmented datasets, and the results are analysed and compared. A more completed
description of the experimental procedure is described in Section 6.1.
The performance of the classifiers can depend on initial conditions. To compensate for
variations in performance due to initial conditions we repeat each experiment three times
then report the average result. Furthermore, when comparing results we set the acceptable
variance to 0.05%. In other words, if the difference in performance between two models
is less than 0.05%, then the two models are said to perform at the same level where neither
is better nor worse than the other.
7.1 The HRSOM and MLP ensemble
This Section presents and discusses the MLP performance when trained on data that has
been augmented by SOMs of different sizes. Two and three hidden layer MLPs s are
trained on data from each of the three datasets. The model’s validation performance is
used as an indicator of how well the model is expected to generalise. The performance on
the validation data is used as a stopping criterion during training. The validation accuracy
(ACC) is calculated periodically. Training stops when the validation accuracy (ACC) does
not improve any further. This trained model is then used to classify the test set. All results
in the tables of this Chapter are an average over three runs and all performances (train,
test, and validation performances) are computed at the final iteration at which validation
results were the best.
Table 7.1 shows the performances of MLPs trained on the KDD99 dataset.
The Table shows that the MLP achieves an ACC and DR generally exceeding 99% for
both the training and validation dataset. All of the results are quite similar. Although the
generalization results are better for the two-layered MLPs than for the three-layered MLP.
The ACC (train and test sets) improves with the resolution of the SOMs. The DR (test
set) improves with the resolution of the SOM although improvements are rather minor in
most cases. However, it is important to note that the results are already close to 100%.
Thus, an improvement of just 0.05% i.e. from 99.9% in accuracy for the training data is
actuality an improvement by 50% towards a perfect accuracy.
The three hidden-layered MLP training and validation performances with SOM aug-
mentation are not as good as its two hidden layer counterpart. Further investigation found
that the validation accuracy stopped improving even before 1,000 iteration. The additional
hidden layer and input dimension may require more iterations to see further improvements
in the training data. Using an early stop criterion to control the number of training iter-
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Table 7.1: KDD99 classification performance produced by the MLP classifier.
Training set
Data Two Hidden Layers (%) Three Hidden Layers (%)
augmented by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
No augmentation 99.96 99.97 0.03 99.96 99.92 99.94 0.10 99.93
HRSOM 96×72 99.91 99.93 0.10 99.91 99.91 99.93 0.12 99.92
HRSOM 128×96 99.92 99.94 0.10 99.92 99.83 99.88 0.18 99.83
HRSOM 192×144 99.95 99.94 0.12 99.92 99.88 99.91 0.18 99.90
Validation set
Data Two Hidden Layers (%) Three Hidden Layers (%)
augmented by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
No augmentation 99.90 99.80 0.11 99.95 99.89 99.77 0.13 99.94
HRSOM 96×72 99.87 99.74 0.14 99.91 99.90 99.79 0.12 99.94
HRSOM 128×96 99.78 99.54 0.27 99.92 99.58 99.14 0.50 99.83
HRSOM 192×144 99.86 99.71 0.16 99.91 99.87 99.74 0.15 99.93
Test set
Data Two Hidden Layers (%) Three Hidden Layers (%)
augmented by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
No augmentation 94.27 91.94 0.67 86.00 94.02 91.56 0.65 85.33
HRSOM 96×72 93.26 90.39 0.66 83.34 94.01 91.55 0.63 85.28
HRSOM 128×96 94.47 92.25 0.74 86.65 94.79 92.75 0.92 87.79
HRSOM 192×144 94.48 92.27 0.68 86.60 94.00 91.54 0.67 85.33
ations to improve the validation results can be indicative to an overfitting problem. We
investigated this possible issue by forcing the MLP to be trained longer, i.e., ignoring the
effects of the early stop criterion. Overfitting was not observed but rather a plateau in
validation performance indicators while the training performance indicators continued to
increase at a very slow rate. We also noted a minor insignificant drop in generalization
performance when training for many more training iterations. Thus, overfitting is not
found to be a major issue with this model when trained on the KDD99 dataset.
The SOM 96× 72 performed the best at the training and validation phases in both
MLP architectures. However, the generalisation performance of larger SOM is better.
Augmentation improved the two hidden layered MLP generalisation performance on all
metrics. The generalisation accuracy improved around 0.2%, which is above the variance
threshold. The false positive rate remains small, < 1% while detection rate improved
0.6%. A similar trend is also observed on the three hidden layered MLP. The validation
accuracy is best with 96×72 augmentation but the generalisation accuracy is best when
augmenting with higher resolution SOM of size 128×144.
Overall, data augmentation has produced some improvements when compared to MLPs
with two hidden layers, or three hidden layers, that have been trained on the original non-
augmented data. While the changes in quality of results may not justify the complexity of
the model but one of the advantages of the ensemble is that the results can be interpreted
by the SOM. For example, as will be shown later in this chapter, the SOM reveals the
proximity of the detected cases of attack to normal cases on the display map, as well as
the location of mis-classified samples on the map. Such insight is useful in the analysis of
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reasons that lead to mis-classifications, and can be used to flag classifications of samples
that are mapped to regions in proximity of the mis-classified samples.
The fact that the ensemble results in using a two hidden layer MLP or a three hidden
layer MLP do not appear to improve on the results of using a two hidden layer MLP or
three hidden layer MLP may be an indication that there is insufficient number of train-
ing samples. A central tenet of the current wisdom is that given an infinite number of
training samples of sufficient “richness”a with this infinite number of training samples,
as the prevailing wisdom indicates, it is possible to train a MLP possibly of many hid-
den layers, which could generalize arbitrarily close to 100%. But here, as observed in
our experiments, a two hidden layer MLP, or a three hidden layer MLP already achieved
good generalization accuracies, which is an indication that there is insufficient number of
training samples to “push” the generalization accuracies further with more hidden layers.
To “push” the generalization accuracies further, researchers often resort to augmentation
of the data, i.e., to increase the number of data samples further. One such method in
augmentation of the number of data samples is the generative adversary network idea, in
which the intuition is to obtain from the current set of training samples, the probability
distribution of the various classes of patterns, and then re-sample new training samples,
from these estimated probability distributions [191, 192]. This line of research is beyond
the scope of this thesis, and we will investigate this further, except to point out this pos-
sible discrepancy in the results which we obtained compared with the prevailing wisdom.
However, as another way to show that there might be insufficient number of training sam-
ples, we decided to use a method, which will take away the difficulties of designing a
mulithidden layered MLP, viz., the determination of the number of hidden layers, which
is called a FRPN. The FRPN consists of a pool of neurons, not necessarily represented in
a layer, but often it is easier to visualize it as a single hidden layer of neurons, but with
fully recursive connections with one another. This architecture is capable of emulating a
multiple hidden layer MLP with an arbirtary number of hidden layers, with the restriction
that all the weights in the multiple hidden layers are shared among the multiple hidden
layers. Thus by using the FRPN instead of the two hidden layer or three hidden layer
MLP, we can find out if the non-augmented MLP generalization performance would be
improved. If it can be improved, then this will show the two hidden layer or three hidden
layer MLP may be still sub-optimal, and we could improve on its results by inclduing
more hidden layers, i.e., we simply have not tried hard enough in finding the number of
hidden layers. On the other hand, if the generalization results do not show improvements,
then, we may conclude that there might not be enough training samples for this detection
problem. This will be investigated later in this Chapter.
aRichness here is meant that the training samples will cover all the important regions of the classification
problem, a concept which is akin to “persistency of excitation” in system identification theory, in which all
the modes existing in the observation are sufficiently excited that they are observable at the outputs [190].
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Table 7.2: CTU-13 classification results produced by MLP classifiers.
Training set
Data Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
augmented by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
No augmentation 98.75 97.84 1.08 96.20 98.89 97.67 0.88 96.60
HRSOM 96×72 99.56 98.58 0.28 98.79 99.61 98.86 0.29 98.96
HRSOM 128×96 99.19 97.47 0.20 96.06 99.44 98.26 0.27 97.94
HRSOM 192×144 99.58 98.71 0.27 98.80 99.65 98.93 0.23 99.02
Validation set
Data Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
augmented by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
No augmentation 99.67 96.29 0.24 94.18 99.60 92.37 0.19 92.91
HRSOM 96×72 99.91 98.79 0.08 99.08 99.93 99.01 0.06 99.37
HRSOM 128×96 99.94 98.91 0.06 99.87 99.93 98.70 0.07 99.81
HRSOM 192×144 99.90 98.18 0.10 99.68 99.90 98.31 0.09 99.65
Test set
Data Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
augmented by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
No augmentation 98.89 98.73 0.92 98.96 98.14 97.09 0.65 98.25
HRSOM 96×72 99.49 99.34 0.19 99.39 99.27 99.27 0.67 99.26
HRSOM 128×96 99.34 99.38 0.21 98.96 99.42 99.45 0.24 99.12
HRSOM 192×144 99.03 99.09 0.27 98.42 98.69 98.77 1.25 98.62
Table 7.2 shows the classification performance of two and three hidden MLP when
trained on the augmented CTU-13 dataset. It can be observed that the classification ACCs
are generally better with augmentation than without but the size of the SOM showed little
influence. The FPR is generally improved when using the augmented data, while the
DR improves with the SOM size. The CTU-13 dataset training data distribution is very
skewed as discussed in Chapter 5 which influences the results seen in Table 7.2.
The validation samples classification ACC of the different SOM size augmentations
show improvement when compared to MLP that were trained on non-augmented data.
The generalisation performance is generally better when using augmentation. Although
the generalization results appear to decrease with the size of a SOM. This can be a sign of
overfitting. Using a three-layer MLP improves results for the training data although there
is little difference in generalization results. Thus, there is no apparent benefit in using a
third hidden layer.
Table 7.3 shows the classification performance of MLPs with two and three hidden
layers when trained on augmented UNSW-NB15 data. The Table 7.3 shows consistent
improvements for training, validation and test results with data augmentation and increase
in SOM size. The results contradict an earlier expectation in Chapter 5 which stated
that improvements in results would be more pronounced for the KDD99 and CTU-13
datasets than for the UNSW-NB15 dataset. A closer inspection of results revealed that
the observed improvements in results are linked to the distribution of feature values. The
distribution of the validation and test data are much more similar to the distribution of
values in the training set of UNSW-NB15 than for the other two sets. Moreover, all types
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Table 7.3: UNSW-NB15 classification results produced by MLP classifiers.
Training set
Data Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
augmented by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
No augmentation 94.49 96.03 12.49 97.74 95.10 96.44 9.88 97.44
HRSOM 96×72 95.15 96.48 9.88 97.52 95.64 96.82 8.52 97.59
HRSOM 128×96 95.27 96.56 9.63 97.58 95.27 96.56 9.63 97.58
HRSOM 192×144 95.28 96.56 9.44 97.50 95.66 96.83 8.52 97.62
Validation set
Data Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
augmented by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
No augmentation 94.71 96.18 12.09 97.91 94.82 96.25 10.37 97.25
HRSOM 96×72 94.84 96.26 10.45 97.30 94.99 96.36 9.57 97.11
HRSOM 128×96 94.98 96.36 10.00 97.30 95.07 96.42 9.58 97.24
HRSOM 192×144 95.03 96.40 9.75 97.26 95.04 96.40 9.54 97.17
Test set
Data Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
augmented by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
No augmentation 84.11 87.07 31.88 97.16 86.08 88.50 27.57 97.23
HRSOM 96×72 86.07 88.51 27.94 97.50 86.47 88.77 26.63 97.16
HRSOM 128×96 86.87 89.18 27.16 98.32 86.60 88.92 26.95 97.67
HRSOM 192×144 86.41 88.76 27.08 97.42 86.61 88.91 26.63 97.42
of attack appear in the training set.
The two hidden layer MLP training ACC is improved by approximately 0.21-0.34%.
The corresponding three hidden layer MLP training ACC improved by up to 0.54%, due to
the significant reduction in FPR as the DR remains similar with or without augmentation.
The validation and generalisation improvements are observed on both MLP architectures
when augmentation is used. The different SOM sizes improved the performance by more
than the defined variance threshold. However, the generalisation performance improved
the most for two hidden layered MLPs and when using augmentations, which reduces the
FPR by ∼4.8% and increased the DR by ∼1.16%.
Data augmentation has shown to generally improve results. The trend is confirmed
when training the MLP on the three different datasets and when using two different MLP
architectures, one using a two hidden layered one, and the second using a three hiddne
layered one. The improvement plateaus on the larger end of the HRSOM size. This can be
an expected result given that the SOM performance metrics shown in Section 4.4.1 also
plateaued when using very large SOMs. Interestingly the two hidden layer MLP often
performed better than MLPs with three hidden layers when trained on non-augmented
data. This aspect is interesting given that the FRPN classifier (considered later in this
Chapter) is able to simulate MLPs with many more hidden layers.
The following section investigates the results further. The SOM is used to show the
properties of samples that experienced the most improvement and to investigate why some
samples remained misclassified.
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Figure 7.1: Location of test samples that are miss-classified by the MLP that was trained
on non-augmented KDD99 data but were classified correctly by an MLP that was trained
on augmented data.
7.1.1 Analysis of classification results
This Section shows the mapping where augmentation improves the generalisation classi-
fication the most. The trained display map is overlaid with the samples in the testing set
that has been correctly identified after augmentation. For the KDD99 dataset augmented
with the mappings of a 192×144 SOM this can be observed in Figure 7.1. It is observed
that the improvements in classifications are for samples that are mapped around the edges
of clusters and particularly where the edge of a cluster is close to a cluster of samples from
another class. The observation confirms the expectation that augmentation would help im-
prove the classification of samples that are more likely to be confused with samples from
another class due to their similarity in feature space. Improvements are often for true pos-
itives near the boundary area of normal clusters, such as observed on the map in the area
around the coordinates (0 < x < 80,10 < y < 20) and (100 < x < 155,99 < y < 125). In-
terestingly, there are attack samples mapped onto the bottom of the display space, where
there were only normal samples mapped during training. The HRSOM augmentation was
capable of correctly identifying many of these samples.
Table 7.4 shows the percentage of test sample false negatives per class label before and
after augmentation. The test set includes attack categories not found in the training set
(unknown attacks). The best false negative reduction from unknown attacks are apache2,
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Table 7.4: The false negatives of test samples (KDD99) before and after augmentation
by a 192×144 SOM.
Primitive label Non-augmented augmented Total
apache2 40.43% 29.60% 794
back 15.28% 4.92% 386
mscan 12.87% 11.34% 1049
Other unknowns 60.49% 59.76% 2336
land 11.11% 0.00% 9
satan 29.30% 20.70% 860
Other knowns 2.68% 2.77% 72014
back, and mscan. The apache2 and back samples are mapped onto the bottom area of
the display space. The mscan samples are mapped onto the high confusion area on the
top right. Attack sample apache2 is an older attack method where the adversary access
remote machines through HTTP requests. The network traffic features did not show much
difference to the normal samples but it has continuous connection to the same service for
more than two seconds, which indicates prolong HTTP requests. The back attack sample
is a type of DOS, which has specific characteristic of having very large packet bytes.
Lastly, mscan is a PROBE attack sample and have been mapped where the PROBE cluster
is on the top right of the display space. Overall, HRSOM augmentation increases the DR
of unknown attacks by 3.48%.
Data augmentation also improved recognition of known attack samples as is shown in
Table 7.4. For example, by using augmentation, the classifier is enabled to identify all of
the “land” attacks (DoS type) whereas the MLP trained on non-augmented data exhibited
a false negative rate of 11.11%. Similarly, the FPR for other PROBE attack types and for
satan attacks are reduced when augmentation is used. While the net increase of recogni-
tion of known attacks is not as impressive as known attacks are already recognized at a
rate close to 100%. The results show that the improvements arising out of augmentation
are most pronounced for the generalization capability of zero-day attack samples.
There are attack samples that remain undetected in the sense that they were not clas-
sified yet, into any one of the known classes, or as something which have not been seen
previously in the dataset so far. One of the reasons is because there are only a handful
of samples in most attack cases. For example there are only two worm attack samples.
None of the trained classifiers could detect these. The normal clusters are much larger so
that it has a huge pull on nearby attack samples. There are 5 attack samples at coordinate
(86,96) and 35 normal samples mapped very close to (85,95). So such proximity of a
relatively large class of samples (normal) would exert “immense” pressure on the rela-
tively smaller number of samples in another class (attack) to be classified to be the same,
unless there are “signals” to inform the classifier during the training process otherwise. In
IDS, this is the usual tactic employed by the attackers: “masquerading” attack classes in
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Figure 7.2: Location of classifications corrected by MLPs trained on augmented CTU-
13 data using A SOM of size 192×144.
close similarity to the normal cases, so as to evade possible detection.
Figure 7.2 shows the areas where the misclassification of CTU-13 test samples is re-
duced after augmentation. It can be observed that the mapping of the test samples that are
classified correctly due to the use of augmentation is quite well separated and form them-
selves into clusters. These are edge case areas where the augmentation by the HRSOM
contributes the most to reduce possible confusions. There are two observed high con-
centrations (clusters) of improvements. One is on the bottom left of the display space
between a large normal and attack clusters. Another is on the right on a small cluster of
attack samples. The odd samples overlapped with opposing samples across the display
space has been correctly identified after augmentation.
Table 7.5 shows the percentage of false negative test samples per label before and after
augmentation. None of these “bot” types are included in either the training or the vali-
dation sets (unknown “bot” types). It can be observed that augmentation has reduced the
Neris bot misidentification very significantly to 0.76%. However, there are still Menti
bot behaviours and two Murlo bot behaviours being misidentified even after HRSOM.
The Neris bot behaves very similarly to the Rbot bot in the training set where it carries
out advertisement click fraud and spamming. It also behaves like other bots where it
would establish a connection to the command-and-control server through HTTP service.
The Menti behaviour is a command-and-control connection but it uses protocol and ser-
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Table 7.5: The botnet label
Bot type not augmented augmented TOTAL
Neris 2.46% 0.76% 241932
Menti 0.43% 0.43% 7853
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Figure 7.3: Location of classifications corrected by MLPs trained on augmented UNSW-
NB15 test data using a SOM of size 192× 144. The coloured circles are samples that
have been classified correctly when using augmentation by incorrectly when training
MLPs on non-augmented data.
vices more similar to the normal behaviour ones. In addition, Menti samples duration and
packet size has the same range as normal samples mapped nearby. The two Murlo be-
haviours are command-and-control connections through custom ports that are still within
the range of the ports commonly used by normal cases.
Figure 7.3 shows the areas where the misclassification of UNSW-NB15 test samples is
reduced after the augmentation, and Table 7.6 shows the changes in false negatives of test
samples before and after augmentation.
It can be observed that the misclassification of both classes (attack and normal) is sig-
nificantly reduced when using augmentation. The improvement covers a broad area of
the feature space. The FNR is reduced by 0.16% while the greatest improvement is ob-
served in the reduction of the FPR rate by 4.8%. Augmentation led to the identification
of all Backdoor and Worm attack samples where MLPs trained on non-augmented data
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Table 7.6: UNSW misclassification in the testing set is reduced significantly with aug-
mented data.
Labels MLPONLY HRSOM 192 TOTAL
Analysis 4.87% 0.59% 677
Backdoor 0.69% 0.00% 583
DoS 0.73% 0.37% 4089
Exploits 0.42% 0.65% 11132
Fuzzers 12.82% 17.42% 6062
Generic 1.80% 0.05% 18871
Reconnaissance 0.17% 0.20% 3496
Shellcode 0.79% 1.32% 378
Worms 2.27% 0.00% 44
missed several samples. Augmentation reduced the false identification around the bor-
ders of well-formed clusters. Approximately, 68% of the reduction in false negatives is
in the bottom left corner (x ≤ 85 and y ≤ 80) of Figure 7.3. The misclassifications that
remain are for samples that are too similar to the opposite classes such that the 192×144
could not assist in separating them. This analysis of results confirms an observation made
in Chapter 6 which indicated that for the UNSW-NB15 dataset, a SOM of even higher
resolution would be of benefit.
We also observed a few cases where augmentation resulted in a misclassification of
samples that were classified correctly by MLPs trained on non-augmented data. The
greatest gain in false negative is observed for Exploits and Fuzzer attacks. These samples
tend to be located on the boundary between attack and normal clusters (see Figure 7.3).
We found that there are only few deterministic features with small value range, such as
the protocol type, service, state, and this effect caused augmentation to pull these samples
closer towards samples belonging to normal clusters.
7.2 The HRSOM and FRPN ensemble
The FRPN uses a pool of neurons to emulate MLPs with an arbitrary number of hidden
layers [2]. There is no need to determine the number of hidden layers or the number of
neurons in each hidden layer. A FRPN with a pool containing just one neuron is akin
to an MLP with one hidden neuron in a single hidden layer whereas any larger pool
would render FRPNs distinct in architecture to an MLP. But even in this case, there are
differences. In the single hidden layer neuron, there are recursive connections, while for
the single hidden layer neuron, there are no recursive connections.
This Section shows the result of an ensemble that substitutes the MLP with the FRPN
then repeating the experiments in a similar fashion as performed in the previous section.
Note that this will be performed on both non-augmented and augmented data, i.e., the fea-
ture vectors are augmented by the coordinates of their projection onto the two dimensional
display space of a SOM. Instead of layers this Section investigates FRPNs with different
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Figure 7.4: KDD99 dataset FPRN training performance
sizes of the neuron pool. The pool size h is varied within the range h ∈ [1;25]. For ease
of reference, a FRPN with a pool size h will be referred to as FPRN h. It is known that
FRPNs are sensitive to the choice of learning rates [2]. Hence, the learning rate will be
kept small at α = 0.00001. The stopping criterion of a training run will be based on an
optimal validation performance as before. The performances will be illustrated using a
whisker and box plot that shows the min-mean-max results from at least three experiment
runs with different initial conditions.
Figure 7.4 shows the training performance of the FRPN when trained on augmented
KDD99 data. The size of the SOM used for augmentation is color coded. It can be
observed that the performance increases with the number of neurons in the pool. Training
a FRPN with HRSOM augmented data is shown to on produce similar or better results as
those obtained from training a FRPN on non-augmented data. Augmenting data with the
mappings of a 96×72 SOM produces better results than when using larger SOMs. This
observation is similar to those made with the HRSOM-MLP ensemble performance in the
previous Section. It is also observed that the results become more stable as the number of
neurons in the FRPN increases.
The validation performances are shown in Figure 7.5.
Both the training and validation performances show a steep improvement when in-
creasing the size of the neuron pool from FRPN 1 to FRPN 5. The improvement in per-
formance then slows with a further increase in the number of neurons as the performance
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Figure 7.5: KDD99 dataset FPRN validation performance.
Table 7.7: The average generalization performance of the FRPN 25 computed on the
KDD99 test data.
Data augmentation ACC F1 FPR DR
not augmented 94.09% 91.67% 0.66% 85.53%
HRSOM 96×72 93.92% 91.41% 0.67% 85.11%
HRSOM 128×96 94.85% 92.84% 0.82% 87.79%
HRSOM 192×144 94.47% 92.25% 0.76% 86.68%
indicators become closer to 100%. From Figure 7.5 it appears that the FRPN 1 overfits
when augmentation is used. However, this result is due to outliers in the results as the re-
sults can vary significantly for small FRPNs. For example, while the training of a FRPN1
on data augmented by a 96×72 SOM seems to improve the ACC, the minimum accuracy
for 96×72 is lower than for all other runs that use the FRPN 1. Furthermore, FRPN 1 is
not necessarily a particularly useful model because it only has one hidden neuron.
Table 7.7 shows the average result of the test data for the FRPN 25. It can be seen that
augmentation helped improve the FRPN generalization by up to 0.8% (ACC). The 192×
144 HRSOM augmentation performed better than FRPNs trained on non-augmented data
but it did not improve as much as when using augmentation of a 128× 96 SOM. This
trend was also observed when training and evaluating MLP with three hidden layers. The
training and validation showed that the augmentation with the 96× 72 SOM performed
best overall although the generalisation performance tends to improve with larger SOMs.
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Figure 7.6: FPRN training performance (CTU-13 dataset).
The observed generalisation (ACC) performance on KDD99 dataset between FRPN
and MLP on non-augmented data only differs within 0.3%, which are 94.27% and 94.02%
for two and three hidden layer MLP respectively. This result suggests that two hidden
layer MLP was sufficient for this dataset. The FRPN made significant difference to the
generalisation performance of data augmented with HRSOM 96×72 and 128×96. The
FRPN 25 improves the ACC by approximately 0.7% and 0.4% on SOM 96× 72 and
128×96 augmented data respectively. Both FRPN 25 and MLPs performed similarly on
HRSOM 192×144 augmented data. Therefore, if you can afford to train large HRSOM,
two hidden layer MLP performed sufficiently.
Figure 7.6 shows the FRPN’s training performance on the CTU-13 dataset. Augmen-
tation improves the performance of all FRPNs except for FRPN 1. The FRPN with one
hidden neuron would default to the distribution of the training data, which is heavily
skewed towards the normal samples. The high performance is likely caused by normal
samples identification as shown by its high false positive rate. As the number of hidden
neuron increases, the augmentations based on the 192× 144 SOM generally improved
results compared to FRPNs that were trained on non-augmented data.
Figure 7.7 shows the corresponding validation performances. The validation set is
skewed towards the normal samples and includes botnet scenarios that also occur in the
training set. FRPN 1 shows a high performance but it is not reliable as previously dis-
cussed. The smaller FRPNs seem to overfit when using augmentation from larger SOMs.
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Figure 7.7: FPRN validation performance (CTU-13 dataset).
Nevertheless, using augmentation from the larger SOM often outperforms smaller SOMs
augmentation similar to those observed for the training performance. Figure 7.7 suggests
the larger FRPN with higher resolution SOMs would generalise the best.
Table 7.8 shows the generalisation performance of the FRPN 25. Augmentation using
a SOM of any size increases the FRPN generalization performance by at least 3% when
compared to the base model that was trained on non-augmented data. A strong increase in
the generalization results is obtained when using the mappings of a SOM of size 96×72
for data augmentation when compared to the base model. The quality of results improve
noticeably with the resolution of the SOM. Using the largest HRSOM produced the best
results and improved i.e. the ACC by over 4% when compared to the base model.
In the case of CTU-13 dataset, the generalisation performance (ACC) of MLP on non-
augmented data shown in the previous section is better than its FRPN counterpart. This
indicates that the two and three hidden layer MLP is enough hidden layer for this dataset.
Unlike KDD99 dataset, the FRPN 25 generalisation performance is similar to the two or
three hidden layer MLP on HRSOM augmented data.
Figure 7.8 shows FRPN’s training performance when using the augmented UNSW-
NB15 dataset. It can be observed that augmentation generally produced results at least as
good as the base model (trained on non-augmented data). The detection rate is between
97% and 99%. The smaller FRPN may appear to have better detection rate but the false
positive rate is quite high as well. Increasing the size of the FRPN reduces the false
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Table 7.8: The test results of the FRPN 25 (CTU-13 dataset).
Data augmentation ACC F1 FPR DR
not augmented 98.74% 98.82% 1.14% 98.63%
HRSOM 96×72 98.87% 98.94% 0.63% 98.43%
HRSOM 128×96 98.11% 98.25% 3.12% 99.17%
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Figure 7.8: UNSW FPRN training performance
Table 7.9: The test results for the FRPN 25 (UNSW-NB15 dataset).
Data augmentation ACC F1 FPR DR
not augmented 85.91% 88.42% 28.55% 97.71%
HRSOM 96×72 86.21% 88.60% 27.42% 97.34%
HRSOM 128×96 86.46% 88.80% 29.73% 98.29%
HRSOM 192×144 86.01% 88.44% 27.71% 97.20%
positive rate by 50% while maintaining a high detection rate. The validation performance
shows similar trend. Figure 7.9 shows the corresponding validation performance. It is
observed that the validation performance improves with augmentation. The improvement
in the ACC is mainly due to a reduction of false positive.
Table 7.9 shows the average test results of the FRPN 25 on UNSW-NB15 dataset.
Again, it is observed that augmentation generally produces results that are at least as
good as the base model. There is a 0.4% difference in accuracy between 128× 96 and
192× 144 data augmentation, which is also observed in the two hidden layer MLP. The
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Figure 7.9: UNSW FPRN validation performance.
Table 7.10: Generalisation results (ACC) comparison for KDD99 and UNSW-NB15
datasets.
Approach KDD99 UNSW-NB15
Recent literature 94.62% [110] 86.40% [109]
DT, Max depth = 15 93.29% 86.36%
MLP ONLY 94.48% 84.11%
HRSOM+MLP 94.79% 86.61%
HRSOM+FRPN 94.85% 86.46%
FRPN generalisation performances indicate that the two or three hidden layer MLPs are
sufficient for this dataset. However, the FRPN can compensate for smaller SOM size
better than MLP.
FRPN is a very powerful NN. It can perform very well with few neurons and the results
become more and more stable (quality of results become more and more independent to
initial conditions) as the size of the FRPN increases for all three datasets. Augmentation is
also shown to motivate better generalisation and does not negatively affect the FRPN per-
formance. The FRPN results overall indicate two and three hidden layer MLP is sufficient
for most of the datasets evaluated in this chapter.
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Table 7.11: CTU-13 Dataset Performance per Scenario.
Approach DR (%) for scenario FPR (%) for scenario1 2 6 8 9 1 2 6 8 9
C4.5 Decision Tree [107] 98.50 97.00 99.40 99.30 99.30 1.20 3.70 0.30 0.50 0.50
Distributed Random Forest [7] 90.00 95.00 96.00 25.00 94.00 14.00 25.00 19.00 13.00 9.00
HRSOM+MLP 99.76 95.55 99.57 82.59 99.33 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.03
7.3 Results compared to literature
Table 7.10 shows the best generalisation result from our proposed ensemble when com-
pared to results of contemporary literature described in Section 5.7. The proposed ensem-
ble using either MLP of FRPN yielded generalisation results for the KDD99 dataset better
than the current state-of-the-art result produced by a CNN [110]. We note that the DR of
the hierarchical SOM ensemble in [5] is reported to be 90.4% compared to 87.79% of our
method. This is because the authors did not remove redundant entries from the datasets
(note that 233,738 of the 311,027 samples in the test set are duplicates). If we include
redundant entries then our DR increases to 91.47%.
The most similar architecture to the proposed ensemble can be found in [101]. Eight
SOM mapping information is used to train and evaluate three hidden layer MLP. Their
training and evaluation were based on a small subset of the KDD99 dataset, consisting
only of samples belonging to the attack classes neptune, satan and portsweep. These are
the attack cases with the larger sample size in KDD99. Moreover, the HRSOM mapped
these classes in well distinct regions as was seen in Figure 6.6. Neptune forms the top
right DoS cluster, while satan and portsweeps are PROBE type attack forming a cluster
close to the DoS cluster. They are observed to be well separated from normal samples
and are hence easy to distinguish. Hence this explains the good results reported in [101].
The CTU-13 dataset generalisation performance was evaluated on scenario basis in [7,
10, 107]. Table 7.11 shows how the ensemble performs on evaluated scenarios. The
HRSOM and MLP ensemble have a DR similar to the best of those obtained in the liter-
ature [7, 10, 107] while producing a much lower FPR. In fact, the FPR of the proposed
ensemble is significantly better across the evaluated scenaria when compared to recent
literature [7]. The only exception is with respect to the DR for scenario 8. The scenario
targets Murlo bot types for which the DT approach produces the best result. However, the
results reported in [107] are based on a cross validation evaluation approach, i.e., the DT
is partially trained with scenario 8 data as well, whereas our model has shown capability
to detect these types of attack samples without being included in the training set.
Our proposed ensemble yield better generalisation accuracy by 0.2% than the AdaBoost
NN reported in [109]. The proposed HRSOM and MLP ensemble generalises better than
decision trees (ACC improved by 1.1% when compared with results reported in [108]),
and better by 0.3% than the best result reported in Table 5.15 in Section 5.6. A multi-scale
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Hebbian NN reported high cross-validation accuracy of 93% from a UNSW-NB15 dataset
subset in [111]. Our proposed method showed 95.28% training and 95.03% validation
accuracy across all UNSW-NB15 dataset samples.
The training time for the ensemble system varied between the datasets. Training an
HRSOM could take up to two weeks depending on hardware used, while the MLP took
approximately 6 to 12 seconds per iteration to train. Training FRPN is even faster, where
the largest FRPN with 25 hidden neuron took up to 4 seconds per iteration to train. How-
ever, classification of unknown sample would not take much time at all once both HRSOM
and MLP are trained. Finding the BMU on an HRSOM of size 192×144 takes approxi-
mately 0.00062 seconds on an average per sample. Then the classification requires only
the forward phase through a trained NN, which takes approximately 0.00000182 seconds
and 0.00000309 seconds on an average per sample for MLP and FRPN respectively. This
means that over 1,600 samples can be assessed per second by using a single system.
Moreover, given that the average attack duration is 1.002, 27.42, and 164.17 seconds for
UNSW-NB15, CTU-13, and KDD99 dataset respectively this means that a sample can
be classified in less time than the attack duration. While the proposed method should be
scalable for most of the common IDSs, it is possible to increase the throughput nearly arbi-
trarily via an implementation on a distributed (i.e. cluster) computing system. Scalability
and quality of the proposed ensemble system results indicated a real world feasibility.
The proposed ensemble has been shown to match, if not improve upon, the state-of-
the-art contemporary IDS performance found in the literature [5, 101, 107, 109, 110,
111, 123]. Furthermore, all of the methods proposed in the literature were evaluated only
against one benchmark dataset. One may argue that those models have been “optimized”
to perform best in a very specific application scenario. In contrast, the proposed model
produced consistently good results across three different benchmark datasets of quite dif-
ferent characteristics as shown in Chapter 5, is capable of generalising to the point of
identifying attack samples not included in the training set, thus presenting itself as a gen-
eral technique for a range of IDS scenarios.
7.4 Comparison with alternative ensembles
Decision trees (DTs) are often reported to be competitive to NNs in IDS applications. It
was shown in Section 5.6 that DT and MLP are the top performing classifier for each of
the three datasets. This raises the question on whether ensembles that include Decision
Trees could work as well as the proposed NN ensemble. It is also possible to consider
an ensemble consisting of DT and MLP. Such an ensemble could potentially work well
together as DT and MLPs have complementary properties.
The HRSOM and MLP work well together because their learning processes involve the
minimisation of the model’s error rate using complementary objectives [157]. HRSOM
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Table 7.12: The training samples where DT and MLP disagree on.
Dataset Disagreed samples DT corrects MLP corrects
KDD99 1536 1136 400
CTU13 2711 2701 10
UNSW 8460 4264 4196
aims to minimise the difference in distance between neuron’s codebook and input vectors,
while the gradient descent algorithm of MLPs aims to minimise the difference between the
network output and its target. The HRSOM also provides mapping information to focus
the MLP effort to high-confusion areas where attack and normal samples are mapped in
close proximities to one another. DT learning process, however, is based on creating rules
that fits the features of the data. Its output is not the rules but the classification decision
made when it reaches a leaf node. Combining DT with MLP should not be based on
augmenting data with DT outputs because the errors made by a DT classifier might be
propagated instead of rectified by MLP. A mixture of expert system approach [193] would
be more appropriate to create a DT and MLP ensemble.
The DT and MLP are trained independently using all of the training samples. DT and
MLP complementary properties can be observed by comparing the classification results
of the two classifiers. Table 7.12 shows the number of training samples where DT and
MLP disagree on their classification. For example, there are 1,536 samples where the
DT produces a classification that differs from the classification of the MLP. Of those
1,536 the DT was correct in classifying 1,136 samples whereas the MLP was correct
for the remaining 400 samples. There are thus samples that DT can classify better than
an MLP and vice versa. The idea of the ensemble is to exploit the capabilities of each
of the two classifiers. There are a number of ways by which this can be carried out.
In this thesis we adopted the following procedure: The training samples are filtered for
each classifier by removing samples that a particular classifier incorrectly labelled. This
results in a subset of training data one for each classifier. The two methods are then re-
trained on the corresponding subsets so as to produce specialised classifiers. Then the
classification results from the specialised DT and MLP are combined as follows: Each
sample is classified by both the DT and MLP. The outputs for each sample is combined
and the combined outputs of all training samples are used to create a new dataset. Since
the target values are encoded by a two-dimensional one-hot encoded vector and hence the
new dataset consists of a set of four dimensional vectors; one for each training sample.
The new dataset is used to train another MLP. This MLP is then used as the gating network
to make the final classification of any of the samples.
Table 7.13 shows the performances of the DT, MLP, DT and MLP ensemble, and com-
pares the results with the HRSOM and MLP ensemble for each of the three datasets. It
can be observed that the DT and MLP ensembles generalise better than the individual
classifiers. However it performs worse than the HRSOM and MLP ensemble on KDD99
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Table 7.13: Generalisation Performance of DT and MLP ensemble.
KDD99
MODEL ACC F1 FPR DR
DT ONLY 92.75% 89.57% 0.58% 81.87%
MLP ONLY 92.11% 88.53% 0.50% 80.05%
DT & MLP 94.21% 91.86% 0.71% 85.93%
HRSOM+MLP 94.79% 92.75% 0.92% 87.79%
CTU-13 Neris
Model ACC F1 FPR DR
DT ONLY 98.98% 99.04% 0.07% 98.17%
MLP ONLY 98.89% 98.73% 0.92% 98.96%
DT & MLP 99.15% 99.20% 0.07% 98.47%
HRSOM+MLP 99.34% 99.38% 0.21% 98.96%
UNSW-NB15
Model ACC F1 FPR DR
DT Only 86.36% 88.38% 23.21% 94.17%
MLP Only 86.04% 88.39% 26.84% 96.55%
DT&MLP 88.87% 90.20% 16.19% 93.00%
HRSOM+MLP 86.87% 89.18% 27.16% 98.32%
dataset and CTU-13 dataset by about 0.58% and 0.19% respectively. With respect to ACC
the DT-MLP ensemble appears to work equally well only on the UNSW-NB15 dataset al-
though the DR is lower and the FPR is higher. Since a robust detection of attacks takes
priority in IDS and hence the HSOM-MLP ensemble presents itself as a better choice.
Moreover, the visual capabilities of the proposed SOM-MLP ensemble provide a better
understanding of the IDS environment which is not matched by DT-MLP ensemble. Fur-
thermore, the neural network gate of the DT-MLP ensemble does not allow a straight
forward explanation of results so that following up on detection would not be as simple
as investigating the HRSOM mappings.
7.5 Summary
Chapter 6 evaluates HRSOM training results on KDD99, CTU-13 and UNSW-NB15
datasets. The HRSOM is shown to have much better visualisation quality compared to
lower resolution SOMs. The normal and attack samples on HRSOM mapping are not only
better separated but also are shown to have more complicated relationships. The KDD99
dataset HRSOM mapping shows normal samples formed well-formed clusters while only
Denial of Service (DoS) attack samples created a cluster. Other attack samples in the
KDD99 dataset are spread on the edges of normal samples. The CTU-13 dataset HRSOM
mapping shows similar observations, where the Virut botnet samples formed the largest
cluster of attack samples. The UNSW-NB15 dataset HRSOM mapping show dense sam-
ple mapping on the right hand side of the display space and the rest of the samples are
spread thinly across the remaining display space.
The SOM mapping quality is also shown through quantifiable performance metrics.
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They are evaluated based on how well the SOM organise the samples in regards to its
ability to cluster similar samples together based on the sample labels and based on the
sample features. The SOM performance increases with its size. The improvement trend
become less steep and plateau after a certain size. The SOM of size where the perfor-
mance metrics start to plateau is the optimal SOM size for the given dataset and any SOM
sizes larger than that is an HRSOM.
The HRSOM visual inspection of these three datasets illustrates the intuition behind
seminal work in IDS and their shortcomings [8, 9]. The attack samples can be found to
form a cluster such that the properties of the cluster can be used as signature to detect
attacks, which resulted in misused-based IDS described in [8]. However, if an unknown
sample may not fit into any of the clusters, it may be misclassified under the misuse-based
approach. Anomaly-based IDS may performed better in this circumstance as described
in [9]. The attack samples are shown to be mapped on different locations to the normal
samples such that if an unknown sample does not fit into any of the clusters of normal
samples, it is classified as an attack sample. The mapping, however, shows there are
outlier normal samples mapped away from a cluster of normal samples.
The novel IDS approach proposed in this thesis utilises the HRSOM mapping informa-
tion to a supervised NN classifier, MLP and FRPN. The mapping information would focus
the learning effort on the difficult areas where the normal and attack samples are mapped
on the same location or they are mapped very close together. The mapping coordinates
are concatenated to the corresponding samples to train and evaluate the NN classifier.
This Chapter shows the HRSOM augmentation performed as good as if not better than
NN classifier without augmentation across all three datasets.
Furthermore, the HRSOM provides a way for the classification result to be traced and
explained. The misclassified samples can be shown on the display space (Section 7.1.1).
The samples on the boundary points of the clusters are the area where HRSOM augmen-
tation improved the classification performance. The attack samples that did not appear in
the training nor validation sets have higher detection rate with HRSOM augmentation.
This Chapter also shows the proposed ensemble model IDS to perform competitively
to the previous works discussed in Chapter 3. It performed well consistently with three
different datasets, which means we have devised a general purpose IDS.
Chapter 8
Creating HRSOMs via map scaling and
their suitability for IDS
The two dimensional HRSOMs presented in Chapter 6 are trained using a GPU-based im-
plementation of the SOM algorithm originally proposed by Kohonen [171]. It was found
that the performance improves as the grid size increases. However, the trend of improve-
ments appeared to reach a plateau as the trainedHRSOM performance approaches 100%.
It raises the issue of cost-benefit trade-off from training even larger HRSOMs. This Chap-
ter describes an alternative to creating HRSOMs using an image scaling technique [176,
177, 179], at greatly reduced computational cost and discusses any added value obtained
from scaling to much larger SOMs.
The approach uses scaling methods which are common to image processing [176, 177,
179]. Given a well-trained HRSOM and a target size, we can interpolate the codebook
vectors of the SOM of the said target size much like how images are scaled.
8.1 Image scaling for SOM
A two dimensional SOM and an image are similar in many ways. They both have a
two dimensional location coordinate (x,y), where there is a vector of information at each
coordinate. An image coordinate is a pixel that contains a three dimensional vector rep-
resenting the color information, commonly referred to as a chromatic vector, determined
by how much red, green, blue (RGB) which constitute to the color of the pixel. Typically,
they are expressed in a range between 0 to 255, for example, if the pixel pertains only to
be “red” the chromatic vector would be (255,0,0). A SOM coordinate has an associated
n-dimensional codebook vector where n is also the dimension of the input vector. There-
fore, a two dimensional HRSOM can be scaled like a color image such as using a trilinear
interpolation technique [176, 177, 179].
Increasing the resolution of a SOM diversifies the display space as was shown in Fig-
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ure 6.6 (Chapter 6). The scaling up method will achieve similar outcomes with respect to
diversifying the resulting mapping. The codebook vectors on the scaled SOM spread the
mapping to adjacent neurons such that the overall mapping structure would look similar
to the trained SOM even though the resolution of this SOM has changed. The spread is
guided by the value distribution of the codebooks rather than on the value distribution of
the samples. The interpolated neurons are not “activated” by the data such that no new in-
formation is actually learned. On the other hand, scaling down the SOM would “smooth”
the mapping so that the mapping structures are compressed.
The scaled SOMs generalisation capabilities will be demonstrated in this Chapter
through both upscaling and downscaling. The upscaled SOMs provide better data vi-
sualisation, but no improvement in generalisation capabilities. The downscaling SOMs
would show some improvement in generalisation errors as training larger SOMs yield
better mapping quality that is maintained after scaling down.
This scaling method uses the full display space unlike the hierarchical, the growing,
or the partitioned SOM where the improvements tend to be focused on partial mapped
regions [163, 164, 165, 166, 167]. The scaling method can also help to relieve the com-
putational pressure by resuming the training from the scaled SOM. Furthermore, model
currentness/recency can be a problem in IDS. Users and adversary behaviours may change
over time and the change may be gradual enough that the model could be stuck in between
relevancy. We might see a few clusters on the display space growing bigger in certain parts
as the user and adversary behaviours change over time. The increase in size to cover the
entire display space, rather than focussing on particular regions, would hopefully provide
a margin for growth and keep the mapping relevancy for longer.
The bilinear interpolation method provides smooth scaling by calculating the values
of additional coordinates from existing ones instead of copying them [176, 177, 179].
Figure 8.1 shows the application of bilinear interpolation method to increase an image
size. The objective is to calculate the value of the “white” spaces, such as i, j,Y , from the
known values A,B,C,D using Equation 8.1. The “white” squares i and j are calculated
with linear interpolation. The “white” square Y is interpolated from the i and j values,
which are now having known values from the linear interpolation process.
In image processing, each pixels has location x,y that holds the image information,
such as color. The two dimensional SOM translation is for each neuron location x,y with
the corresponding n-dimensional vector which is the same as the input vector dimension.
The interpolation aims to calculate the corresponding codebook vectors for newly formed
neuron coordinate x′,y′ on the target SOM. The data projection on the scaled SOM is in
finding the BMU on the interpolated codebook vectors.
Algorithm 3 shows the modified bilinear filter for SOM. The target size is any arbitrary
resolution wt×ht . The width and height ratio is calculated to retrieve the known codebook
vectors A,B,C,D to interpolate the codebook for the “white” spaces on the target SOM.
CHAPTER 8. CREATING HRSOMS VIA MAP SCALING AND THEIR SUITABILITY FOR IDS126
Figure 8.1: Bilinear interpolation process diagram. The aim is to calculate the value of
the “white” spaces from {A,B,C,D}.
Given known value {A,B,C,D} ∈ Ys the interpolation for {i, j,Y} ∈ Y1 is as follows :
i = A+w× (B−A), j =C+w× (D− c)
Y = i+h× ( j− i)
Y = A+w× (B−A)+h× (C+w× (D− c))
Y = A× (1−w)× (1−h)+B×w× (1−h)+C×h× (1−w)+D× (w×h)
(8.1)
Each new codebook vector is calculated from the corresponding A,B,C,D. The process
is repeated for each new location ( j, i) ∈ wt × ht . The Equation 8.1 is realised in line
19-23. This is why we do not recommend scaling unless there is a well-trained HRSOM
to scale with. The new codebooks are only as good as the existing ones where they are
not modulated by the data projected.
The bilinear interpolation scaling itself has some limitations to scale beyond a mag-
nitude of two, i.e., scaling up or down two times the source image size [176, 177, 179].
Trilinear interpolation is recommended when scaling images with a larger magnitude than
two [176, 177, 179]. Trilinear interpolation scaling is an extension from the bilinear in-
terpolation scaling where it uses a smaller and a larger image calculated from the bilinear
interpolation to produce the target image size.
Figure 8.2 shows the process to interpolate the target image Y . The idea is to use a
bilinear scaling to upsize a smaller image and downsize a bigger image than the source
image to finally achieve the target size. There are two reference images : (1) larger image
Y1 bounded by pixels ABCD and (2) smaller image Y2 bounded by pixels EFGH. The
source image is assigned as the larger or the smaller reference image accordingly. The
other reference image is then scaled using the bilinear scaling shown in Equation 8.1. If
the source image is larger than the target image, scale it to an image smaller than the target
image and vice versa. Alternatively, both reference images can be scaled from the source
image. The target image Y is interpolated from these two reference image.
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Algorithm 3 Bilinear interpolation for 2D SOM
Output:
1: Target SOM codebook vectors Yt
Input:
2: Source SOM codebook vectors Y
3: Training data input vector X .dim
4: w×h source SOM dimension
5: wt ×ht target SOM dimension
6: procedure BILINEARSCALE(X .dim,Y ,w,h,wt ,ht )
7: ratiow = (w−1)/wt , ratioh = (h−1)/ht
8: offset= 0
9: for i ∈ ht do
10: for j ∈ wt do
11: x = TRUNC(ratiow ∗ j), y = TRUNC(ratioh ∗ i)
12: diffx = (ratiow ∗ j)− x,diffy = (ratioh ∗ i)− y
13: index= y∗w+ x
14: Yt [o f f set].codebooks.x = j
15: Yt [o f f set].codebooks.y = i
16: A = Y [index].codebooks, B = Y [index+1].codebooks
17: C = Y [index+w].codebooks, D = Y [index+w+1].codebooks
18: for d ∈ X .dim do
19: Yt [o f f set].codebooks.point[d]
20: = (A.point[d]∗ (1−diffx)∗ (1−diffy))
21: +(B.point[d]∗diffx ∗ (1−diffy))








The aim is to calculate the “white” spaces value in the target images Y in the same
manner as the bilinear filter. The “white” space Y in Figure 8.2 is interpolated by Y1 and
Y2, that is Y1 = A(1−w1)(1− h1)+Bw1(1− h1)+Ch1(1−w1)+D(w1× h1) and Y2 =
E(1−w2)(1−h2)+Fw2(1−h2)+Gh2(1−w2)+H(w2×h2). The estimated distance h3
between Y1 and Y is calculated, which is the delta ratio of their width. Then the “white”
space value Y is calculated by substituting the corresponding variables in Equation 8.2.
Algorithm 4 shows the modified trilinear interpolation for SOM. The algorithm as-
sumes the two reference SOMs Y1 and Y2 are already initialised. The larger Y1 and
smaller Y2 reference SOMs are obtained by scaling the source SOM to the required size
using Algorithm 3. The target size is a user defined arbitrary resolution, within limits,
wt × ht . The codebook vectors A,B,C,D and SOM and E,F,G,H are retrieved from the
larger and the smaller reference SOM respectively. Each new codebook vector is calcu-
lated from the estimated h3 and corresponding A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H. The process is re-
peated for each ( j, i) ∈ wt×ht . The Equation 8.2 is realised in line 30-38. The projection
is obtained by finding the BMU on the interpolated codebook vectors.
These scaling methods are relatively fast. The interpolation process would simply cal-
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culate the codebook vectors on the scaled SOM as it goes through each coordinates, such
that it takes approximately O(N) computational time to run the bilinear interpolation, N is
the number of neurons of the target SOM. The trilinear interpolation method essentially
runs two bilinear interpolation so it takes a little bit longer than the bilinear interpola-
tion. It takes seconds to scale a SOM from size 192× 144 to 1920× 1440. Finding the
BMU to obtain the scaled mapping using the GPU-based algorithm takes approximately
O(log(N)) for every sample. In contrast, it takes about two weeks to train 192×144 from
scratch using the GPU-based HRSOM algorithm.
The scaling methods only diversify the mapping to a certain extent. The overall map-
ping structure may not change significantly but there may be substructures that become
visible after scaling. On the other hand, for downscaling, the space with the downscaled
SOM tends to be more compact. Thus, points which were apart could be brought together
to form tighter clusters. The trilinear interpolation process scaled the SOM mapping pre-
sented in Chapter 6. The next Section shows the scaled maps visual inspections.
Figure 8.2: Trilinear interpolation process diagram.
Given bilinear scaled Y1 is the larger image with dimension w1×h1 and
Y2 is the smaller image with dimension w2×h2




Y = Y1 +h3× (Y2−Y1)
(8.2)
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Algorithm 4 Trilinear interpolation for 2D SOM
Pre-requisites:
1: Larger SOM codebook vectors Y1 are initialised
2: Smaller SOM codebook vectors Y2 are initialised
Output:
3: Target SOM codebook vectors Yt
Input:
4: wt ×ht target SOM dimension
5: Larger SOM codebook vectors Y1
6: w1×h1 larger SOM dimension
7: Smaller SOM codebook vectors Y2
8: w2×h2 smaller SOM dimension
9: Training data input vector X .dim
10: procedure TRILINEARSCALE(X .dim,Y1,Y2,w1,h1,w2,h2,wt ,ht )
11: ratiow1 = (w1−1)/wt , ratiohl = (h1−1)/ht
12: ratiow2 = (w2−1)/wt , ratiohs = (h2−1)/ht
13: offset= 0
14: h3 = (w1−wt)/(w1−w2)
15: for i ∈ ht do
16: for j ∈ wt do
17: x1 = TRUNC(ratiow1 ∗ j), y1 = TRUNC(ratioh1 ∗ i)
18: diffx1 = (ratiow1 ∗ j)− x1,diffy1 = (ratioh1 ∗ i)− y1
19: index1 = y1 ∗w1 + x1
20: A = Y [index1].codebooks, B = Y [index1 +1].codebooks
21: C = Y [index1 +w].codebooks, D = Y [index1 +w+1].codebooks
22: x2 = TRUNC(ratiow2 ∗ j), y2 = TRUNC(ratioh2 ∗ i)
23: diffx2 = (ratiow2 ∗ j)− x2,diffy1 = (ratioh2 ∗ i)− y2
24: index2 = y2 ∗w2 + x2
25: E = Y [index2].codebooks, F = Y [index2 +1].codebooks
26: G = Y [index2 +w].codebooks, H = Y [index2 +w+1].codebooks
27: Yt [o f f set].codebooks.x = j
28: Yt [o f f set].codebooks.y = i
29: for d ∈ X .dim do
30: Yt [o f f set].codebooks.point[d]
31: = (A.point[d]∗ (1−diffx1)∗ (1−diffy1)∗ (1−h3))
32: +(B.point[d]∗diffx1 ∗ (1−diffy1)∗ (1−h3))
33: +(C.point[d]∗diffy1 ∗ (1−diffx1)∗ (1−h3))
34: +(D.point[d]∗diffx1 ∗diffy1 ∗ (1−h3))
35: +(E.point[d]∗ (1−diffx2)∗ (1−diffy2)∗h3)
36: +(F.point[d]∗diffx2 ∗ (1−diffy2)∗h3)
37: +(G.point[d]∗diffy2 ∗ (1−diffx2)∗h3)
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Figure 8.3: KDD99 dataset scaled HRSOM mapping shows no change in the overall
organisation of the clusters. However, the scaled SOM is able to approximate how the
trained SOM mapping of the same size.




This Section shows the results of the scaled up SOM projections using trilinear method.
The trained SOMs of size 32×24 and 96×72 that are scaled to the size 192×144, while
the trained SOM sof size 192×144 is scaled to 960×720. The experiments are conducted
on: KDD99, CTU-13, and UNSW-NB15 datasets. Certain mapping quality indicators of
these SOMs are compared in Section 8.2.2.
Figure 8.3 shows the KDD99 dataset trained SOMs of size 32×24 and 96×72 that are
scaled up to 192× 144. The cluster structures are observed to be similar to the original
projection. The SOM of size 32×24 scaled version still projects the majority of mapping
on the top left hand corner. The normal cluster structures remain even though they have
been transformed into several different sub-clusters. The attack samples projected on the
edges are mapped similarly on the upscaled version and a few attack samples managed to
separate themselves from the normal clusters. However, there are a few substructures that
emerged from the scaled SOM of size 32×24.
The gaps between the structures are exaggerated such that the projection on the bottom
left area has been separated into smaller clusters. The bottom right hand corner appears
to have projected the normal samples into one uniform cluster. The scaling has diversified
the mapping in that area. It splits into two clusters and the bottom cluster appears to
have formed a number of “thin stripes” on its left hand edge. These formations were
not visible before scaling occurred. The existence of these sub-structures in the area was
encountered when we trained a SOM of size 192× 144, as shown in Figure 8.4. This
shows the predictive power of the upscaling process.
Similar observations can be made on the SOM scaled from size 96× 72 to 192× 144
in Figure 8.3. The clusters on the trained SOM are located around the same areas on
the scaled SOM. There are attack samples mapped along the y-axis (left) on the trained
96× 72, where it remains on the scaled version. The mapping diversifies after the SOM
was scaled. Thin fin-like structures start to appear on the scaled version, which also
appeared on the scaled SOM of size 32× 24. The linear scaling method spreads the
mapping to adjacent neurons such that the samples mapped on one neuron would be
spread in rows or columns. The empty spaces on the scaled version are also more visible.
Additionally, there is an empty space that was not visible on the trained SOM. The large
cluster along the right border has a small line that separated the sample mappings on the
area. The increased mapping space is not utilised as well as trained SOM as shown by the
large gaps between the scaled clusters.
Visually, the mapping quality of the trained SOM of size 96× 72 is better than the
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scaled SOM from size 32× 24 even though it has been scaled to twice its size. The
trained SOM of size 96×72 utilised the extra mapping better than the scaled SOM from
size 32× 24 such that the gaps between structures are smaller. The trained SOM of size
96×72 learned something new that was not present in its smaller counterpart where new
cluster structures are formed rather than spread out. In the same manner, the trained SOM
of size 192× 144 in Figure 8.4 shows better mapping quality than either SOM scaled
version in Figure 8.3. The increased display space is utilised more than the scaled version
of the same size. There is a higher degree of freedom to diversify the projection results as
the codebook vector is influenced by the distribution of the input data.
The two scaled SOMs of size 192× 144 and the trained SOM of the same size show
different mappings even though they are of the same resolution and trained with the same
data in Figure 8.3. The mapping appears to be mirrored where the clusters of attack
samples are on the right hand side of the trained SOM of size 192× 144 instead of the
left. Some distortions are known to occur when training SOM with different initial condi-
tions [171]. The mapping in the rest of the Section may show some distortions as observed
in Figure 8.3. The mapping space is used more fully when trained. Both scaled SOMs of
size 192×144 have larger gaps between clusters than the trained ones.
Figure 8.4 shows a HRSOM that has been scaled from 192× 144 to 960× 720. The
general mapping of scaled SOM of size 960× 720 is similar to the trained HRSOM of
size 192×144. The attack samples are mostly mapped on the right hand side, while the
normal samples occupy most of the mapping as the majority label in the dataset. The
scaled HRSOM allows some samples previously mapped on the same neuron to separate
as they are spread to adjacent neurons. These newly separated mappings can be found at
the cluster edges of normal samples. The scaling has also broken up a few clusters into
several clusters, such as the cluster of normal samples in between the clusters of attack
samples on the right. The scaling process from SOM of size 192×144 to 960×720 has
enlarged the empty spaces as shown in Figure 8.4. Striped structures have formed where
there were just a few empty neurons within a cluster on the trained SOM.
Figure 8.5 shows the CTU-13 dataset trained SOM of size 32× 24 and 96× 72 with
their respective scaled versions of size 192×144. The scaled 32×24 SOM utilised very
little of the mapping space even less than the corresponding KDD99 dataset scaled SOM
in Figure 8.3. The CTU-13 dataset has different characteristics to the KDD99 dataset,
such as the number of features, label distributions and statistical properties, as described
in Chapter 5. The clusters that appear on both CTU-13 and KDD99 dataset mappings are
determined largely by the network protocols, flag and services features. The numerical
features determine the shape and size of the clusters. The standard deviation between
the numerical features are much smaller in KDD99 dataset such that most of the display
space are utilised to project the gradual changes between samples. The CTU-13 dataset
numerical features have a much larger standard deviation, which produces larger gaps
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Figure 8.5: CTU-13 dataset scaled HRSOM mapping shows no change in the overall
shape or structure of the clusters.
between clusters on the display space. The scaling method did not diversify the mapping
much further as it is influenced by the distribution of existing codebook vectors.
The scaled SOM of size 32×24 in Figure 8.5 shows the general area of mapping to be
the same as its trained counterpart. However, three clusters of normal samples have been
broken into several smaller clusters. How the scaling method linearly spread the mapping
is visible on the scaled SOM of CTU-13 dataset. The attack samples on the left hand
border is spread along the y-axis. The center of the mapping also shows how the mapping
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is spread horizontally. The samples appear to be mapped in linearly along the x-axis.
The trained SOM of size 96× 72 in Figure 8.5 shows how much better the mapping
diversifies when trained. The trained SOM of size 96× 72 has a much higher mapping
quality than the scaled SOM of 192×144 from SOM of size 32×24. The gaps between
the clusters are not as large, and the spread of the mapping is less linear as it is modulates
by the distribution of the input data. The scaling method cannot project the complex
relationship learned from the input data. Its corresponding scaled version shows sub-
structures within a cluster on the trained SOM of size 96×72. The elongated cluster on
the left hand side of the mapping has spread into two clusters, where one outlines the
right side of the cluster. Separations into smaller clusters are also visible on the center
of the scaled SOM. Some embedded normal samples have managed to be separated from
the attack clusters such as the ones along the top of the mapping space. The clusters are
spread thinly in some areas, such as the clusters on the right border. This may be caused by
the number of samples and feature variance in CTU-13 dataset as observed in Chapter 5.
There are ∼ 400,000 less samples in this dataset when compared to the KDD99 dataset.
The CTU-13 dataset mapping is best scaled from large and trained SOM.
The trained SOM of size 192× 144 in Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6 shows the display
space is utilised much more than either scaled SOMs of the same size. However, there
are some similarities between them. There are thin clusters formation on both mapping.
There are large elongated clusters of normal samples. The scaled SOM of size 192×144
from 96×72 can be viewed as visual approximation to the trained SOM mapping of the
same size due to these similarities. Nonetheless, there are some distortions as expected
due to different initial conditions between training 96×72 and 192×144. In contrast, it is
difficult to say if the general mapping from a scaled SOM of 32×24 is an approximation
for the trained SOM of the same size. The trained SOM of size 192× 144 and a scaled
version of 32× 24 mappings are very different. There are some indications as to the
general organisation on the trained HRSOM from the scaled version of 32× 24, such
as the normal samples have continuous features that have been projected into a spread
across the mapping space. However, the scaled version of 32× 24 did not utilise the
display space as fully as the trained SOM of size 192×144. This further emphasizes the
importance of training the appropriate size of SOM.
Moreover, it appears that there needs to be a trained SOM of minimal size, e.g., 96×72,
which contains most of the salient features of the display before the upscaling process
would be usedul in seeing more subtle features, which are not visible in lower sized
traiend SOMs. In the case of the trained SOM of size 32× 24, probable it is below this
minimal size, and therefore the upscaled versions do not show the salient features. On the
other hand, it is pleasing to observe that the upscaled SOM, say, from trained SOM of size
96×72 to 192×144 shows most of the features which are observable in the trained SOM
of size 192×144, which can also be seen from KDD99 dataset mapping in Figure 8.3.
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Figure 8.6 shows the CTU-13 dataset trained SOM of size 192× 144 and its scaled
counterpart of size 960×720. Similar to other scaled SOMs, this one has the same general
mapping to its trained SOM origin. However, the mapping does not immediately show
any new structures that were not visible before. Smaller clusters throughout the mapping
space have separated into striped substructures, such as the clusters of normal samples in
the center. The gaps between the larger clusters on the map are not as exaggerated but the
gaps within large clusters are bigger which form a “fuzzier” looking cluster rather than a
more uniformed one, as shown on the top along the x-axis.
Figure 8.7 shows the UNSW-NB15 dataset trained SOM of size 32× 24 and 96× 72
with their respective scaled SOMs of size 192× 144. The general mapping areas do
not change as observed with trained and scaled SOM mappings of other datasets. The
clusters of normal and attack samples are found in the same general area on both the
trained and scaled SOMs. However, the UNSW-NB15 dataset is in a unique position
where the display space is mostly filled with neurons mapped with both attack and normal
samples such that the scaled version shows improvement in separating these overlapping
samples. The scaled SOM of size 192×144 from 32×24, for example, shows the attack
samples to spread towards the edge of the large cluster occupying most of the display
space. The attack samples separation is also observed on smaller cluster on the bottom
left and on the right hand corners of the scaled display space. Evaluating the scaled SOM
from size 32× 24 on mapping quality metrics with respect to its class membership may
show significant improvements.
The scaled SOM from size 96× 72 to 192× 144 also shows similar improvements.
There are neurons that visibly mapped both normal and attack samples which, on the
scaled SOM, are mapped on distinct neurons separating the two classes. The top left
cluster, for example, has more normal samples mapped separately from attack ones on
the scaled version of the mapping. There are substructures that become more visible in
the scaled version. There is an indication of smaller clusters on the center of the map.
The scaled version shows there is an elongated teardrop shaped cluster in the middle of
the display space, as well as log-shaped ones to its left.
Training larger SOM has shown better mapping quality than the scaled SOM mappings
of the same size on CTU-13 and KDD99 datasets. UNSW-NB15 dataset mapping is no
exception. The trained SOM of size 96×72 formed more clusters than the scaled version
of SOM > 2× its size from 32×24 SOM. The projection still shows much of the display
space are mapped with both normal and attack samples. However, there are areas where
the normal and attack samples are separated, such as the right side of the map where there
are more attack samples than normal ones.
The trained SOM of size 192×144 formed more clusters than any scaled SOMs of the
same size, as shown in Figure 8.7. The scaled SOM of size 192×144 from 32×24 only
shows the same three clusters and looks quite different to the trained HRSOM of the same
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Figure 8.7: Scaling UNSW-NB15 dataset trained SOMs show no change in the overall
shape or structure of the clusters.
size. In contrast, scaled HRSOM of size 192×144 from 96×72 has some key similarities
even though there is noticeable distortion. Both mappings have clusters of mostly normal
and the other clusters of mostly attack samples on the edge of the mapping. These clusters
appear on the top right corner of the scaled SOM mapping of size 192×144 from 96×72,
while they appear on the left hand border of the trained SOM of the same size. There is
also one corner mostly mapped with normal samples, which can be found on the bottom
left corner of the scaled SOM mapping of size 192×144 from 96×72, and it also appears
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on the top right corner on the trained SOM of the same size. On both maps, most of the
space are mapped with both normal and attack samples with some gaps in between that
create log- or long- teardrop shaped clusters. There are more substructures of such shapes
on the trained SOM of size 192×144 than the scaled SOM of the same size from 96×72.
Figure 8.8 shows the UNSW-NB15 dataset trained SOM of size 192× 144 and its
scaled version of size 960× 720. The UNSW-NB15 dataset mapping of a scaled SOM
of size 960×720 from 192×144 is shown in Figure 8.8 (right). The mapping maintains
the general mapping shapes of the trained SOM with one or two clusters forming due
to scaling existing gaps. These newly formed clusters can be found on the upper right
center of the display space. The scaling also spread the attack cluster on the the left hand
side of the SOM such that it does not appear as compact. The overlapping mapping of
normal and attack samples tend to stay on the same area but they spread out and their
edges appear smoother. It appears the attack samples are spread more so than the normal
samples. This might help in improving metrics based on the class membership.
Visual inspection of trained and scaled SOM show the advantages and disadvantages
of upscaling a SOM. The scaling method contributes in improving the mapping quality to
some extent as sub-structures within clusters are revealed. Although the overall organi-
sation of the clusters do not change, the new clusters are formed due to the non-activated
neurons being scaled just as much as the activated neurons. The neurons mapped with
both sample labels may have a chance to separate but its spread appears to be linear.
The scaling method requires relatively low computational cost to approximate the im-
provement in mappings for larger SOMs. The scaled SOM of size 192× 144 from size
96×72 of each dataset mappings are shown to share a few characteristics with the trained
SOM of the same size. If the original SOM is too small, its scaled version does not share
as many characteristics with the corresponding trained SOM of the same size.
The SOM scaling method can contribute to the IDS as a component in several ways.
The scaling method further separates the normal and attack sample mappings without
changing the overall organisation of the clusters. The ratio of training cost to performance
improvement would be too significant at some point. The SOM performance was found in
Section 6.2.2 to be increasingly difficult to improve as the SOM size grows bigger. If the
trained HRSOM still shows much of the mapping space is overlapped with both sample
labels such as UNSW-NB15 dataset trained HRSOM mapping, the scaling method can
distribute the mapping to adjacent neurons to separate the normal and attack samples.
The augmentation from the scaled HRSOM may improve the detection rate even further.
The scaled SOM is also shown to increase some gaps in the display space. This could be
beneficial to provide some margin to allow changes in the user and adversary behaviours
over time without having to train a new HRSOM. The clusters of normal samples across
three datasets show intermittent changes in their features as they tend to spread across
the display space. It is possible that user behaviours may change over time such that the
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clusters of normal samples grow in certain areas. If the change in the cluster is frequent
enough, it can become a fixture to model more current user behaviours. The enlarged gaps
from the scaled SOM allow this change with less opportunity to confuse with other clus-
ters. The newly visible gaps may also shed light on possible exploitable user behaviours
by the adversary. We learned from the HRSOM visual inspection in Section 6.2 that at-
tack cases may appear on the cluster edges of normal samples. Newer attack patterns may
try to emulate the normal samples on these cluster edges. The gaps visible from scaled
SOM may be the areas where this kind of exploit may occur.
Unfortunately, the validity of the mapping of SOM of size 960× 720 cannot be per-
formed as it will take a long time to train a SOM of such a size. However, based an
experiance of scaling a trained SOM of size 96×72 to 192×144, and its validation sub-
sequently by trained a SOM of size 192× 144, it is a reasonable expectation that the
upscaled SOM of size 960× 720 would contain some, if not all, the characteristics of a
trained SOM of the same size on the same dataset, had this been feasible. There lies the
benefit of being able to scale from a trained SOM to an ultra HRSOM of size.
One may ask, since the upscaling process is relatively inexpensive computationally,
would it be possible to scale a SOM to say, 19,200×14,400, or even higher resolution, to
almost continuous scaling, i.e., the resolution is so high that is as though it is continuous.
The answer is we can, but, then the results cannot be validated as currently there does not
exist any continuous SOM and few ultra HRSOM (UHRSOM), unless it is a pedagogical
dataset. It is not feasible computationally to train it so as to verify if the observations
made on the scaled UHRSOMs match those of trained UHRSOM.
The results presented here show the effects of upscaling of trained SOM. It would also
be interesting to observe the behaviours of down-scaled SOMs from trained SOMs as one
would expect, the down-scaled SOM would make the clusters formed in the trained SOM
more compact. This is validated in experiment and analysis in the following Section.
Scaling down
This Section shows the results of the scaled down SOM projections using the 90trilinear
method. The trained SOMs of size 96× 72 is scaled down to 32× 24, while trained
SOMs of size 192× 144 is scaled down to 96× 72. Certain mapping quality indicators
are compared between the trained and scaled SOMs in Section 8.2.2. The experiments
are conducted on: KDD99, CTU-13, and UNSW-NB15 datasets.
Figure 8.9 shows the KDD99 dataset training samples mapped on scaled down SOM
of size 32×24 from 96×72 (left) and SOM of size 96×72 from 192×144 (right). The
scaled SOM of size 32×24 maintained the larger SOM structures. The overall mapping
may look similar between the trained 32×24 in Figure 8.3 (top left). However, on closer
inspection, the scaled down version of the same size utilised the mapping space more than
the trained counterpart. The attack samples mapped on the left hand side form more tight
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Figure 8.10: CTU-13 dataset training samples mapping on scaled down SOM
knit clusters. Similar observation can be seen with the scaled down SOM of size 96×72.
The gaps between the formed clusters are smaller than the trained SOM of the same size
seen in Figure 8.3 (bottom left).
The scaled down SOMs are seen to be a more compact version of its larger SOMs
counterparts. The performance metrics would show that the scaled down versions could
perform better than their trained counterparts, e.g., the scaled down SOM of size 32×24
from 96×72 or from 192×144 would perform better than the trained SOM of size 32×
24. Section 8.2.2 validates this observation in using several mapping quality metrics.
Figure 8.10 shows the CTU-13 dataset training samples mapped on scaled down SOM
of size 32×24 from 96×72 (left) and SOM of size 96×72 from 192×144 (right). The
scaled down SOM of size 32× 24 shows better use of the display space than the trained
counterpart in Figure 8.5 (top left). There are more clusters projected on the scaled down
SOM, which are a compressed version of the clusters projected on the original trained
SOM of size 96×72. This explains the better information gain and Gini impurity measure
of scaled SOM of size 32×24 than the trained counterpart.
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Figure 8.11: UNSW-NB15 dataset training samples mapping on scaled down SOM
The scaled down SOM of size 96×72 from 192×144 in Figure 8.10 shows compressed
structures from its SOM mapping origin, which have very different overall mapping than
the trained SOM of size 96×72. There are more variations in the number and the shape
of clusters on the SOM of size 192× 144. The scaled down version maintains these
variations when scaled down. The scaling down process compressed the larger mapping
structures, which is evident by the difference in mapping density. The trained 96× 72
mapped approximately 53 samples per neuron, while the scaled down version from larger
SOM mapped approximately 55 samples per neuron. The trained SOM of size 96× 72
did not have the high degree of freedom to form these variations, because of the limited
grid size could not allow, which resulted in simpler structures.
Figure 8.11 shows the UNSW-NB15 dataset training samples mapped on scaled down
SOM of size 32×24 from 96×72 (left) and SOM of size 96×72 from 192×144 (right).
Interestingly, the visual inspections reveal the scaled down SOM of size 32× 24 (left)
has very similar mapping to the trained counterpart in Figure 8.7 (top left)a. The scaled
SOM appears to have more activated neurons than its trained counterpart. The ratio of
activations are 93.23% and 86.20% for scaled and trained SOM respectively. Even though
the scaled down SOM had to compress the mapping into simpler structures, it attempted
to maintain the rate of which the display space is utilised on the larger SOM.
The scaled down SOM of size 96×72 from 192×144 shown in Figure 8.11 (right) ap-
pears to maintain the original structures from the trained SOM seen in Figue 8.7 (bottom
left). However, the trained SOM is more dense than the scaled down counterpart, which
indicates the scaled down SOM is more spread out. This observation was similar to the
one exhibited by the mapping of CTU-13 dataset. The scaling down process maintains
the mapping of the original SOM as best as possible, including the degree of freedom in
which the clusters are formed.
aAlbeit flipped horizontally due to differing initial condition.
aThe mapping is mirrored due to the different initial condition






















































32x24 96x72 192x144 768x576 960x720
Figure 8.12: KDD99 dataset scaled and trained SOM information gain (right) and Gini
impurity (left). Trained SOMs of size indicated on the horizontal axis versus scaled
resolutions indicated by color.
The next Section evaluates and compares the scaled and trained SOM on several key
metrics.
8.2.2 Scaled SOM quality assessments
This section evaluates the trained and scaled SOM on key metrics: information gain,
Gini impurity measure and silhouette index. The information gain would measure if the
scaling of the SOM increases the information rate produced by the mapping compared
to its trained counterparts. Gini impurity would provide an estimate on how much the
normal and attack mappings have separated as a result of scaling. The silhouette index
would show if the cluster organisation of the data is affected by scaling. Each of these
metric comes with its own assumptions, as they all attempt to reduce to one set of num-
ber representing the underlying quality of the mappings. Therefore, in the use of each
of these metrics, the reader will need to bear in mind these assumptions, otherwise the
interpretation of the metric might be led astray by the underlying base assumptions.
There are three trained SOM sizes evaluated for each datasets, which are 32×24, 96×
72, and 192×144. Each trained SOM is scaled to the other sizes, e.g., a trained SOM of
size 32×24 is scaled to a SOM of size 96×72 and 192×144 respectively. The SOM of
size 96×72 was found to be some approximation to the larger SOM when scaled to SOM
of size 192×144 so that it is further scaled to 768×576 to see if it performs comparably
to the SOM of the same size but scaled from SOM of size 192×144.
Figure 8.12 shows the information gain and Gini impurity measure of KDD99 dataset
trained SOM indicated on the horizontal axis versus scaled resolutions indicated by color.
The information gain histogram remains relatively similar between the scaled and trained
SOMs, which indicates there is not much more information can be inferred in the scaling
up SOM. The visual inspection did show how the mapping of samples are generally the
same as the trained SOM when scaled. Additionally, we found in Section 6.2.2 that in-
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Figure 8.13: CTU-13 dataset scaled and trained SOM information gain (right) and Gini
impurity (left). Trained SOMs of size indicated on the horizontal axis versus scaled
resolutions indicated by color.
formation gain between SOM sizes trained with KDD99 datasets did not show significant
differences when compared to other metrics. The Gini impurity measure does improve
with the scaled up SOM as the samples are more spread out so that there are more neu-
rons mapped with single label than before scaling the SOMs. The mapping performance
confirms the observation on the visual inspection in Figure 8.9, where the scaled down
SOM performed better than the trained one of the same size.
Even though visually, the KDD99 dataset mapping of the scaled SOM of size 192×144
and of the trained SOM of 96×72 showed characteristics that appear on the trained SOM
of size 192× 144, the performance indicator shows the scaled SOM is no replacement
to the trained SOM. Both the information gain and the Gini impurity measure performed
better on the trained SOM than the scale version of size 192×144. Furthermore, the Gini
impurity measure improvement is much better when the SOM of size 192×144 is scaled
to 768×576 than when the SOM of size 96×72 is scaled to the same size.
Figure 8.13 shows that for the CTU-13 dataset, the information gain and Gini impu-
rity measure of the trained SOM shown on the horizontal axis versus scaled resolutions
indicated by color. The trend is very similar to the KDD99 dataset ones, except it is on
a different scale. The Gini impurity measure is observed to be similar when a trained
32×24 is scaled to 96×72 then reduced significantly when scaled to 192×144. The in-
formation gain and Gini impurity measure of the trained and upscaled 32×24 show there
is not much information intrinsic from a trained 32× 24 SOM and the improvement in
other metrics stem from the spread of samples. In the same manner, the trained 192×144
SOM shows better information gain and Gini impurity measure when compared to the
same sized SOM achieved through scaling.
The visual improvement of SOM of size 96× 72 scaled to 192× 144 in the previous
Section also did not materialise in the information gain and the Gini impurity measure
performance. The trained SOM of size 192×144 performs better than the scaled version
from a SOM of size 96×72. The trend carries to the scaled SOM of size 768×576 where
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Figure 8.14: UNSW-NB15 dataset scaled and trained SOM information gain (right) and
Gini impurity (left). Trained SOMs of size indicated on the horizontal axis versus scaled
resolutions indicated by color.
the scaling from trained SOM of size 192×144 performs better than from trained SOM
of size 96× 72. On the other hand, the scaled down version of larger SOM performed
better than the trained SOM of the same size.
There is no noticeable difference in information gain between the trained and scaled
down SOM of size 96× 72. However, slight decrease in Gini impurity indicates the
scaled down SOM separates the samples better than the trained version of the same size.
Scaling down from SOM of size 192× 144 did not show improvement in information
gain which indicates the scaled down SOM did not lose too much information from the
original mapping. However, the scaling down also did not improve on the trained SOM
counterpart. Nonetheless, the Gini impurity shows improved performance between scaled
down SOM to trained SOM of the same size.
Figure 8.14 shows for a set of SOMs trained on the UNSW-NB15 dataset and its scaled
version information gain and Gini impurity. The trend is very different from the previous
datasets. The scaled SOM appears to improve quite significantly than the trained SOM.
However, on closer inspection the scaled SOM did not achieve the same level of infor-
mation gain from the trained SOM of the same size. The UNSW-NB15 dataset trained
SOM tend to utilise over half of the display space with neurons mapped with both attack
and normal samples. The scaling method spread these mappings such that some of those
samples might end up being separated. The Gini impurity shows similar trend where the
trained SOMs perform better than the scaled counterpart.
Unlike the other two datasets, the scaled SOM of size 192× 144 from 96× 72 per-
formed similarly in information gain to trained SOM of the same size. However, the Gini
impurity measure of the trained SOM of size 192×144 is still better than its scaled ver-
sions. The trend carries to the scaled SOMs of size 768×576. We have observed how the
UNSW-NB15 dataset mappings consist of many neurons mapped with both normal and
attack samples. Spreading the samples linearly can have significant impact in evaluation
with respect to its class label. The information gain and Gini impurity appear to remain
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the same or decrease when scaled down.
Scaling down the SOMs did not show much improvement to their trained counterparts.
The information gain and Gini impurity between scaled and trained SOM of size 32×
24, for example, are similar with SOM that has been scaled down from size 192× 144
performed slightly better. The performance appears to decline between the original SOM
to its scaled down counterparts. The SOM of size 192× 144, for example, is shown to
decrease in information gain by approximately 0.1 when scaled down to 96× 72. This
is the largest information gain decline among the three datasets, which indicates that the
UNSW-NB15 dataset has lower tolerance for scaling down.
The scaling up a SOM has been shown to improve mapping quality to some extent
in both visual and quantitative evaluation. The visual inspection shows how the general
structure of the mappings remains the same after scaling either up or down. The informa-
tion gain supports this observation by showing that there is little gain from scaling SOM
even when scaled up to 4 times the original size. The improvement in quality is caused
by the linear spread of neurons mapped with both normal and attack samples. This spread
which leads to separation improves certain metrics such as the Gini impurity measure.
Nonetheless, the improvement is still no match to the trained SOM.
Section 6.2.3 showed how the SOM size can affect the cluster organisation of the data,
whereas this section compares the cluster organisations of scaled SOMs. The visual in-
spection shows that scaled up SOMs may reveal some sub-structures within the clusters
formed from training, while scaled down SOM maintains the original structures. The sil-
houette index from clustering the codebook vector would reveal if there is any significant
deterioration in the cluster organisation when scaled down, in addition to any improve-
ment in the cluster organisation of the up scaled SOMs.
Figure 8.15 shows the silhouette index of KDD99 dataset trained SOM indicated on
the horizontal axis versus scaled resolutions indicated by color. It shows similar trend to
that exhibited by the information gain in Figure 8.12 where the trained and scaled SOMs
yield similar values. There is no significant difference between trained and scaled down
SOMs. Figure 8.9 shows how the scaled down SOMs maintained some characteristics of
the original mapping. The silhouette index of scaled down SOMs reflects this observa-
tion. The upscaled SOMs of size 768× 576 or higher show much more improvements
as the gaps are exaggerated to allow for clearer definition between clusters; though such
observation does not occur in CTU-13 dataset trained SOM.
The visual inspection of KDD99 dataset mapping between scaled SOM of size 192×
144 from 96× 72 in Figure 8.3 indicates some characteristics that appear on the trained
SOM of the same size. The silhouette index evaluation in Figure 8.15 reaffirms this
observation whereas information gain and Gini impurity did not. However, the scaled
SOM of size 768×576 shows the approximation from a scaled computed on the trained
SOM of size 96× 72 is limited when compared to SOM of size 192× 144. The cluster
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Figure 8.15: KDD99 dataset trained and scaled SOM silhouette index where the hor-
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Figure 8.16: CTU-13 dataset trained and scaled SOM silhouette index where the hor-
izontal axis indicates the trained SOMs of different sizes versus the scaled resolution
indicated by color.
organisation of the data is further improved when scaled to 960×720.
Figure 8.16 shows the silhouette index of CTU-13 dataset trained SOM indicated on
the horizontal axis versus scaled resolutions indicated by color. The cluster organisation
of the data does not always improve as the SOMs are scaled up. The scaled SOM of size
192× 144 from 32× 24 performed worse than when it is scaled to 96× 72. The hier-
archical clustering uses distance as a basis for cluster membership. The scaled SOM of
size 192×144 from 32×24 appears to have very large gaps that may affect the codebook
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Figure 8.17: UNSW-NB15 dataset trained and scaled SOM silhouette index where the
horizontal axis indicates the trained SOMs of different sizes versus the scaled resolution
indicated by color.
clustering process where neurons that supposedly belong in the same cluster have larger
distance than before scaling. Similar observation also occurs on SOM of size 96×72. The
silhouette index did not improve when the SOM of size 96× 72 was scaled up. Scaling
up of well trained HRSOM yields slight improvement of the silhouette index, e.g., from
trained SOM of size 192×144 to SOM of size 768×576. The silhouette index is shown
to decrease compared to the trained SOM origin when scaled down. The trained SOM of
size 192×144 showed mapping improvement compared to trained SOM of size 96×72,
so that when the SOM is scaled down to a quarter its size, the cluster organisation suffers
as the mappings are now compressed into simpler structures.
Visual inspection shows the CTU-13 dataset trained SOM of size 192×144 utilise most
of the display space as shown in Figure 8.4. However, the newly formed sub-clusters from
scaling up SOMs did not improve the silhouette index significantly even when scaled up
to 768× 576 or to 960× 720. The cluster organisation is maintained when scaled down
to SOM of size 32× 24 and of size 96× 72 such that the silhouette index is better than
the trained SOM of the same size as shown in Figure 8.16.
Figure 8.17 shows the silhouette index of UNSW-NB15 dataset trained SOM (horizon-
tal axis) versus scaled resolutions (indicated by color). The trend is different from the
other two datasets. The silhouette index improves when the SOMs are scaled up even
though the SOM of size 192× 144 performed better when trained than the scaled one.
The silhouette index performance also reaffirms how the scaled SOM of size 192× 144
from 96× 72 could approximate the performance of trained SOM of the same size. The
scaled down SOMs show similar or better silhouette index than the trained SOMs of the
same size. The trained and scaled down SOM of size 32×42 have similar silhouette in-
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dexes. While the scaled down SOM of size 96×72 from trained SOM of size 192×144
resulted in better silhouette index than trained SOM of size 96×72.
The HRSOM mapping of UNSW-NB15 dataset shows most of the neurons are mapped
with both normal and attack samples. The significant improvement in the mapping quality
from up scaling SOM is mostly due to separation of these samples. The up scaling method
provides an alternative to diversify the display space without having to train larger SOM.
The improvement did not materialise as vividly on the other two datasets as they are
skewed towards one sample class such that the metrics return very good performance in
favor of the majority classes. Scaling down the SOM mapping of UNSW-NB15 dataset
maintains some level of cluster organisation of the trained SOM, which can be observed
by the mappings shown in Figure 8.11.
8.2.3 Further Investigations of the Properties of Scaling Effects
Previous sections presented the interpretation of the scaling of SOMs as a way to assist
the visualization of the data on very large SOMs, so large that they cannot be trained
under existing computational resources available to us. In this section, we wish to present
an alternative interpretation of the scaling from a modelling perspective.
The problem may be stated as follows: Given a set of feature vectors V = [vi], i =
1,2, . . . ,NT , vi ∈Rn. If we can train a SOM of size Q1 = N1×M1, the question is what
might be its performance as measured by the various performance indices: micro-purity,
macro-purity, grouping index, information gain, Gini impurity measure, silhouette index,
or using visual examination on the quality, on a SOM Q2 = N2×M2, where Q2 >> Q1.
In other words, we are asking the question: what would be the benefits brought by a SOM
Q2 over those already delivered by Q1. Central to this question is: how well a SOM Q1
capture the underlying “model” of IDS as presented from the observation dataset V .
As we do not have any information on the performance of a trained SOM of Q2, the best
way we could do is to assume that Q1 already captures all the salient characteristics of
the given feature set V , and use an “extrapolation” method to “extrapolate” the “model”
captures by Q1 forward to Q2. In other words, we use a scaling method, like a bilinear
filter, a trilinear filter, and “extrapolate” the “model” from Q1 to Q2. Now if Q2 > Q1
this may be conveniently called a predictive model, and if Q2 < Q1, then this may be
conveniently called a “backward” model, or a “backcasting” model.
Viewed from such perspective, then it makes sense that the SOM Q1 would need to
be trained well. Otherwise the forward prediction would not be beneficial. As indicated
previously, the set of performance indices: micro-, macro-purity, grouping index, have
underlying assumptions, like spherical distribution, for them to work well. The informa-
tion gain measure is a rule-based method, and so it is sensitive to noise contained in the
dataset. It is “brittle” and non robust. The Gini impurity measure while is not based on
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rules, appears to behave in a similar fashion to the information gain. The silhouette index
also has its inherent assumption. In other words, at this moment in time, the research
has not provided us with a good way to measure maps which exhibit, say, “fan-shaped”,
“claw-like” maps as exhibited on the HRSOM. Therefore, it is not advisable to use these
mapping quality assessments “blindly” to assess the quality of the mapping provided by
SOM Q2 compared with that provided by SOM Q1, if Q2 > Q1.
So this is exactly what we found in the above few subsections. When, say on the
KDD99 dataset, we trained a SOM Q1 = 32× 24, and scaled it up to say Q2 = 96×
72, we find that the scaling, e.g., bilinear filter, spread the mapping linearly, while the
trilinear filter is better in making predictions on the performance on the testing dataset. In
other words, we find that the “model” as captured by the training of a SOM Q1 = 32×
24 when extrapolated using a trilinear transformation, cannot captured all the measured
characteristics as exhibited in the testing dataset. This is especially the case, when we
know in the testing dataset there are classes of patterns which do not occur in the training
dataset. The quality of the scaled SOM Q2 = 96× 72 can only be assessed using visual
inspection technique, as the set of performance criteria does not give good indications.
If we denote the mapping M1 as the SOM Q1 = 32× 24, and M2 as the SOM map
Q2 = 96×72, then we could have obtain conceptually the following mapping error.
M pe = M
p
2 −M1 (8.3)
where M p2 is the predicted mapping at Q2 resolutions, i.e., the scaled map obtained using
the trilinear transformation, and M pe is the prediction error. This is conceptual only as we
do not possess a good way on measuring the differences between two maps, when the two
maps may be of different resolutions, whilst exhibiting in two dimensions. Me when both
M1 and M
p
2 are evaluated on the testing dataset will inform us of the predicted benefit
which would have arisen from the extrapolation from Q1 to Q2.
Now if we trained the SOM Q2 and use it to evaluate on the testing dataset, then we
can obtain the actual modelling error
Me = M2−M p2 (8.4)
where M2 is the map at resolution Q2 which is evaluated on the testing dataset. This
modelling error, conceptually informs us on how well Q2 extrapolated from Q1 performs
in terms of modelling the underlying set of feature vectors.
If we assume somehow we can measure the mapping error between two maps of differ-
ent resolutionsb evaluated on the testing dataset, then we can assess the benefits as offered
bThere are ways, though not exactly perfect, as it requires discretization. One may assume that the two
dimensional map is represented as a surface S , then the error between two maps can be represented by
S 2 = S2−S1, where S1, S2 represent the surfaces at resolution Q1 and Q2 respectively.
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Figure 8.18: Scaled and Trained HRSOM mapping of KDD99 dataset training samples
with an overlay showing test samples mapping
by scaling a SOM from resolution Q1 to Q2 using say trilinear tansformation.




















By assessing the predictive modelling error, it is possible to conclude when it may be
a diminishing return to increase the resolution of the SOM further. This is the value of
having such a scaling method in the context here: It allows one to know when there may
be a diminishing return to increase the resolution of the SOM further.
The interpolation process distributes the codebook vectors uniformly, even though the
dataset distribution is not. The scaled up SOM may end up performing worse than ex-
pected. On the other hand, the scaled down SOM would preform just as good if not better
than the trained SOM because the codebook vectors are “smoothed” over. Figure 8.18











































Trained SOM 96x72 (100%)
Figure 8.19: Generalisation error on KDD99 dataset trained SOM enlarged and shrunk
by 5% interval of the total number of neurons while maintaining aspect ratio.
illustrates the scaled up and scaled down effects. It shows the mapping of KDD99 dataset
test samples (colored symbols) overlaid the mapping of training samples (in gray) of dif-
ferent trained SOMs, which are scaled SOM of size 64×48 from a trained SOM of size
96×72 (top left), trained SOM of size 96×72 (top right), scaled SOM of size 192×144
from a trained SOM of size 96× 72 (bottom left), and trained SOM of size 192× 144
(bottom right).
The trained SOM of size 96×72 (bottom left of Figure 8.18) shows some gaps on the
normal samples mapping on the bottom right corner. The scaled up version enlarges this
gap, while the trained SOM did not. The mapping of attack samples from the test set
is affected negatively by the scaling up, while the scaled version smoothed out the gaps.
The bottom left attack test samples are clustered on top of a cluster of normal training
samples with some attack samples mapped on their border points on the trained SOM of
size 96× 72 (top right of Figure 8.18). The scaled down version of size 64× 48 keeps
this structure while the scaled up version of size 192× 144 widens the gap between the
cluster of attack and normal samples such that more test samples are mapped on neuron
not activated by training samples. The trained SOM of size 192×144 used the mapping
space more fully and the cluster of attack samples occupy more mapping space such that
there are less chances for test samples to be mapped on non-activated neurons. These
effects of scaling on the ability to generalise is evaluated using generalisation error.
The generalisation error E is calculated as follows. Given a trained SOM Q of size
N×M, label each BMU using majority rule of the training samples X mapping. If i-th
neuron yi ∈Q, for example, is mapped with 5 training samples where 3 of them is labelled
c 1 and 2 of them is labelled c 0 then yi = c 1. Then label each test sample according
to their respective BMUs in the trained SOM. If the test sample label and the BMU’s
label differ, it is an error. Using the previous example, if a test sample u′ ∈ X ′ BMU yi is
labelled c 1 (yi.label = c 1) but the sample label is different (x′.label = c 0) then it counts
as an error. The total number of error is then normalised against the total number of test
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Algorithm 5 Generalisation error calculation
Output:
1: SOM generalisation error E
Input:
2: Trained SOM Q of size N×M
3: Training data X
4: Testing data X ′
5: procedure GENERALISATION ERROR(Q,X ,X ′)
6: for x ∈ X do
7: Find x.BMU = mini{‖x− (yi ∈ Q)‖}
8: end for
9: for yi ∈ Q do
10: if |yi == x.BMU |== 1 then
11: yi.label = x.label
12: else if |yi == x.BMU |> 1 then
13: Find label = max{|x.label|} where x.BMU == yi
14: yi.label = label
15: else
16: yi.label = NULL
17: end if
18: end for
19: E = 0
20: for x′ ∈ X ′ do
21: Find x′.BMU = mini{‖x− (yi ∈ Q)‖} where yi.label 6= NULL




26: E = E /|X ′| return E
27: end procedure
samples. Thus, the generalisation error E is best when closest to zero. The complete steps
of the corresponding procedure can be found in Algorithm 5.
The previous performance metrics indicated that the generalisation error may decrease
when SOM is scaled down, whereas, the scaled up SOM generalisation error may remain
relatively unchanged or even increase. Figure 8.12 to Figure 8.17 show that scaled down
SOM performed better than the trained SOM of the same size, e.g., scaled SOM of size
32×24 from trained SOM of size 96×72 performed better than the trained SOM of size
32×24. Figure 8.18 shows the scaled down SOM of KDD99 dataset mapping structures
are smoother versions of its SOM origin. However, the SOM size could be scaled down so
much there will not be enough mapping space to be of use. The scaled up version populate
the codebook vector by “prediction” such that it may over fit to the training mappings and
be detrimental to the generalisation performance.
Figure 8.19 shows how the scaling of KDD99 dataset trained SOM of size 32×24 (left)
and 96×72 (right) affect the generalisation error. Each SOM is scaled in ∼ 5% interval
of the trained SOM; total number of neurons while maintaining the aspect ratio. KDD99
dataset is skewed heavily towards the normal samples such that low generalisation error
is expected. It also has the largest number of training samples. The smaller SOM on the

















































Trained SOM 96x72 (100%)
Figure 8.20: Generalisation error on CTU-13 dataset trained SOM enlarged and shrunk
by 5% interval of the total number of neurons while maintaining aspect ratio.
left (32× 24) shows that the generalisation performance is declining projection between
the original size (100%) and when scaled down to −50% of its number of neurons. The
generalisation error increased rapidly beyond −50%. Scaling up the SOM shows that the
generalisation error appears to increase when scaled beyond +150%.
The trained SOM of size 96×72 (right) shows a similar trend. There is some decline
in generalisation error as it is scaled down up to −50%, but since the error rate increases
so rapidly that the overall trend appears to be increasing. On the other hand, scaling up
the SOM did not have much effect on the generalisation error.
Figure 8.20 shows how the scaling of CTU-13 dataset trained SOM of size 32× 24
(left) and 96×72 (right) are affected the generalisation error. The generalisation error of
the smaller SOM on the left appear to be much lower, i.e., better than the larger SOM on
the right. However, this dataset is also skewed heavily towards the normal samples such
that the low error rate may only reflect the majority samples. CTU-13 dataset trained
SOM of size 32× 24 has a similar trend to Figure 8.19 where the generalisation error
starts to increase very rapidly when scaled down beyond −50% of its original size. The
scaling up of the SOM shows no discerning difference in the generalisation error.
The trained SOM of size 96×72 (right) shows a different trend where the generalisation
error rapidly increases beyond 25% scale on either side. The CTU-13 dataset may not
have enough training samples for the scaled SOM. The mapping density as shown in
Figure 8.5 decreases dramatically when scaled, i.e., less activation neuron ratio than the
trained SOM, such that the turning point for the generalisation error on scaled SOMs is
lower for larger SOMs than smaller ones.
Figure 8.21 shows how the scaling of UNSW-NB15 dataset trained SOM of size 32×24
(left) and 96× 72 (right) affect the generalisation error. The smaller SOM on the left
shows similar trend on the other two datasets seen so far where downscaling beyond
−50% is detrimental to the generalisation error. Enlarging the smaller SOM appears to
yield similar generalisation error to its trained counterpart. There is only slight incline
























































Trained SOM 96x72 (100%)
Figure 8.21: Generalisation error on UNSWN-B15 dataset trained SOM enlarged and
shrunk by 5% interval of the total number of neurons while maintaining aspect ratio
beyond scaling to +150%. The trained SOM of size 96× 72 (right) shows clear trends
beyond downscaling to −50% where the generalisation error is on the rise. Scaling up
the SOM, however, shows a few peaks but no particular trend. This dataset has a more
even distribution between the normal and attack samples. However, there are significant
portion of the mapping space mapped with both samples that were not able to be separated
even when scaled from 192×144 to 960×720 as seen in Figure 8.8. This could explain
the lack of significant difference in generalisation error when scaled up.
The changes in mapping quality for different size SOMs indicate that the IDS perfor-
mance could improve. Although larger trained SOMs are better performers than scaled
version of the same size, the higher mapping quality of trained SOM is also observed even
when scaled down. There is some threshold in generalisation performance of the scaled
SOMs. The SOM can only be scaled down by 25− 50% of the trained SOM before the
generalisation error increases, where there is not enough mapping space to be of use. On
the other hand, if the SOM is scaled up by over 50%, the mapping over fits to the training
mapping and the “predicted” codebook vectors do not generalise well.
8.3 Effects of augmentation
by mappings of scaled HRSOM
This Section discusses and analyses the effect of scaled HRSOM augmentation on MLP’s
classifying performance on the three benchmark datasets. Previous section showed FRPN
is more suitable as a general framework as it does not require to know how many layer
would be for any particular dataset. It is also shown to be capable to compensate possible
errors in SOM mapping better than MLP, which could diminish any detrimental effect the
scaled SOM may have. The MLP would show the effects of augmentation by mapping of
scaled SOMs better than FRPN.
The scaled HRSOM of size 960× 720 of the KDD99 dataset training samples shows
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Table 8.1: Classification performance of the MLP for the KDD99 data.
Training set
Data augmented Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
no-augmentation 99.96 99.97 0.03 99.96 99.92 99.94 0.10 99.93
Trained 96×72 99.91 99.93 0.10 99.91 99.91 99.93 0.12 99.92
-scaled to 64×48 99.83 99.88 0.19 99.84 98.91 99.18 0.26 98.55
-scaled to 192×144 99.76 99.83 0.24 99.77 99.75 99.82 0.21 99.74
Trained 192×144 99.95 99.94 0.12 99.92 99.88 99.91 0.18 99.90
-scaled to 768×576 99.92 99.67 0.01 99.37 99.93 99.70 0.01 99.46
-scaled to 960×720 99.92 99.68 0.01 99.42 99.92 99.68 0.004 99.39
Validation dataset
Data augmented Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
no-augmentation 99.90 99.96 0.06 99.94 99.89 99.77 0.13 99.94
Trained 96×72 99.87 99.74 0.14 99.91 99.90 99.79 0.12 99.94
-scaled to 64×48 99.87 99.74 0.13 99.89 99.90 99.80 0.10 99.93
-scaled to 192×144 99.82 99.63 0.17 99.80 99.89 99.77 0.12 99.93
Trained 192×144 99.86 99.71 0.16 99.91 99.87 99.74 0.15 99.93
-scaled to 768×576 99.80 99.60 0.002 99.21 99.83 99.65 0.01 99.33
-scaled to 960×720 99.82 99.64 0.004 99.30 99.83 99.64 0.003 99.29
Test dataset
Data augmented Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
no-augmentation 94.27 91.94 0.67 86.00 94.02 91.56 0.65 85.33
Trained 96×72 93.26 90.39 0.66 83.34 94.01 91.55 0.63 85.28
-scaled to 64×48 93.40 90.60 0.62 83.65 94.01 91.54 0.61 85.23
-scaled to 192×144 93.31 90.46 0.69 83.51 93.78 91.19 0.63 84.68
Trained 192×144 94.48 92.27 0.68 86.60 94.00 91.54 0.67 85.33
-scaled to 768×576 91.92 88.19 0.40 79.38 92.02 88.35 0.39 79.64
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Figure 8.22: Scaled and Trained HRSOM mapping of KDD99 dataset training samples
with an overlay showing false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) test samples
significant improvement in information gain in previous Section. This observation is
caused by further separation between attack and normal samples. However, the data is so
skewed towards the normal samples, the newly formed clusters of attack cases may not be















Figure 8.23: The location of zero-day attack test samples on a scaled map. The coloured
symbols refer to the location of zero day samples detected by MLP that were trained on
non-augmented data (in yellow), detected by the ensemble that used a trained HRSOM
(in light blue), and by an ensemble that used a scaled SOM (red).
Table 8.2: KDD99 zero day attack detection comparison
Zero day attack Trained HRSOM 192×144 Scaled HRSOM 960×720 Total sample
Ave density Detected Ave density Detected
apache2 39.70 70.40% 18.05 68.26% 794
back 4.39 95.08% 1.96 11.92% 386
httptunnel 8.06 85.52% 4.39 0.69% 145
mailbomb 9.33 0.97% 4.05 0% 308
mscan 10.18 88.66% 2.91 39.85% 1049
named 1.13 5.88% 1.06 0% 17
processtable 24.80 36.29% 12.61 16.80% 744
ps 1.20 27.78% 1.13 0% 18
saint 4.73 97.80% 2.09 96.43% 364
sendmail 1.67 46.67% 1.67 0% 15
snmpgetattack 5.59 3.91% 2.84 0% 179
snmpguess 44.88 1.11% 39.89 0.28% 359
sqlattack 1 100% 1 0% 2
udpstorm 1 50% 1 0% 2
worm 1 0% 1 0% 2
xlock 2.25 0% 1.80 11.11% 9
xsnoop 1.33 25% 1 0% 4
xterm 1.44 30.77% 1.30 0% 13
TOTAL 9.38 59.89% 4.08 33.67% 4410
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dense enough to be considered separate from the larger cluster of normal ones. In order
to investigate this further, the scaled HRSOM of size 960× 720 is used to augments the
KDD99 dataset, and the augmented data is used to train and evaluate the MLP classifier.
The result is shown in Figure 8.1.
It can be seen in Table 8.1 that the false positive rate (FPR) generally improves the
larger the SOM this however appears to be linked to a decrease in detection rate (DR).
While the scaled HRSOM reduced the FPR significantly to never before seen levels,
the scaled SOMs cannot match the DR, F1 score (F1), and accuracy (ACC) of trained
HRSOMs. The FPR of the scaled HRSOM, for example, by one order of magnitude on
the training data. Similar observations can be made for the validation data where the
accuracy performance is similar between trained and scaled SOM but the FPR is much
improved. This observation suggests an increase in false negative samples. The general-
isation performance tend to be affected negatively when using scaled SOMs as shown in
Section 8.2.3.
The classification result is inspected closer in Figure 8.22. The figure shows the map-
ping of training samples on a trained HRSOM (left) and on a scaled HRSOM (right).
Superimposed are coloured symbols that show the location of false positive (FP) and
false negative (FN) test samples on these maps. The mapping of the training samples is
spread quite sparsely on the scaled HRSOM. Moreover, it did not use the mapping space
fully. Out of 27,648 available neurons on the trained SOM, there are 76.29% neurons
mapped with at least one sample (activated neuron). In contrast, there are only 30.26% of
activated neurons on the scaled HRSOM. The scaling has an affirmative effect on nega-
tive samples where the false positive samples are reduced. However, the minority labels
are spread so thin that they are more likely mistaken as normal samples. Nonetheless,
Figure 8.22 illustrates opportunities to improving IDS. For example it is possible to use
the scaled HRSOM to rank the classification of samples. The mappings can be used to
rank classification based on the distance to areas where FN and FP are found on the map.
The final classification would have a confidence level instead of binary label assignment.
The KDD99 testing set contains samples that simulate zero day attack. These samples
do not occur in the training or validation sets. Figure 8.23 shows the mapping of training
samples on a scaled HRSOM of size 960×720. Superimposed with the mapping of zero
day attack test samples that were detected by the MLP that was trained on non-augmented
data (in yellow), the ensemble that used a trained HRSOM of size 192× 144 (in light
blue), and the ensemble that used a scaled HRSOM of size 960× 720 (in red). It can
be seen that the ensemble (using trained HRSOM) detects most of the zero-day samples
that were also detected by the MLP (trained on non-augmented data). In contrast, the
scaled HRSOM ensemble can only detect zero day attack samples mapped near clusters
of attack samples, such as the area on the right hand side of the mapping space. The
scaling of the HRSOM has introduced sparsity to the MLP that it becomes detrimental to
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Figure 8.24: Scaled and Trained HRSOM mapping of CTU-13 dataset training samples
with an overlay showing false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) test samples.
the generalisation performance.
The zero day attack detection seems to deteriorate when augmenting with scaled
HRSOM. The silhouette index on scaled HRSOM in Figure 8.15 indicated that the
samples are grouped very well based on their similarity. Nonetheless, the scaled HRSOM
can only detect about a third of the zero day attack samples. In order to investigate this
observation, the average density and detection rate calculated for each zero day attack
label that is how many samples are mapped per neuron on trained HRSOM of size
192×144 and its scaled counterpart of size 960×720 are evaluated.
Table 8.2 shows the KDD99 dataset zero day attack label with its average density and
detection rate on trained HRSOM of size 192× 144 and its scaled counterpart of size
960× 720. The scaled HRSOM mapped the attack sample sparsely, for example the
“apache2” zero day attack density mapping was halved from 39.70 to 18.05 samples per
neuron. The detection rate appears to decrease with the average density, for example
“apache2” zero day attack detection decreased by around 2%. The codebook vectors are
interpolated which increases the sparsity of the mapping, including the zero day attack.
This is evident by having only around 30% of the neurons activated on over 691,200 total
neurons. The mapping coordinates of the scaled HRSOM no longer contribute to the MLP
model because the mapping has spread too far.
Table 8.3 shows the trained and scaled SOM augmentation performance on CTU-13
dataset. The scaled SOMs of varying sizes failed to perform as well as the trained SOMs.
There is overall deterioration on different metrics in all three phases. The mapping results
in previous sections show how much CTU-13 dataset trained HRSOM mapping quality
is better than the scaled HRSOM. The scaled HRSOM may not be suited for classifying
CTU-13 dataset but it also illustrates how the classification result can be ranked. The
scaled HRSOM of size 960×720 has activated 13.09% of the available neurons, in con-
trast to the trained HRSOM of size 192× 144 which activated 58.37% of the available
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Table 8.3: Classification performance of the MLP for the CTU-13 dataset.
Training dataset
Data augmented Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
no augmentation 98.75 97.84 1.08 96.20 98.89 97.67 0.88 96.60
Trained 96×72 99.56 98.58 0.28 98.79 99.61 98.86 0.29 98.96
-scaled to 64×48 99.44 98.27 0.25 97.86 99.53 98.53 0.71 98.31
-scaled to 192×144 99.44 98.28 0.32 98.20 99.58 98.70 0.22 98.55
Trained 192×144 99.58 98.71 0.27 98.80 99.65 98.93 0.23 99.02
-scaled to 768×576 99.28 97.78 0.46 97.93 99.63 98.86 0.19 98.72
-scaled to 960×720 99.22 97.59 0.47 97.60 96.60 85.73 0.23 80.17
Validation dataset
Data augmented Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
no augmentation 99.67 96.29 0.24 94.18 99.60 92.37 0.19 92.91
Trained 96×72 99.91 98.79 0.08 99.08 99.93 99.01 0.06 99.37
-scaled to 64×48 99.91 98.46 0.08 99.66 99.92 98.52 0.27 99.02
-scaled to 192×144 99.89 97.98 0.09 98.73 99.93 98.73 0.05 99.15
Trained 192×144 99.90 98.18 0.10 99.68 99.90 98.31 0.09 99.65
-scaled to 768×576 99.85 97.41 0.14 99.47 99.92 98.58 0.07 99.51
-scaled to 960×720 99.82 96.93 0.14 98.62 99.33 83.73 0.09 79.24
Test dataset
Data augmented Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
no augmentation 98.89 98.73 0.92 98.96 98.14 97.09 0.65 98.25
Trained 96×72 99.49 99.34 0.19 99.39 99.27 99.27 0.67 99.26
-scaled to 64×48 99.28 99.32 0.24 98.85 99.19 99.24 0.77 98.68
-scaled to 192×144 99.36 99.40 0.19 98.97 99.35 99.39 0.17 98.94
Trained 192×144 99.03 99.09 0.27 98.42 98.69 98.77 1.25 98.62
-scaled to 768×576 98.78 98.86 0.43 98.11 98.45 98.55 1.22 98.17
-scaled to 960×720 98.83 98.90 0.51 98.25 96.62 96.63 0.23 93.89
neuron. The mapping information from the scaled HRSOM became a much more diffi-
cult learning problem as the augmentation provides less concise information for the MLP.
Figure 8.24 shows false positive and false negative test samples on trained and scaled
HRSOM mapping of CTU-13 dataset. The areas of false positive and false negative sam-
ples mapping shapes are not too different after scaling, but it grew in size. This could be
the side effect from scaling where it scales the misclassification sample as well. The sam-
ples overall are also mapped thinly across the mapping space such that the more dominant
clusters in density or size of the majority samples would overtake the minority samples.
The scaled HRSOM mapping of CTU-13 dataset can be used to rank the classification re-
sult from the MLP akin to the scaled HRSOM mapping of KDD99 dataset. The samples
mapped near misclassified training or validation samples would have lower confidence
level than those far away to the misclassified samples.
The KDD99 and CTU-13 datasets have skewed distributions such that the minority
sample detection suffers but the scaling illustrates how the classification results can be
ranked. The scaling spread the samples so thin that the minority class samples are easily
mistaken as the other class. The misclassified sample mapping on both scaled HRSOM of
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Table 8.4: Classification performance of the MLP for the UNSW-NB15 dataset.
Training dataset
Data augmented Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
no augmentation 94.49 96.03 12.49 97.74 95.10 96.44 9.88 97.44
Trained 96×72 95.15 96.48 9.88 97.52 95.64 96.82 8.52 97.59
-scaled to 64×48 95.10 96.44 10.02 97.51 95.69 96.85 8.48 97.65
-scaled to 192×144 95.28 96.56 9.45 97.50 95.77 96.92 8.22 97.65
Trained 192×144 95.28 96.56 9.44 97.50 95.66 96.83 8.52 97.62
-scaled to 768×576 95.22 96.52 9.44 97.41 95.70 96.87 8.43 97.64
-scaled to 960×720 95.34 96.61 9.08 97.42 95.61 96.80 8.56 97.57
Validation dataset
Data augmented Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
no augmentation 94.71 96.18 12.09 97.91 94.82 96.25 10.37 97.25
Trained 96×72 94.84 96.26 10.45 97.30 94.99 96.36 9.57 97.11
-scaled to 64×48 94.89 96.30 10.34 97.32 95.05 96.40 9.54 97.19
-scaled to 192×144 95.05 96.41 9.94 97.37 95.04 96.40 9.62 97.21
Trained 192×144 95.03 96.40 9.75 97.26 95.04 96.40 9.54 97.17
-scaled to 768×576 94.97 96.35 9.83 97.20 95.08 96.43 9.60 97.26
-scaled to 960×720 95.02 96.38 9.76 97.25 95.02 96.37 9.44 97.09
Test dataset
Data augmented Two Hidden Layer (%) Three Hidden Layer (%)
by ACC F1 FPR DR ACC F1 FPR DR
no augmentation 84.11 87.07 31.88 97.16 86.08 88.50 27.57 97.23
Trained 96×72 86.07 88.51 27.94 97.50 86.47 88.77 26.63 97.16
-scaled to 64×48 86.46 88.87 27.87 98.15 86.81 89.10 26.76 97.88
-scaled to 192×144 85.30 87.76 27.44 95.70 86.67 88.97 26.80 97.66
Trained 192×144 86.41 88.76 27.08 97.42 86.61 88.91 26.63 97.42
-scaled to 768×576 86.51 88.86 27.22 97.71 86.30 88.66 27.16 97.28
-scaled to 960×720 86.57 88.88 26.78 97.46 86.62 88.92 26.62 97.44
the two datasets are shown to create clusters on their own which means the classification
decision can be ranked by how far is the decision from the misclassified mappings. If it is
very far, the ranking is higher and vice versa when it is closer to the misclassified mapping
it would have lower rank. This confidence level allows for more nuance IDS rather than a
simple attack and non-attack classification.
The UNSW-NB15 dataset has slightly different learning challenges than the other two
datasets. The distribution between the attack and normal samples are a bit more even than
KDD99 and CTU-13 datasets but as seen in previous Sections. Its feature space is not
distinguishing enough, even on the largest scaled HRSOM 960× 720. The two classes
samples are still often mapped on the same location, albeit slightly more separated. The
added value from scaling on UNSW-NB15 dataset is the spread of the outlier points to
separate. They occupy most of the display space that is mapped with one of two samples
per neuron with conflicting labels. The scaled HRSOM separated these samples to some
extend that could improve the overall classification performance.
Table 8.4 shows the classification performance of trained and scaled HRSOM aug-
mented UNSW-NB15 dataset. The scaled HRSOM sizes are 192× 144 scaled from
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Figure 8.25: Scaled and Trained HRSOM mapping of UNSW-NB15 dataset training
samples with an overlay showing false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) test samples.
96×72, 768×576 and 960×720 from 192×144. They are compared to MLP only model
and augmentation with trained HRSOM 192× 144. The MLP model augmented with
scaled HRSOM of size 192× 144 from 96× 72 has training performance that matched
the model augmented with trained HRSOM of the same size. It could even match the
validation performance. However, the generalisation of scaled HRSOM is lagging behind
by 1% in accuracy for two hidden layer MLP and only slightly better than the trained
HRSOM augmentation for three hidden layer MLP.
The scaled HRSOM of size 768×576 and 960×720 from 192×144 augmentation for
two and three hidden layer MLP performances are also shown in Table 8.4. The train-
ing performances for both scaled HRSOM augments are similar to the trained HRSOM
of size 192× 144. However, the scale SOM augmentation improved the generalisation
performance up to 0.16% in accuracy and 1% in detection rate for two hideen layer
MLP. The scaled HRSOM of size 768× 576 and 960× 720 did not improve the origi-
nal HRSOM augmentation any further for three hidden layer MLP. The spread of samples
to the adjacent neuron has shown to improve the HRSOM and MLP based ensemble IDS
performance significantly, i.e., there is more than > 0.05% increase in generalisation per-
formance.
Figure 8.25 shows false positive and negative test samples on trained and scaled
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HRSOM mapping of UNSW-NB15 dataset. The misclassification areas are not signifi-
cantly different between trained HRSOM of size 192× 144 and scaled HRSOM of size
960×720. The most improvement areas on the mapping are where samples are sparsely
mapped and on the border mapping on the left hand size of the display space. The scaling
process distributes the sample mapping and increases the chances for the two classes
samples to separate. The training set distribution is not overwhelmingly skewed towards
one or the other such that the mapping separation provided more information to MLP to
make correct classification.
Obtaining HRSOM by scaling cannot fully replace trained HRSOM but it can improve
the IDS performance given well trained large enough SOM. We can train the biggest
SOM we can afford then scale it further to gain slightly better performance. We have
shown comparable performance is obtained between scaling HRSOM from trained SOM
of size 96× 72 to 192× 144 and trained HRSOM of size 192× 144. However, there is
detrimental effects when scaling HRSOM beyond 50−150% larger. The augmented data
by mappings of scaled HRSOM of size 768× 576 or 960× 720 performed worse than
their trained original HRSOM of size 192×144.
Chapter 9
Conclusions
Cyber security is a necessity in the ever progressing and interconnected world of informa-
tion technology. The timely detection of intrusions is the first step to respond to violations
of security policies and to prevent the exploitation of weaknesses in the trusted computing
base. Current available IDS implementations are far from being perfect and are riddled
with known shortcomings in reliability, accuracy and speed. They also yield high false
positive rate, are susceptible to noise, lack in generalization capability, or lack the ability
to detect zero day attacks. These shortcomings contribute to security breaches remaining
undiscovered for up to 18 months despite alerts being raised from an IDS.
Conventional IDS are generally built on either of two basic assumptions: (1) attack
samples can be detected from known signatures [8] and (2) deviation from normal be-
haviour indicates an attack attempt [9]. IDS built on assumption (1) may miss new attack
samples where the signature is yet to be discovered. IDS built on assumption (2) may yield
high false positive rate as there might be misidentified exceptional normal behaviour.
What complicates matters is that the approach taken with existing IDS is based on
methods that have been optimized for a given application scenario consisting of a specific
set of network services and network protocols. Hence, these methods require a redesign
when the application scenario changes, for example, when an organization implements
changes to its internet services or adopts new communication protocols. Furthermore, a
common property of conventional IDS is the lack of understanding of relationships be-
tween normal and attack behaviours. Information technology is a field in which network
services and network protocols change rapidly. This implies that a lack of insights into
patterns that constitute attacks, of attack patterns that are easily confused with normal pat-
terns (and vice versa), as well as the specialized nature of existing IDS this can create a
significant overhead when adapting an IDS for changes in network services or protocols.
This thesis studied a new approach to IDS based on HRSOMs for discovery of pattern
associations and for risk assessment and the supervised neural networks MLP and FRPN
for pattern classification. The two methods are combined into a robust and scalable en-
semble system that can be trained to perform IDS on a range of application scenarios
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without requiring architectural modifications and generally produces a quality of result
that is close to or better than the state-of-the-art. The proposed approach can thus serve
as a readily adaptable general framework to IDS. The approach is scalable to allow just-
in-time assessment of network traffic patterns.
This thesis applied the High Resolution Self-Organising Map (HRSOM) to a range of
IDS benchmark datasets. The HRSOM is trained to project raw data samples onto a two-
dimensional display space. This allows for a visual inspection of the data. The method
has demonstrated suitability for gaining novel insight into the relationships between nor-
mal and attack samples. The advantage of the HRSOM over traditional i.e. low resolution
SOMs is that the much larger mapping space can retain and thus reveal complex relation-
ships between normal and attack behaviours. The mapping quality has been shown to
improve with an increase in size of the mapping space across multiple performance met-
rics, which can be attributed to the higher degree of freedom to project the data such that
the map is able to reveal areas of high confusion between the normal and attack samples.
The improved mappings can be utilised to aid generalisation abilities.
The thesis proposed a computationally efficient method for creating HRSOMs via map
scaling. The scaled HRSOM was found to provide a visual cue on how the trained
HRSOM may look like given appropriate size to scale. Certain SOM size was found
to provide a visual cue on how the trained HRSOM may look like given appropriate size
to scale. The scaled HRSOM of size 192× 144 from trained SOM of size 96× 72 has
similar structures to the KDD99 dataset trained HRSOM of the same size. The scaled
HRSOM of size 192×144 from trained SOM of size 96×72 using CTU-13 dataset and
UNSW-NB15 dataset show similar observation. The HRSOM mapping performance of
the same size, however, is better when trained than scaled across multiple metrics. The
trained HRSOM also showed better mapping quality when scaled down when compared
to the trained SOM of the same size. A scaled down SOM of size 96× 72 from trained
HRSOM of size 192×144 has better mapping quality than trained SOM of size 96×72.
The scaled and trained SOM generalisation performances are evaluated to investigate
potential detrimental effect of scaling SOMs. The interpolation process when scaling up
can be thought of “predicting” the codebook values based on the existing ones. The scaled
up SOM may exhibit some improvement due to some diversification of mapping. On the
other hand, the codebook vector values are “smoothed” out, which compresses the infor-
mation from trained SOMs. The scaled down LRSOM version of HRSOM would perform
better than a trained SOM of the same LRSOM size. However, the SOM generalisation
ability deteriorates when scaled by certain magnitude. If the SOM is scaled down too
small, there is not enough display space to project the samples any more. If the SOM
is scaled too large, the codebook “prediction” becomes unreliable such that the mapping
would over fit not generalise very well.
The threshold where SOM quality started to deteriorate varies between datasets. The
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scaled SOM mapping of KDD99 and UNSW-NB15 datasets were observed to decline in
generalisation quality when scaled down around 50%. The KDD99 dataset mappings
show generalisation deterioration when scaled up beyond 150%, while UNSW-NB15
dataset mappings show no discerning difference when scaled up. The CTU-13 dataset
mappings exhibit lower threshold at around 25% before the generalisation quality de-
clined.
The data augmented with scaled HRSOM was used to train and evaluate MLPs to in-
vestigate the effectiveness of scaled SOMs. The enlarged HRSOM through scaling data
augmentation was found to lower false positive rate but increase the learning difficulty
for KDD99 and CTU-13 dataset. These datasets have sample distributions skew towards
the normal samples. The enlarged HRSOM spread the mapping so thin that the attack
samples are easily mistaken as normal samples. That being said, the enlarged HRSOM
augmentation managed to improve the generalisation detection rate and overall accuracy
on UNSW-NB15 dataset. This particular dataset has more even distribution of samples
and the scaling separated samples previously overlapped on the trained HRSOM. The
scaling up process practically “predicts” the values of additional codebook vectors on a
linear scale based on existing values. However, the datasets used do not have such distri-
bution of classes. This is demonstrated by augmentation of very large scaled SOM that
performed worse than its original trained HRSOM.
A key finding in this thesis is that map scaling can improve the visualization aspects
but can be detrimental to the generalization capabilities of the SOM. As a component in
the proposed network ensemble it is thus best to use a trained rather than scaled HRSOM.
While training a HROM can be time consuming this needs to be done just once for each
application scenario and, once trained, new samples can be projected very quickly in
log(N) time, where N is the size of the SOM (the total number of neurons).
Visual inspection of projections by the HRSOM confirmed two basic assumption in
IDS as well as revealing additional insights. Normal behaviour outliers are typically
mapped on top of or on the edges of attack clusters rather than being stand alone out-
liers. The most damaging intrusion such as remote access and user privilege escalation
are the most difficult to detect because not only have they the least number of samples but
also they assimilate strongly to normal clusters. The clusters quality among the mappings
are indicative of the level of learning difficulty for the supervised methods. KDD99 and
CTU-13 datasets show well separated normal and attack patterns given a large enough
HRSOM. UNSW-NB15 dataset mappings show normal and attack samples are heavily
overlapped on much of the display space. This is reflected by the supervised methods
which generally produced much better results for the KDD99 and CTU-13 datasets than
for the UNSW-NB15 dataset.
Supervised NNs have been an attractive component in IDS because they can generalise
well and are not reliant on a priori assumptions about the data. MLPs are a common
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NN implementation and have been shown to have complementary properties to SOMs.
This thesis studied MLPs that have been trained on samples that were augmented with
information of their mapping on a HRSOM. This thesis found that the procedure helps
MLPs on focusing its training efforts on samples that are easily confused as revealed by
the HRSOM. This reduces the likelihood of a false classification as these samples would
yield higher error rate during the back propagation phase of MLP training algorithm.
This thesis also considered a recently introduced FRPN as a possible and attractive
substitute to the MLP. It is found that the FRPN is very powerful by producing better
results than the MLP and with a smaller number of neurons. Since an FRPN removes the
requirement of defining hidden layers (which are central in the design of MLPs) and hence
this greatly simplifies architectural considerations. The FRPN can be implemented very
efficiently on parallel computing infrastructure and, once trained, can classify samples in
log(N) time, where N is the number of hidden neurons.
Note that the afore mentioned computational complexities of the HRSOM and FRPN
are independent to the number of samples. This is because each sample can be processed
independently from each other on parallel computing infrastructure. Samples from mul-
tiple network interfaces can thus be mapped and categorized in parallel. The process can
also be pipelined to allow the mapping and assessment of samples in quick succession.
The proposed approach has been evaluated across three datasets: KDD99, CTU-13,
and the UNSW-NB15 datasets. These datasets were chosen because they met the criteria
discussed in Chapter 5. They are publicly and readily available, include both normal and
attack samples. The sets are large and the samples are varied, and labelled. They repre-
sent different IDS learning scenarios as well as differ in complexity in terms of sample
distribution skewness and the source of the data. The proposed ensemble has produced
excellent results across all three datasets and has hence demonstrated the capability to be
a general framework IDS that can be implemented in a wide range of networked environ-
ments. This finding is reinforced through an application to a related application domain
viz. malware detection as is demonstrated in Appendix A.1.
The thesis demonstrated that the data augmentation process never hindered either MLP
or FRPN classification performance but instead provided opportunities for improvement
in results. The proposed ensemble system for IDS generalised well and included the abil-
ity to identify attack patterns that did not occur in the training set. This method is com-
petitive with the state-of-the-art performance reported in recent literature as discussed in
Section 7.3. The HRSOM and FRPN ensemble evaluated on KDD99 dataset, for exam-
ple, resulted in generalisation accuracy performance 94.85% compared to 94.62 reported
in [110]. The mixture of expert system consisting of decision tree and MLP generalises
slightly better only on UNSW-NB15 dataset such that the proposed HRSOM ensemble is
more suited as a general framework for IDS.
This thesis revealed that the ensemble performance improves with larger HRSOMs
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although the performance improvements slowed down as the size of a HRSOM increases.
Since the computational complexity increases with log(N) and since the improvement in
performance asymptotically approaches an optimum and hence there is a value N which
presents itself as an optimal cost-benefit point. This optimum can differ from scenario to
scenario. For example, the thesis has shown that the optimal size of the HRSOM is larger
for the UNSW-NB15 dataset than for the other two datasets. Nevertheless, the thesis has
also shown that there appears to be no N that is too large. From a practical perspective
this means that the HRSOM should be chosen as large as possible up to the computational
limits of given computing infrastructure. The systems performance can be regulated via
hardware such that, for example, if a further improvement in performance is required this
can be achieved with the addition of computing nodes.
This thesis has achieved its aims by:
• reviewing seminal works in IDS, revealing shortcomings as well as shed light on
some of the findings of previous works,
• devising a method that can lead to a better understanding of IDS environment,
specifically the relationship between normal and attack samples in a runtime en-
vironment,
• devising a scalable data driven network ensemble that can generalize well in a range
of intrusion detection scenarios and serve as a general framework IDS,
• introducing and studying a computational efficient alternative to obtain HRSOM
using modified image scaling methods.
Chapter 10
Future Work
The work presented in this thesis left a number of open problems that can be studied
further. Some of these open problems are discussed in this chapter as follows.
10.1 Data format and data structure
This thesis has shown how the ensemble handles samples that are presented as data vec-
tors. The samples in the datasets are assumed to be independent. In practice, however,
such independence assumption can be false as network activities can occur in context of
other network activities, in context of time, or in context of other i.e. external or inter-
nal factors. Such context can be represented by using data sequences (i.e. temporal se-
quences) or as data graphs (i.e. scenario graphs or attack graphs [194]). There exist Graph
Self-Organizing Maps (GSOM) [195, 196] and Graph Neural Networks (GNN) [197] that
can model such data structures and could thus be used to substitute the HRSOM and MLP
in the ensemble. It would be interesting to answer the following questions:
1. Can the encoding and modelling of dependencies of network traffic help improve
the detection accuracy of an IDS consisting of an GSOM and GNN ensemble?
2. If the modelling of dependencies improves results then by how much?
An answer to this question would provide an indication on the significance of sam-
ple dependencies in IDS and would help validate the independence assumption of
standard IDS.
3. Can GSOM reveal additional insights into relationships of attack and normals sam-
ples that are based on sample dependencies?
4. What type of dependency play a significant role in IDS? Are dependencies to other
samples or other factors more relevant than dependencies on time? Are dependen-
cies more important for the detection of attack than for normal samples?
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10.2 Detection of type of attack
The methods presented in this thesis categorized samples into either attack or normal.
From the mappings on the HRSOM it was observed that samples of similar types of attack
are often clustered. Samples belonging to similar attack types tend to cluster together with
the exception to being stealth attacks such as remote login attacks. The finding could be
the basis of an approach to identify each attack type.
10.3 Multi-dimensional HRSOM
The HRSOM in this thesis is limited to two dimensional mapping space. This has been
demonstrated beneficial for illustration and visualisation purposes. In the ensemble, when
augmenting data with their mappings, it is not necessary to limit the mapping space to
two dimensions. Since a HRSOM can be of arbitrary dimension and hence it would
be interesting to investigate three dimensional, four dimensional, or higher dimensional
HRSOMs and how the corresponding mappings when used for data augmentation would
affect the prediction accuracy of the classifier.
10.4 Network initialization via HRSOM scaling
HRSOMs are trained via an iterative training algorithm. The number of required training
iterations can increase with larger SOMs to allow mappings to move across the large
mapping space if necessary. The number of required training iterations can be reduced by
using a good network initialization. Due to the unsupervised nature of the SOM algorithm
it is not a-priori clear what constitutes a good initialization. There exist a number of ad-
hoc approaches that aim at improving the initial condition of a SOM. It should instead
be possible to use the proposed scaling method as a way to estimate the mapping of
training samples and to use this estimate to initialize the HRSOM as follows: Train a
small SOM on a given training set. Training a small map can be done relatively quickly.
Scale the trained SOM to create a HRSOM that meets the required target size. This
scaling initializes the codebook vectors of the HRSOM. Now train the HRSOM for some
iterations to fine tune the mappings on the HRSOM. It should be interesting to investigate
how effective such an initialization method would be.
10.5 Real-time Detection System
The thesis hypothesised that the proposed ensemble system can detect intrusions fast.
An open question is on specific hardware requirements that would raise detection alerts
fast enough before any damage can happen. The question is complicated by the fact that
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additional consideration are to be made when implementing the proposed IDS in a live
system:
• Timing is critical in IDS as it takes very little time from successful intrusion attempt
to damage caused [49, 198, 199, 200]. There are three requirements to be met in
order to accommodate real-time detection as highlighted in [198]: (1) fast detection
algorithm, that is the time to compute the input until a decision (normal or attack) is
reached. (2) The data is processed as soon as they are generated, and the algorithm
not require all the audit data at the same time. Lastly, (3) the IDS process multiple
data stream concurrently.
• The ensemble system proposed in this thesis was evaluated against data benchmarks
that did not contain any information about time taken until damage occurs. Thus,
this aspect was not investigated in this thesis. Nonetheless, the classification by
the ensemble is very fast once the models are trained. The GPU implementation
allows for the determination of the BMU in parallel. Similarly, the processing and
classification of samples by the MLP and FRPN can be done in parallel. The SOM
training algorithm does not necessarily require standardization or normalisation so
the data can be fed as is. This could facilitate finding the winning codebook on
trained HRSOM as soon as they arrive. Further optimizations are possible by, for
example, determining a winning codebook only among the set of codebooks that
have been activated at least once by a training sample.
• Pre-processing and feature extraction can be the most time consuming part [199].
Processing different levels of features is recommended in [199], for example, fea-
tures available at the network level only consists of the network packets informa-
tion but not about how long the connection lasts. While the proposed ensemble has
little requirements on pre-processing and feature extraction the concept of process-
ing sets of features at different levels could be incorporated in the ensemble. The
HRSOM can be trained at different levels of features and then acts as a probabilis-
tic detection method. If a HRSOM cannot determine the network packet with high
level of confidence it can be escalated to the next HRSOM with additional features.
The last decision gate is the NN component which would have all the features and
the last HRSOM level mapping. Therefore, the attack can be detected as soon as
relevant information is available.
• Live systems are often dynamic in nature. Normal and attack behaviour might
change overtime. This thesis proposed a SOM scaling method provides some mar-
gin to accommodate such changes. The ensemble could be made more robust to
such changes by adopting transfer learning. Transfer learning is a process to recog-
nise pattern based on recognition of another, for example a model to recognise
apples can be used to recognise similar fruit like a pear [201]. We have seen some
capability for transfer learning on HRSOM. The KDD99 dataset trained NN aug-
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mented with HRSOM can recognise attack types not occur in the training set. The
CTU-13 dataset trained HRSOM with one set of botnet types can recognise other
similar botnet types not included in the training samples.
• The model could be updated with the gradual change that may occur in the IDS en-
vironment. It is possible to extend the life of the ensemble by training the HRSOM
and MLP/FRPN continuously. Thus, the ensemble can assess samples while being
trained on new information in the background. The method could prioritize the as-
sessment of samples and use vacant computing resources for the training process in
the background. The advantage of such an approach would be that samples could be
assessed almost immediately (albeit at reduced accuracy initially) without having
to wait for a completion of a full training session, the system can incorporate and
model new samples as they occur and thus be useful in pervasive IDS, and utilize
available computing resources more effectively.
• A multi-stage classifier can be developed from the proposed ensemble to acceler-
ate detection and increase accuracy. The HRSOM has shown that some patterns are
well distinct. There are clusters of samples, for example, that only consist of normal
samples and which are well distinct from attack samples. Samples that are mapped
to such clusters (i.e. far away from areas where attack samples are mapped) can be
classified immediately by the HRSOM thus removing the requirement of augment-
ing the sample and passing it through the MLP or FRPN. Thus, the use of the MLP
or FRPN could be limited to cases where the mapping occurs in close proximity of
samples from different classes (i.e. where the HRSOM would be prone to confuse
the sample). This would reduce the average time needed to assess samples. the
concept can be extended further as follows: Since the MLP or FRPN would not
be consulted in cases where no confusion occurs and hence the classifier could be
trained solely on samples that are mapped to regions of confusion. This would re-
duce the amount of data used for training the classifiers as well as further specialize
the classifier on difficult cases.
• The abilities of the proposed method were demonstrated on three benchmark prob-
lems (plus one more in the Appendix). One may ask how transferable is such
knowledge to other un-tested real world problems. The experimentation in this
thesis has increased our awareness of the type of issues which need to be addressed
in a practical real world IDS application. It should thus be interesting to study the
proposed method in a real world scenario.
10.6 Response integration
Detecting intrusion is part of the bigger security mechanism [112, 118]. The next step
after detection is to respond to the attack attempt, which can be achieved in a number of
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ways [121]. The simplest one is to block the source of the attempt, for example the IP
address or the attacker. More advance methods deflect the attempt to a virtual environment
such that it would not affect the real system [120]. An advantage in deflecting it to a virtual
environment is to collect attack pattern to update the model. The attack pattern obtained
from the virtual environment is mapped onto HRSOM to prevent future similar attacks.
If the HRSOM is scaled, it should provide enough mapping space to allow additional
projections. The strategy is similar to auto-immunisation proposed in [202].
The response to a detection can be customised based on the HRSOM mapping. The
mapping space can be divided into different regions, such as well-formed attack clusters
or highly overlapped mapping. These region can be used the basis for responding to an
intrusion attempt. If the intrusion attempt lands on a user-based patterns, it can block
and alert the administrator about unusual behaviour. An unknown sample response can
be based on the HRSOM confidence level. The confidence level can be based on the
winning ratio of the neuron or its neighbourhood, for example if the unknown sample is
mapped with 50:50 ratio on a neuron or in a neighbourhood of neurons it can be escalated
to the virtual machine to be monitored or to be escalated to another classifier.
The HRSOM can also be used for more proactive measure, such as forecasting at-
tacks. The training phase can be based on a certain period of time, such that there is
an HRSOM mapping for certain time of day or week or year. The appropriate measure
can be taken on the basis of upcoming mappings. We envision a radar-like visualisation
where a time-lapse snapshots of the system behaviour can be used to inform administrator
to take appropriate countermeasures. Automated response can also be configured based
on the appropriate HRSOM at the time. Denial of Service (DoS) attack, for example,
might be seasonal where it would try to bring the system down at certain time to affect the
availability of the system to the most users. Countermeasures could be taken before the
attack occurs. Similarly, if the user tend to be travelling at certain time of year, it could
reduce false positive by foreseeing some anomaly in user behaviour.
Intrusion deterrence and prevention should ideally occur at design time. The HRSOM
visualisation capability can be used to inform about security measures. Information about
the location of a mapping can be used to provide feedback on how well the system is
secured. Additionally, it could be used to convince stakeholder to invest in security by
showing the attack and normal mapping before and after security measures are deployed.
Security is an ever evolving field as adversary find new ways to overcome security
mechanisms that were previously assumed secure. It is possible that the HRSOM map-
pings are exploited by an adversary to device an intrusion mechanism that would match or
map to normal labelled neurons. It would be interesting to study approaches that would
turn such attempts against the adversary, e.g., it might be useful to “game” the system
with the aim to pre-emptively catch the adversary before an attempt is made.
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Appendix A
Multi-labels learning problems
The proposed ensemble in this thesis has been utilised for binary classification to achieve
the primary objective of the discovery of network attacks. The secondary goal is to iden-
tify the type of attack. This appendix will demonstrate that the proposed method is suit-
able for multi-class applications as well as being a general framework solution to IDS
and related application. This will be demonstrated by using a large dataset from a related
domain viz. Microsoft’s malware detection dataset.
A.1 Microsoft Malware Dataset
Chapter 5 introduced Microsoft Malware Dataset (MS Malware). It was not used as IDS
benchmark as it only includes malware behaviour such that no normal relationship can be
observed. Furthermore, the truth label is not published for the test set. However, it is a
good evaluation dataset for multi-label learning problems.
The published dataset consists of 10,870 samples, where each sample is described in a
pair of files. The two files are the hexadecimal representation of the malware binary and
the corresponding assembly stack. A number of feature extractions are available. This
work used the features from a submission by “5dataheroes”, which is available from a.
The features is 363 dimensional consisting of the size of the asm file, file size in bytes,
section code size of the asm file, 2-gram of application delivery network (ADN) families
of instruction, 2-grams of ADN families of instructions, and the binary files’ bag-of-
words. The feature values tend to have standard deviation between 0 and 1. There are
only a third of the features have standard deviation bigger than 1. These are the n-gram
and bag-of-words features, which would be the most deterministic. The features are nor-
malised in the range [-1,1] to train the SOM and NN.
The dataset is evaluated by using the same experimental set-up as was used for the other
datasets in this thesis. However, the generalisation performance is evaluated using ten fold
ahttps://5dataheroes.wordpress.com/2015/06/02/data-science-project-ms-malware-classification/
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Figure A.1: The mappings of Microsoft malware dataset on a SOM of size 64× 48
showing separately the mapping of all nine malware types.
cross validation with ratio 10:1 as the truth label on the test set was not published at the
time of writing. The performance metrics used are accuracy (ACC), F1 score (F1), and
Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (ROC AUC). ACC is calculated
on the diagonal of the confusion matrix. The rest of the metrics are calculated in One-vs-
All (OvA) micro average. The ROC AUC is used instead of false positive and detection
rates due to the absence of normal samples. The false positive of one attack type to another
is not as critical as mistaken normal pattern to attack one.
A.2 Visualisation
The MS Malware consists of 9 different malware types. HRSOM enables better boundary
between these 9 malware types than the lower resolution. There is simply more mapping
space for dissimilar types of malware to separate. Moreover, it would show the macro-
relationship as much as the micro-relationship between malware types.
The Kohonen’s Self-Organising Map (SOM) is trained unsupervised so it is very ver-
satile in its application. Figure A.1 shows the mappings of the MS Malware samples on
a trained SOM of size 64× 48. It can be seen that each malware type is organized in
clusters although there is some overlap between clusters of different malware type. The
small mapping space may not provide much information to an NN classifier as multiple
samples from different malware types are often mapped to the same neuron. Almost 10%
of activated neurons mapped more than one malware type. The malware identification



















Figure A.2: The mappings of Microsoft malware dataset on a SOM of size 208× 156
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Figure A.3: MS Malware trained 208×156 zoomed into the areas where samples were
previously mapped on single neuron when trained lower resolution SOM, which are
(49,36) on the left and (63,47) on the right
is thus ambiguous in certain areas. The upper right corner, for example, maps predomi-
nantly samples of type Gatak and Vundo. Some neuron can compute the majority class
only by a handful of samples. Neuron (49,36), for example, is mapped with 4 Gatak and 6
Vundo samples. Similarly, neuron (63,47) is mapped with 7 Gatak and 11 Vundo samples
with one of each Tracur and Ramnit samples. This would make classification of samples
mapped to these locations ambiguous. If the SOM is used for classification using majority
rule, these neurons would only have around 55% confidence on their classification.
The same dataset is used to train a HRSOM of size 208×156. The corresponding map-
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pings are shown in Figure A.2. The increased mapping space allowed clusters of samples
to be mapped in distinct regions. The mapping reveals that despite having been trained un-
supervised, samples are found to be organized in clusters which are largely distinct from
each other. Each malware type has mostly been projected into well-formed structures with
some outliers scattered across the mapping space. “Ramnit” samples occupied the bot-
tom right corner of the mapping. “Lollipop” samples formed multiple clusters that can be
found in different areas of the mapping space. “KelihosVer3” samples are mostly mapped
on the left hand border and a smaller cluster is formed toward the center of the mapping.
“Vundo” samples can be found on the top left border with some “Gatak” and “Lollipop”
samples. “Simda” malware has the least number of samples. This may explain why the
mapping of corresponding samples are often found scattered in and around other mal-
ware clusters rather than forming an own cluster. Most “Tracur” samples formed a cluster
on the centre right, while others can be found on the top and center left of the mapping
space. “KelihosVer1” formed a cluster on the left hand side next to “KelihosVer3”, as
they are different version of the same malware. “Obfuscator” cluster can be found next
to “KelihosVer3” and some of their samples are mapped on the right side of the mapping.
“Gatak” malware formed round-shaped cluster on the center, bottom, and right side of the
mapping space as well as on the top as previously mentioned.
99.42% of activated neurons on this HRSOM exceed a confidence level of 55% thus
featuring much less neurons with ambiguous majority when compared to the smaller
SOM. The neurons previously mapped with multiple malware has diversified and are
mapped on separate neurons as is shown in Figure A.3. The Figure shows the mappings
of samples on the HRSOM that were previously mapped to a single neuron (49,36) by
the SOM of size 64×48. It can be seen that the HRSOM diversified the mapping of these
samples while maintaining the topology as they are mapped in close proximity. Samples
of four different malware types were mapped to (63,47) by the SOM of size 64× 48.
Figure A.3 (right) shows that the HRSOM diversified the mappings such that the different
malware types now form different and well distinct clusters.
The HRSOM reveals similarities between malware types. The ASCII dump from the
binary files can include instructions executed by the malware. The malware types tend
to share similar instructions, which can be observed from the mapping in Figure A.2.
Kelihos malware of both version can be found next to each other on the left hand side of
the map. Vundo and Tracur are trojan malwares. They are related and the corresponding
mappings can hence be found in close proximity to each other. For example there is
a cluster of Vundo samples on top of a cluster of Tracur samples on the right side of
the map. Less obvious relationships can also be observed. For example, Obfuscator is
mapped in-between of KelihosVer3 and KelihosVer1. This implies that Obfuscator is
more related to each of the Kelihos versions that the two Kelihos versions to each other.
Moreover, Gatak formed several clusters (to about 6 major clusters as can be seen in the






















































Figure A.4: The mapping quality of SOMs when trained on the MS MALWARE dataset.
figure) that are located in well distinct regions. This implies that there are well distinct
sub-types of Gatak malwares each of which sharing similarities with a different set of
other malware types.
The improvement in mapping quality when using the HRSOM is as apparent in this
multi-label dataset as was observed for the binary problem we have seen throughout the
rest of the thesis. The training procedure is no different to the ones used in Chapter 4.
The mapping quality of the SOM is investigated further with the help of quality metrics
as follows.
A.2.1 Mapping quality
SOMS of increasing size were trained on the MS Malware dataset. Due to the higher
dimension and multi-label nature of the dataset, we also trained SOM sizes bigger than
192×144. The evaluation metrics were described in Section 4.4.1.
Figure A.4 shows the mapping quality under different metrics for a given SOM reso-
lution. Each metric is observed to continually improve with the size of the SOM, where
the grouping index and Gini impurity improve the most. The grouping index improved by
32.95% from 58.55% by a SOM of size 32×24 to 0.915% by a SOM of size 192×144.
Similarly, Gini impurity improved very significantly from over 4.8% to just 0.84%. The
figure implies that further improvements may be possible by increasing the size of the
SOM even further. this, however, was not attempted here due to time limitations and due
to the fact that the performance curves already start to level out.
The observations made here follow the the same trend as was observed for the other
datasets evaluated in Section 6.2.2. This demonstrates the robustness of the HRSOM. It
has yield consistently good mapping quality across multiple datasets with varying sizes,
number of labels, and even distribution skewness. The improved quality of mappings
by a HRSOM should be able to assist a classifier as was demonstrated on other datasets
presented in this thesis. The following Section evaluates the affect of data augmentation
on the learning and generalization performance of MLPs and the FRPN.
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Table A.1: Classification performance of the MLP when trained on augmented data.
Training data
Augmented by Two Hidden Layers (%) Three Hidden Layers (%)
ACC F1 ROC AUC ACC F1 ROC AUC
no augmentation 99.13 98.31 98.90 99.71% 99.25% 99.46%
HRSOM 128×96 99.17 98.44 98.97 99.73% 99.30% 99.48%
HRSOM 192×144 99.15 98.28 98.84 99.72% 99.29% 99.48%
HRSOM 208×156 99.18 98.48 99.01 99.77% 99.31% 99.48%
HRSOM 224×168 99.20 98.55 99.03 99.76% 99.36% 99.53%
Cross validation data
Augmented by Two Hidden Layers (%) Three Hidden Layers (%)
ACC F1 ROC AUC ACC F1 ROC AUC
no augmentation 98.49 96.46 97.78 98.97% 98.29% 98.92%
HRSOM 128×96 98.57 95.95 97.71 99.06% 98.17% 99.08%
HRSOM 192×144 98.51 97.09 98.26 98.97% 97.76% 98.65%
HRSOM 208×156 98.65 97.14 98.48 98.90% 97.76% 98.66%
HRSOM 224×168 98.71 97.21 98.25 98.97% 98.17% 98.96%
A.3 HRSOM and NN ensemble
This Section investigates the effect of using the mappings of samples from the
MS Malware dataset to augment the data before training MLP or FRPN classifiers.
Four different size of SOMs are considered: 128× 96, 192× 144, 208× 156, and
224×168. Maps smaller than the high resolution threshold are included to have a better
picture on the affect of the neural map resolutions. Ten fold cross validation with ratio
10:1 is used to evaluate the generalisation performance of each model as the truth label
on the test set was not available.
The mapping of a SOM is concatenated to the data samples which are then divided into
the ten cross validation subsets. MLPs with two and three hidden layers are trained to
evaluate the effects of the augmentation. The two hidden layers consist of 726 neurons
(twice the dimension of the dataset) in the first hidden layer and 182 neurons in the second
hidden layer respectively. The MLP with three hidden layer added a third layer consisting
of 64 neurons. We also evaluate the effect of augmentation on the FRPN.
The cross validation training stopped at fixed number of iteration. We also set the
performance variance threshold to 0.05% (the difference between two models’ learning
performances). If two models perform within the set threshold then they are considered
to perform at the same level where neither is better nor worse than the other.
Table A.1 shows the training and generalisation performance of MLPs when using ten
fold cross validation with of without augmentation. It is observed that augmentation
generally improves the training performance. The training accuracy of the model when
trained on data augmented by either of SOM of size 128× 96 or 192× 144 is similar
(within approximately 0.2%) even though the micro purity improvement observed in Fig-
ure A.4 was found to be more significant at approximately 0.8%. A more significant
improvement is observed when augmenting the data with the mappings of the HRSOM
















































Figure A.5: Accuracy of FRPNs of various sizes on the training data (left) and cross
validation data(right).
of size 208× 156 or of size 224× 168. This produces an improvement by ≥ 0.05% for
both two and three hidden layer MLPs.
It can also be observed in Table A.1 that the generalisation performance of MLPs with
two hidden improves with data augmentation and that the improvement in generalization
increases with the size of the HRSOM. In contrast no such improvement is observed for
three layer MLPs. The generalisation accuracy of MLPs with two hidden layers increases
by 0.08% with augmentation when using the SOM of size 128×96 and the generalization
continues to improve by ≥ 0.05% with each increase in size of the SOM. By using the
largest SOM to augment the data the generalization accuracy improved by 0.22% when
compared to non augmented data. This is a significant improvement given the closeness
to a perfect (i.e 100%) result. In contrast the generalization performance of the three
hidden layer MLP remains approximately the same as when using non-augmented data.
The result may be an artefact from the early stopping condition, or may be due to the fact
that the pattern classes are relatively easy to distinguish as was revealed by the HRSOM.
In general the generalization performance of the three hidden layer MLP is better than
the generalization performance of the two hidden layer MLP. It is observed that data
augmentation never caused harm to the generalization performance.
FRPNs of various size are trained on augmented data. The results are summarized in
Figure A.5, Figure A.6, and Figure A.7. We trained FRPN by incrementally increasing
the number of hidden neuron from 1 to 25 in order to investigate the effects of the size of
the FRPN on generalization abilities of the FRPN.
Shown is the Accuracy in Figure A.5, F1 in Figure A.6, and AUC in Figure A.7 for
FRPNs of size 1 through to 25 that have been trained on data that have been augmented
by either a SOM of size 128× 96, 192× 144, 208× 156, 244× 168, or 224× 168. The
results are compared to FRPNs that have been trained on data that were not augmented.
Each of the experiments is repeated 10 times and the best, worst, and average result is
indicated by the box and whisker plots in each of the three figures. The most significant




























































































Figure A.7: ROC AUC of FRPNs of various sizes on the training data (left) and cross
validation data(right).
findings from these experiments are:
1. The performance of FRPN increases quickly with the number of neurons in the
FRPN. The performance exeeds that of the MLP when the number of neurons
reaches or exceeds 10. Thus, the FRPN produces results that are better than the
results of the MLP while at the same time there are far less neurons (and far less
network parameters) in the FRPN. It is such much faster and easier to train well
performing FRPNs than well performing MLPs.
2. Data augmentation did not show an improvement in results when the size of the
FRPN was less than 10 neurons. Once the FRPN is of reasonable size (10 or more
neurons) then data augmentation assisted in improving both, the training perfor-
mance as well as the generalization result. The larger the SOM the greater the
improvement in result.
3. An improvement in results is obtained by either augmenting data with very large
SOMs or by training larger FRPNs. Training an FRPN of size 20 on data that were
augmented by a SOM of size 224× 168 matched the performance of an FRPN of
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size that has been trained on non-augmented data. However, training the FRPN of
size 20 is much faster since the number of adjustable parameters increase quadrat-
ically with the number of neurons. Data augmentation is thus an computational
efficient alternative to improving the performance of the FRPN.
4. The improvements in results mirror those observed on the other datasets in this
thesis.
The ensemble approach in this thesis has shown to consistently perform well across
multiple datasets. The quality of results has been excellent throughout. No significant
changes to the architecture of the ensemble was necessary to obtain good results. The
training and application procedures remained unchanged. Thus, the proposed approach
has demonstrated to qualify as a robust general framework to IDS and related applications.
Appendix B
Parameters and scripts
This appendix includes excerpts from the scripts and training parameters to obtain the
results seen in this thesis. SOM training used software somsd [17]. The somsd software
and scripts below are run on a Fedora 25 linux distribution. Full list of technical informa-
tion can be found on page xvi. The software used for training HRSOMs is an in-house
development [196]. The software is command line driven. The SOMs in this thesis have
been trained by using the command line as follows:
./somsd -gpu -iter ${i} -alpha 0.6 -xdim ${x} -ydim ${y} -radius ${r}
-seed ${s} -maptype som -log ${x}_${s}_${trn}.log
-cout ${x}_${s}_${trn}.net -res ${x}_${s}_${trn}.res
-din ${trn} -vin ${val} -tin ${tst}
, where seed ${s} initialize the neuron codebooks such that prime numbers is recom-
mended. To reproduce results presented in this thesis the following seed values where
used: 23 31 37 41 47 53 61 97. File ${x} ${s} ${trn}. log records quantization error at each
iteration. The trained codebook vectors are saved in file ${x} ${s} ${trn}. net while the
corresponding training samples mapping is saved in file ${x} ${s} ${trn}. res with format
0idxylabel. If validation ${val} and testing ${ tst } file are supplied, the corresponding map-
ping would be saved under the file name after the −res flag with appropriate suffix which
are ${x} ${s} ${trn}. res val and ${x} ${s} ${trn}. res test respectively. The number of iter-
ation ${i} is increased by approximately 1.5×500 at every increment of ${x} and ${y}
dimensions. If the quantization rate was found to still be high after training due to the
different number of features and samples on the different datasets, the training iteration is
increased. Table B.1 shows the SOM dimensions and the number of training iteration for
each dataset featured in this thesis.
The MLP and FRPN have been trained by using software that was developed by us [18].
the software is command line driven. The MLPs were trained by using the command line
as follows:
./mlp -batch -rprop -alpha ${a} -hidden ${h} -seed ${seed}
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Table B.1: SOM Training Parameters
x-dimension y-dimension Radius Iteration ${i}
${x} ${y} ${r} Feat41 CTU-13 UNSW MS Malware
32 24 30 500 500 500 800
64 48 60 750 750 750 1200
96 72 90 1125 1125 1125 1800
128 96 120 1500 3700 2000 2700
192 144 180 2250 5000 2855 3000
208 156 195 NA NA NA 6500
224 168 210 NA NA NA 7000
f o r h in 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 25
do
. / mlp −f r p n −a l p h a 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 : 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 −h i dd en ${h}
−s eed ${ s eed } − i t e r ${ i }
− t r a i n ${ f } −v a l i d ${ v a l } − t e s t ${ t s t }
−l o g a : ${ l o g f i l e } −o u t ${ n e t f i l e }
i f [ ” ${h}” −g t ” 5 ” ]
then
i =$ ( ( i +( i / 3 ∗ 2 ) ) )
e l s e
i =$ ( ( i +( i / 4 ) ) )
f i
done
Figure B.1: Running the software mlp to train FRPN
-iter ${i} -train ${f} -valid ${val} -test ${tst}
-log a:${logfile} -out ${netfile}
whereas the FRPN were trained by adding the command line option ”-frpn”. The MLP
training used resilient back-propagation (−rprop flag) such that the network weight up-
dates are adaptive to the the local gradient information [203]. The learning rate de-
noted by −alpha is set to very small value to start with along with the decay rate, such as
0.00001:0.000001. The two hidden layer MLP architecture for the three benchmark datasets
(KDD99, CTU-13 and UNSW-NB15) are 100 and 20 neurons for first and second hidden
layer respectively, while 10 neurons made up the third hidden layer in three hidden layer
architecture. The flag −hidden denote the MLP architecture to be trained where each hid-
den layer is separated by a colon (:), e.g., variable ${h} would be replace with 100:20 for
the two hidden layer architecture mentioned. The MS Malware trained MLP has 726:182
and 726:182:64 for two and three hidden layer MLP respectively. The number of itera-
tions varies according to the early stopping condition, such that the variable ${i} would
be the maximum iteration number to train the MLP. The confusion matrix and accuracy
are calculated at each iteration and recorded in file ${ logfile } where the a: prefix denotes
concatenation if such file exists. The trained MLP network is saved as a binary file to
${ netfile }.
Figure B.1 shows how to run the mlp software [18] to train FRPN of different hidden
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neurons. The implementation of MLP and FRPN are on the same software so that we
only need to add −frpn flag. The −rprop flag is not implemented for FRPN such that we
trained the FRPN for ${i} iterations. The increasing number of FRPN hidden neurons
requires more iteration to train such that there is additional script to add more iteration to
the previous FRPN parameters.
Appendix C
HRSOM Benchmark Results
This appendix analyses the HRSOM capabilities with the existence of two benchmark
datasets. Each of the two datasets will be used to train a two dimensional SOM of incre-
mental size: 32× 24, 64× 48, and 224× 168. Note that this follows the golden rule of
a rectangular shaped mapping space [171]. The training parameter σ(0) is set to 0.75d
where d is the diagonal of the map, and the learning rate α(0) = 0.6. σ and α were
chosen so that distant neurons are updated effectively so as to reduce the likelihood of en-
tangled maps [171]. The number of training iterations is adjusted according to the number
of neurons in the SOM and the size of training sets. The larger the SOM, the more itera-
tions will be used to allow for appropriate adjustments of the increasingly distant neurons.
The neighbourhood relationship is hexagonal and the Gaussian neighbourhood function
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Figure C.1: Halfmoon dataset that shows overlapping half-circle
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C.1 The halfmoon separation learning problem
The halfmoon problem consists of a synthetic dataset that is composed of two interleav-
ing semi circles in a two dimensional space. The data is generated using make moons
function in SKlearn python library [20]. There are 10,000 data points,where each class,
represented by different colours shown in Figure C.1, consists of 5,000 data points. Fig-
ure C.1 shows the plotted halfmoon dataset. The two patterns are well-separated by a
large distances. It is not a particularly difficult learning problem, where we may get 100%
accuracy. The dataset is traditionally used to demonstrate a model’s ability to separate
non-linearly separated classes. In this thesis, the dataset is used to investigate how well
HRSOM can preserve the topology within the dataset in the display space, which in this
case, also a 2 dimensional space. This is an interesting intellectual exercise, as one would
normally not use HRSOM to map a dataset in 2 dimensions to a display space of 2 di-
mensions, as there will not be any dimensionality reduction advantage.
C.1.1 HRSOM Visualization
Figure C.2 shows the mapping of the halfmoon dataset on a trained SOM of size 32×24
and 64×48, where the mapping is shown on the left and the corresponding density map-



















































































Figure C.2: Halfmoon data trained SOM of size 32× 24 and 64× 48, SOM mapping
(left), and the corresponding density map (right).










































Figure C.3: Halfmoon data trained SOM of size 224× 168, SOM mapping (top), and
the corresponding density map (bottom).
is distinct separation between the two half circles. The SOM maximises the utilization of
the grid by spreading the mapping, which visually shows more clearly where the bound-
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ary points are. The topology of the halfmoon data is still preserved even when the SOM
size increases. The density mapping shows fairly even distribution of the sample mapping
per neuron, where there are about 20-25 samples mapped to each neuron, dependent on
the SOM grid size. For example, we have 10,000 data points, and if we have a SOM grid
size of 32x24, then on an average the number of samples mapped to each neuron would
be about 13, if they are evenly distributed in the display space. If the grid size is 64x48,
then on an average the number of samples mapped to each neuron in the display space
will be about 3. But obviously, there are neurons which would not have any data samples
mapped to at all. So, in general, this would be dependent on the grid size, and the ways
in which the data is mapped onto the display space, which would be problem dependent.
The halfmoons dataset trained SOM of size 64× 48 shows a different orientation in
Figure C.2. This is known to happen with SOM, especially when trained with different
initial conditions [171]. Other SOM mappings shown in this Appendix would be likely
to show rotated image from one SOM mapping to another. The SOM size is twice the
size of the previous SOM. The SOM of size 32×24 shows no gaps between the mapping
space except for the boundary points. The SOM of size 64× 48 shows there are gaps in
the data, such as on the left and right hand corners. These gaps were not visible on SOM
of size 32×24. The corresponding density map for SOM of size 64×48 shows that there
are more samples mapped in the center of the two structures. This indicates some density
preservation.
We trained HRSOM of size 224× 168 with the halfmoon dataset that has the number
of neuron three times as large as the sample size. The observations in Figure C.2 can be
used to speculate how the HRSOM mapping would show. The HRSOM is expected to
maintain the two half circles separated, but each of the half circle may show some empty
spaces. The two half circle data will be spread out as seen in the lower resolution SOM.
Furthermore, there are more neurons to sample size such that we can expect one-to-one
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Figure C.4: Halfmoon data trained SOM of size 224× 168, where the border of each
circle is highlighted in red on the original dataset (left) and on the SOM of size 224×168
(right).
APPENDIX C. HRSOM BENCHMARK RESULTS 210
the point cloud of the two classes.
Figure C.3 shows the halfmoons dataset trained HRSOM mapping of size 224× 168,
where the mapping is shown on the top figure and the corresponding density mapping
on the bottom figure. The halfmoons are rotated by about 90◦. Similar to the lower
resolution SOM, the points are spread across the mapping space while maintaining the gap
between the two halfmoons. The HRSOM maintains the original data topology. There are
separations of dissimilar samples as indicated by the gaps within each halfmoon mapping.
The corresponding density map in the bottom of Figure C.3 shows the mapping is
almost one-to-one. There are some neurons that are mapped with two or more samples,
mainly around the center of the halfmoons. This observation is similar to the density
mappings in Figure C.2. The HRSOM also achieves density preservations. Nonetheless,
the mapping shows each the data points is unique as shown by the empty nodes within
each halfmoons. This observation is not visible in Figure C.2 with the lower resolution
SOM.
Figure C.4 shows the highlighted borders of the two half circles on the original dataset
on the left and on the HRSOM of size 224× 168 on the right. The borders of the half
circle ends on the original input space is mapped to the long oval borders on the top and
on the bottom of the SOM mapping. Overall, this dataset demonstrates how the HRSOM
not only preserves the topology of the data but also offer insights that are not visible in
lower resolution SOMs, or can explain the data properties that were not identified by a
low resolution SOM.
C.2 The UCI glass identification learning problem
The UCI glass identification learning problem consists of data collected from forensic
crime investigations and comprises of 214 instances [204]. There are six types of glasses
in the dataset as shown in Table C.1. There are 9 features, which consist of the refractive
index (RI) of the glass, and 8 chemical compositions of the glass measured in weight per-
cent in corresponding oxide. This multi-class dataset is chosen to show how the HRSOM
cab shed light onto the nature of the learning problem. Table C.2 shows the summary of
the features of the dataset.
C.2.1 HRSOM Visualization
Figure C.5 shows the UCI glass identification dataset trained SOM of size 32× 24 and
64× 48, where the mapping is shown on the left and the corresponding density map
on the right. There is no immediate grouping of the classes visible except for “build-
ing windows non float processed” on the bottom left corner of the map. The SOM of
size 32×24 has more neurons than the sample size so there should be enough neurons for
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Table C.1: UCI Glass Identification Dataset Classes [204]
Class No. Class Name
1 building windows float processed
2 building windows non float processed




Table C.2: UCI Glass Identification Dataset Feature Summary [204]
No. Feature Name Data Type MIN MEAN MAX STDEV
1. RI Real 1.511150 1.51837 1.533930 0.00303686
2. Sodium (Na) Real 10.73 13.4078 17.379999 0.816604
3. Magnesium (Mg) Real 0 2.68453 4.49 1.44241
4. Aluminum (Al) Real 0.29 1.44491 3.5 0.49927
5. Silicon (Si) Real 69.809998 72.6509 75.410004 0.774546
6. Potassium (K) Real 0 0.497056 6.21 0.652192
7. Calcium (Ca) Real 5.43 8.95696 16.190001 1.42315
8. Barium (Ba) Real 0 0.175047 3.15 0.497219
9. Iron (Fe) Real 0 0.0570093 0.51 0.0974387
one-to-one mapping. However, there are samples with different labels mapped to the same
location such as (3,0), (8,4) and (10,4). These samples have similar refractive index and
compositions. The samples mapped on (3,0) have refractive index of 1.516 and similar or
equal weight of Sodium, Magnesium, Potassium, and Barium. The samples mapped on
(8,4) have similar or equal weight of Sodium, Silicon, Potassium, Calcium, and Barium.
There are two samples mapped on (10,4) that have refractive index of 1.517 and 1.518
with similar or equal weight of each chemical elements. The corresponding density map
for SOM of size 32×24 shows the neurons are mapped with multiple samples.
The SOM of size 64× 48 in Figure C.5 shows similar mapping to SOM of size
32× 24 even though the locations are slightly different, where the grouping of “build-
ing windows non float processed” is mapped on the top right corner. There is only one
location mapped with different sample label on (49,0) compared to eight in the smaller
SOM. This shows there is no harm in training larger SOMs even on smaller datasets. The
corresponding density map shows mostly one or two samples per neuron. The neurons
mapped with multiple samples have the same class label, except for (49,0).
The SOMs revealed that the dataset covers a large feature space and that it consists
of some samples that are very close in the feature space. Since the SOM is topology
preserving and hence the algorithm preserves the large distances between many of the
samples. This leave insufficient space to differentiate between the few samples that are
very close to each other and hence these are mapped to the same neuron. Since such



















































































Figure C.5: UCI Glass Identification data trained SOM of size 32× 24 and 64× 48,
SOM mapping (left), and the corresponding density map (right).
samples can belong to different classes and hence this implies that it can be difficult for a
classifier to separate the classes.
We then trained a HRSOM of size 224× 168. By training a SOM with large grid
sizes, i.e., high resolution, the organisation of the data is not expected to change but the
density should be more one-to-one. The smaller SOMs have indicated that this dataset is
a difficult classification problem. There is no immediate grouping of the data. However,
the HRSOM may show novel insight compared to the previous lower resolution SOM.
Figure C.6 shows the UCI Glass Identification dataset trained HRSOM mapping of size
224× 168, where the mapping is shown on the top figure and the corresponding density
mapping on the bottom figure. The map is similar to the SOM map of size 32×24 where
the “building windows non float processed” is mapped on the left bottom corner of the
map. There are samples mapped next to each other either horizontally or vertically, which
indicate that the neurons mapped with two or more samples have managed to be separated
while maintaining their topology, i.e., mapped close to each other without being mapped
on the same neuron. There is still no immediate grouping between the data points. The
corresponding density map shows that there is one sample for every neuron.










































Figure C.6: UCI Glass Identification data trained HRSOM of size 224× 168, SOM
mapping (top), and the corresponding density map (bottom).
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Figure C.7: Zoomed HRSOM of size 224× 168 where the black circles shows the
samples previously mapped on the same location in lower resolution SOM of size 32×24
Figure C.7 shows the zoomed map of the UCI Glass Identification dataset trained
HRSOM of size 224×168. The black circles highlights the samples previously mapped
on the same location on the SOM of size 32×24. The highlighted samples on the top left
corner of the map were mapped on (3,0). The highlighted samples in the middle of the
map were mapped onto (8,4) and (10,4). They are still mapped relatively close to each
other, considering how large is the mapping space compared to the number of samples.
The HRSOM shows more visible details compared to the lower resolution counterparts.
It shows how the samples of the same labels are organised, for example the “headlamp”
samples on the right border are separated where they were mapped on the same location
on the lower resolution SOM. It also has enough mapping to show the samples from
different labels on separate locations. Overall, even though the samples are difficult to
classify, the HRSOM shows better separations between samples of different labels and
shows how the samples of the same labels are organised.
C.3 Summary
In this appendix, we consider two datasets, namely, the halfmoon dataset, and the UCI
Glass Identification dataset. The halfmoon dataset provides some insight into the oper-
ations of the HRSOM in terms of its topology preserving properties. Normally, there is
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no gain in mapping a two dimensional dataset onto a two dimensional display space, as
there is no benefits in doing so. However, by carrying out this example, through the use of
a LRSOM, and then a HRSOM, it highlights the topology preserving capabilities of the
SOM, in that features or data points which are close to one another in the data space or
feature space, will be mapped to points in the display space with their tolopological rela-
tionships preserved. This intellectual exercise provides deeper insights into the operation
of the SOM, which otherwise would not be available.
The UCI Glass Identification dataset is well-known to be a difficult dataset to classify
(cite some references). By using the LRSOM and then a HRSOM to visualize the mapped
feature space in the display space, it shows immediately why this is so. The various
classes are ampped onto one another in the display space because of their similarity in the
feature space. But then by using a HRSOM, it shows that even the overlapping classes
which were mapped onto the same point (neuron) in the display space of a LRSOM,
are being separated because of the HRSOM. This clearly highlights the advantage of the
HRSOM, to the contrary of most traditional thinking in the literature: a LRSOM would
be sufficient, and that a HRSOM would not add much to the visualization. It is this
traditional thinking which leads researchers to generally use a LRSOM. But as shown in
this Appendix, a HRSOM is capable of providing separations of the features whcih were
mapped onto the LRSOM. This is one of the reasons why HRSOM is useful, as clearly
shown in this Appendix, and in the thesis as a whole.
